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George Schöpßin
Power, Ethnicity and Communism 
in Yugoslavia
The rise and fall of Yugoslavia between 1918 and 1991 clearly illustrates the proposition that states require a cohesive set of ideas and identities 
acceptable to the bulk of the population by which to legitimate themselves. In 
most cases in Europe, states are based on a single dominant ethnic group which 
frames the underlying set of ideas that provide the purposiveness that institutions 
need for their survival. Yugoslavia is significant because no one single ethnic 
group was in a position to act as the basis for the state and as a result, two 
alternative concepts were attempted. They both failed.
Nor were there any convincing attempts at constructing a state based on 
ethnic consensus, admittedly a difficult undertaking. The main contending 
national groups never sought genuinely to understand the other’s perspectives, 
interests or aspirations. The consequences were predictable—under the impact 
of the failure of legitimation, the state collapsed, despite the growth of some 
vested interests in its perpetuation. In the event, these proved too weak to 
withstand the ethno-national movements that sought and found expression in 
the programme of separate statehood.
The first of the two attempts at constituting a state, inter-war Yugoslavia, 
rested on two not wholly mutually supportive pillars—language and monar­
chy. They both had antecedents in the 19th century with significant consequences 
for the 20th. The central concept of statehood that emerged in Central and 
Eastern Europe after the reception of nationalism in the first half of the 19th 
century was the equation of language, nation and state. Although this proposition 
was frequently stated as an incontrovertible fact by nationalists, in reality it 
was a programme. Indeed, all three elements were programmatic and ignored 
other aspects of the existing cultural and political order, something which 
could be said of many programmes.
The core of the language strategy was a muddled form of élite accommoda­
tion, particularly before the imposition of the royal dictatorship in 1929. It was
George Schöpflin was born in Budapest and is lecturer in East European 
Politics at the London School of Economics. He publishes widely on various 
aspects of Central and Eastern European politics. The above article is a 
chapter from his forthcoming book on nationalism.
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muddled because it was intertwined with elements of hegemonic control. In 
effect, the Serbian tradition of conquest and expansion dominated the new 
state, and many in the Serbian élite never really understood the need for 
accommodation. In this sense, the suspension of the semi-democratic institutions 
and the slide into full hegemonic control proved to be a logical step for much of 
the Serbian élite. This outcome, however, was fatal, because it ethnicized the 
state in the eyes of the non-Serbs and eroded whatever loyalty they had to it. In 
this respect, the institution of the monarchy, far from legitimating the state, 
came to be perceived as alien and oppressive. By the 1930s, the absence of a 
shared political discourse placed the separate ethnic discourses at the centre of 
politics and these could never be more than dialogues des sourds.
In effect, both the legitimating pillars reflected this flaw. To take the 
question of language first, it was by no means self-evident in the region that a 
language was in all respects the same as was meant by the protagonists of 
linguistic nationalism in the West. The difficulty in Central and Eastern 
Europe was that, with the exception of Polish, none of the languages of the area 
enjoyed an unbroken history as media of high cultural and political communi­
cation. While many of them had had some kind of a mediaeval or early modem 
existence as the language of a court or literature, this had generally fallen into 
desuetude and they existed only as series of dialects spoken by the peasantry.
Consequently, the construction of a language as a cultural medium required 
an act of will, something that was undertaken by the intellectuals who were 
newly entering the political scene and thereby secured themselves a solid 
status and base for power. In this respect, the definition of these old-new 
languages—Czech, Hungarian and, in the South Slav lands, Serbian, Croatian 
and Slovene—was an act of rational construction, with opportunity for claims 
to power being smuggled in with hidden agendas. Nationalists might claim that 
all they were doing was reviving long-suppressed languages and thereby 
providing opportunities for the spirit of the people to find expression, much as 
Herder had proclaimed, but the way in which a language was defined unques­
tionably had implications for the size and population of the nation and state 
that these nationalists were seeking to call into existence.
In the South Slav lands this problem was acutely complex because, in 
strictly philological terms, using the spoken language on the ground as the 
benchmark, the entire Slavonic-speaking Balkans constituted a single language 
area. Slavonic dialects shaded off into one another, and by linguistic criteria no 
fundamental distinction could be made between the dialects that eventually 
became Slovene, Serbian, Croatian, Macedonian, and Bulgarian. When the 
19th century intellectuals began their endeavours, therefore, their decisions 
were to have far-reaching results both culturally and politically (Banac, 1984). 
With respect to Slovene and Bulgarian, these issues were resolved by the 
activists of these proto-nations opting for variants that were recognizably 
different from their neighbours. Macedonian is a separate issue that only 
emerged as a key factor after the Second World War. The problem of the 
Serbian and Croatian languages, on the other hand, bedevilled relations between
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these ethnic groups virtually from the outset. The essence of the relationship 
was that, in the 19th century, a group of Croatian intellectuals decided to opt 
for the particular dialect of Croatian (stokavski) that was closest to Serbian, in 
the conscious belief that in consequence, the groups would come to constitute 
a single nation and thereby eventually find statehood together.
The Illyrian idea
This became known as the Illyrian idea, which attracted considerable support from among the Croats, who found the thought of Serbian backing against 
Vienna and Budapest rather congenial. A minority of Croats, however, re­
jected this and argued that the Croatian nation was separate and different from 
the Serbs. This division of opinion was never fully settled, but during and 
immediately after the First World War, the great majority of the Croatian élite 
opted for Illyrianism and Yugoslavia, although it should be noted that Stjepan 
Radic, the future leader of the Peasant Party, rejected it from the outset1. The 
Croats had constructed an identity that overemphasized language and under­
stated the significance of history and religion (Roman Catholicism).
The Serbs likewise came to accept the Yugoslav idea, but did so with a 
different history and with different agendas. This requires this further refine­
ment. Under Ottoman rule, the Serbian patriarchate at Pec became the only 
Serbian institution, and the identification between Serbs and Orthodoxy grew 
very strong during the centuries. As far as language was concerned, effectively, 
the Serbs all spoke the same Stokavian dialect, but politically could be divided 
into two broad groups, the Serbs of Serbia proper and the Serbs of Austria- 
Hungary.
The former lived in the Kingdom of Serbia, which had successfully carved 
out its independence from the ailing Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, and 
added new territories, inhabited mostly by Eastern Orthodox Slavophones, 
who were easily integrated into the Serbian national ideal. The Serbs outside 
Serbia, the precani, in the Vojvodina, Bosnia and Croatia, shared the language 
and religion of the Serbs, but their politics was determined by different 
considerations—relations with Vienna, with Budapest and, where appropriate, 
with the Croats.
They identified themselves as Serbs by language, religion and history— the 
role of the memory of the glorious defeat at Kosovo, which marked the end of 
the mediaeval Serbian state and the conservation of this memory through the 
great cycle of oral ballads can hardly be overstated in this context. What the 
Serbs were reluctant to accept, however, was that other South Slavs, speaking 
the same language as themselves, could have a substantially different culture. 
There was a clear tendency on their part to see the Croats as Catholicized 
Serbs, who would return to Serbdom once the error of their ways was demon- 1
1 Dragnitch, 1983
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A Chronology of Yugoslavia’s History
1918 Unified Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes proclaimed on the 
1 st of December
1919 First general elections held on whole territory of new state with universal 
manhood suffrage
1921 Vidovdan Constitution adopted by Constituent Assembly; Communist 
Party outlawed
1928 Shots in parliament on 20 June kill or wound a number of Croatian 
deputies
1929 King Alexander suspends constitution on 6 January; name of state changed 
to Kingdom of Yugoslavia
1931 King grants new constitution
1934 King Alexander assassinated on 9 October; Peter II succeeds under 
regency council
1937 Tito appointed to head Communist Party of Yugoslavia
1939 Sporazum, agreement between Serbian and Croatian leaders
1941 Regency and government overthrown on 27 March after acceding to 
Tripartite Pact; Peter II declared of age; formation of all-party govern­
ment; Axis Powers attack on 6th of April; collapse, occupation and 
partition of Yugoslavia; resistance and civil war begin
1943 Jajce Declaration of Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of 
Yugoslavia on 29 November establishes bases of future communist regime
1944 Belgrade liberated by Red Army and Tito’s partisans on 20 October
1945 German troops surrender in Yugoslavia on the 15th of May; Constituent 
Assembly, elected from a single list, proclaims Federal People’s Repub­
lic of Yugoslavia on 29th of November
1946 First communist constitution adopted
1948 Communist Party of Yugoslavia expelled from the Cominform on 28 
June; break with the Soviet bloc
1950 Self-management and non-alignment the distinguishing ideological marks 
of Yugoslav communism
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1952 Communist Party of Yugoslavia changes its name to League of Commu­
nists of Yugoslavia at Sixth Congress
1953 Second communist constitution adopted
1961 Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned States
1963 Third communist constitution adopted; name of state changed to Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
1966 Rankovic disgraced
1971 Croatian nationalist upsurge, suppressed by Tito; armed forces emerge as 
a significant political factor
1974 Fourth, and most elaborate, communist constitution adopted, brings Yu­
goslavia near to being a confederation by introducing republican veto; 
Tito life president
1978 Collective leadership implemented at Eleventh Congress
1980 President Tito dies on the 4th of May
1981 Explosion of Albanian nationalism causes extended riots in Kosovo; 
renewed outmigration of Serbs
1983 First informal re-scheduling of Yugoslavia’s foreign debts; ‘stabilization’ 
plan adopted
1987 Record number of strikes disrupts industry; demonstrations by Serbs in 
Kosovo; Milosevic in control of Serbian party organization; democrati­
zation under way in Slovenia
1989 Milosevic in control of Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina
1990 Democratic elections in Slovenia and Croatia eliminate communists 
and elect nationalists; confederal plan rejected by Milosevic
1991 25 June Slovenia and Croatia declare independence; intervention by 
armed forces unsuccessful in Slovenia, leads to civil war in Croatia; 
mobilization by Serbian minorities outside Serbia
1992 15th of January Slovenia and Croatia receive international recognition; 
Yugoslavia formally at an end
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strated to them. Alternatively, they expressed reservations about Illyrianism, 
which they regarded as an attempt by the Croats to denationalize the Serbs.
The strongest current among the Serbs, as represented by the great cultural 
innovator, Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic, was that all speakers of the Stokavian 
dialect were Serbs. In this way, there arose two diametrically opposed concep­
tions of the South Slav nation—the Croats’ Illyrianism, which sought to 
include all the South Slavs while recognizing some of the differences among 
them, and the Serbian one, which was purely linguistic and ignored cultural, 
religious and historical factors. By mid-19th century, the Serbian state was 
influenced in the direction of expanding its power over all speakers of Stokavian, 
whom it regarded as Serbs. And this unification of the Serbs would take place 
under the Serbian monarchy, as the only possible counterweight to Austria.
The role o f the Serbs o f Croatia
T he Serbs of Croatia were both subjects and objects of these processes.They looked back on a tradition of separateness defined by the Military 
Frontier2, which was directly under the jurisdiction of Vienna, and which gave 
them an identity of their own. They were uneasy about the rise of Croatian 
nationalism and tended to look simultaneously towards Serbia, Vienna and 
Budapest, especially in the last years of the 19th century, when the Hungarian 
government relied on them heavily as a political base.
The turn came in the early years of this century, when the project of Croatian 
and Serbian cooperation against Budapest was born at a time of growing 
tension within the Habsburg Empire. Eventually this was to culminate in the 
wartime Corfu Declaration, as the basis of a South Slav state based on agreement 
involving the leaders of the three main protagonists—the Croats, the Serbs of 
Croatia and the Serbian leadership.
The new state came into being on the 1st of December 1918, and was based, 
as sketched above, on the principles of one language giving rise to one nation 
and the Serbian monarchy, which was now elevated to an all-South Slav 
kingdom. Indeed, the state was initially called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes. It was inevitably based on serious mutual misperceptions on the 
part of both Serbs and Croats.
Both language and monarchy fell into this category of misunderstanding, 
but this was exacerbated by differences of style and aspirations derived from 
different historical experiences. The Serbs insisted on establishing Yugoslavia 
as a unitary state and were impatient with any suggestion of federalism. They 
were able to write this into the Vidovdan Constitution not least because Radic 
insisted on boycotting the constitutive assembly. Vidovdan, St Vitus’ Day, 
28th of June, was the day on which the Battle of Kosovo was fought; its 
significance as a symbol of national affirmation for the Serbs was enormous,
2 Rothenburg, 1966
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but its adoption as a Yugoslav symbol was an ominous indication of how the 
Serbian élite viewed the new state. This emphasis on a unitary state was hardly 
surprising. Unitarism had been the key Serbian experience. By the same token, 
the Croats’ political experience had been precisely the opposite—continuous 
argument with Vienna and Budapest from a recognized position of a separate 
political existence.
On the language issue, the new ruling élite was dominated by Serbs and 
Yugoslav inclined Croats (as well as Slovenes, of course), and it was decided 
early on that these two ethnic groups were in fact one nation and that they 
spoke one language, Serbo-Croat. The 1921 census did not ask questions about 
national allegiance and returned Serbo-Croat speakers as a single category.
The monarchy was, as agreed, the Serbian monarchy writ large, but with 
very little evidence that the King, Alexander, had any understanding of the 
need to appear in a different light to his Croat subjects. He shared the view of 
the Serbian élite that Croats were essentially the same as Serbs, and where they 
behaved in an unexpected, non-Serbian fashion, this was occasioned by ill-will 
or other deviancy or political disloyalty. This attitude was underpinned by the 
historical baggage which the Serbs brought with them, the idea that the new 
state must be strong, unitary, centred on Belgrade and run by Serbs. There was 
no suggestion of proportionality or any redefinition of the state ideology in a 
way that would satisfy the Croats. In fact, pro-Yugoslav Croats accepted this 
with reservations, not least because parts of Croatia, notably the littoral, were 
under threat from Italy and the Serbian connection provided a vital defence.
Croatian political culture
Not that the Croats were without baggage of their own. Crucial in this respect was their experience in their struggle against Vienna and Budapest, 
which had been legalistic and argumentative. The Croatian discourse was 
couched in terms of petitions, pleas, counterpleas and the like, which left the 
Serbian élite, to whom this was alien, perplexed and impatient. Any detached 
examination of the relationship between the prime minister, Nikola Pasic, and 
the leader of the largest Croatian party, the Peasant Party, Stjepan Radic, 
would leave the impression of a dialogue des sourds. It was as if the two 
leaders were discussing entirely different matters; the political process was not 
helped by Pasic’s lack of imagination and Radio’s mercurial, unpredictable 
behaviour.
The Serbs felt that the Croats could never be satisfied with what was on 
offer, while the Croats felt cheated that Yugoslavia did not mean the hoped for 
liberation through statehood, but a new semi-colonial dependency, made all 
the worse by the fact that the Serbs operated by a very different set of ground 
rules from the one that they had learned in Budapest. Nor were matters helped 
by the monarch, who intervened indirectly in politics whenever he thought that 
royal or Serbian interests were affected. Finally, the Serbs of Croatia were
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initially euphoric, but gradually concluded that the new dispensation did not 
bring them as much as they had hoped. Matters were resolved in a highly 
negative way with the murder of Radic in 1928, actually on the floor of the 
Yugoslav parliament (he died two months later3)—he was shot by a deputy 
who insisted that he could no longer tolerate the way in which Radic insulted 
the honour of the Serbian nation. The Croats took terrible revenge. In 1934, 
two Croatian gunmen murdered Alexander in Marseilles, where he had just 
arrived on an official visit, and shot the French foreign minister for good 
measure too. Before this, using Radio’s murder as the pretext, Alexander had 
suspended parliament and instituted a royal dictatorship, from which the 
Croats felt themselves excluded. The agreement of 1939, known as the 
Sporazum, came too late to reconcile the two parties, and when Germany 
invaded Yugoslavia in 1941, responses from Serbs and Croats were very 
different. The former resisted, the latter used the opportunity to establish a 
state of their own. The event clearly demonstrated that the Yugoslav state 
lacked the support of the Croats, essentially because neither linguistic nor 
monarchical legitimation gave them enough of an interest to attract their 
backing, on the contrary.
Partisans and the war
The collapse of Yugoslavia was followed by four years of war. The war years were extraordinarily cruel4, predictably so, in which the pent-up 
frustrations and passions of the interwar years, the sense of humiliation felt by 
the Croats and the sense of betrayal felt by the Serbs, were released in the 
situation without effective authority. Three main currents emerged. The new 
rulers of the Croatian state (known by its initials, NDH—Nezavisla Drzavna 
Hrvatska, or Independent State of Croatia) embarked on a policy of constructing 
an ethnically pure Croatia by genocide and many thousands of Serbs were 
massacred. The Serbs in Serbia rallied behind the monarchy, as represented by 
the Cetniks, while those in Croatia joined the communist-led Partisans. As the 
war unfolded, the Partisans offered the clearest and most attractive programme. 
In essence, they were successful in creating a threefold legitimating myth, that 
they were the only truly committed force dedicated to fighting the foreign 
occupation forces, that they were the true representatives of inter-ethnic peace 
and reconciliation, and that they would most effectively achieve the aspirations 
of the radical peasant masses, which had been largely excluded from the 
politics of the interwar period.5 Neither the Croatian nationalists nor the 
Cetniks were able to match this dynamism and persuasiveness, and the Parti­
sans emerged from the Second World War as twofold victors. They expelled
3 Dragnitch, 1983
4 Djilas, M., 1977
5 Bicanic, 1935
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MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS IN YUGOSLAVIA 1921-1981
19211 1961 2 1981 3
Serbs 4.66 7.80 8.14
Croats 2.86 4.29 4.43
Slovenes 1.02 1.56 1.75
Muslims 0.73 0.98 2.00
Macedonians 0.59 1.05 1.34
Montenegrins - 0.51 0.58
Albanians 0.44 0.91 1.73
Hungarians 0.47 0.50 0.43
Yugoslavia, total 12.01 18.56 22.42
in millions
Sources:
1 Banac’s calculations, (Banac 1948, p. 58)
2 Shoup (1968) citing Statisticki godisnjak SFRJ 1964 p. 268
3 Ramet (1984), citing Statisticki kalendar Jugoslavije 1982 p. 21
all the foreign occupation forces, and they defeated their enemies in a civil war. 
In 1945, they were definitely the masters.
The post-war order was consciously built on the proposition that the prewar 
system had failed, that a revolution had taken place, and that the new commu­
nist ideology was the wave of the future. The self-confidence and energy of the 
new rulers were unquestionably bolstered by their unshakeable belief in com­
munist ideology and practice, viz. that class was invariably more significant 
than nation and, say, a Serbian worker could by definition not have different 
interests from a Croatian worker. Where a different national interest was 
perceived, this false consciousness could be corrected by agitation and propa­
ganda, by resocializing the population, and by ridding society of its reactionary 
elements. Nationhood, in this belief system, was a bourgeois device aimed at 
dividing the proletariat and at preventing it from recognizing its tme interest, 
viz. proletarian internationalism.
The other elements in the mix included the enormous prestige of the 
communist leader, Josip Broz Tito, who was of mixed Croatian-Slovenian 
descent but always regarded himself as a Yugoslav. To the Tito factor should 
be added the prestige derived from victory in the twofold war, and the associ­
ated prestige of the Soviet Union in a population which had been sympathetic 
to Pan-Slavism and tended to regard the Soviet Union as the revitalized Slav 
power. Among the Orthodox, this was enhanced by the traditional role that 
Russia had played as the protector of Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. The 
practical arrangements made by the communists derived from these factors— 
they established a nominally federal system that remained under the very tight 
control of the Communist Party. The underlying idea was that communist
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ideology would serve as the unifying formula to hold the different nations 
together, and that Leninist organization would provide the cement. Conse­
quently, the reduction of ethnicity to its cultural aspects was intended to be a 
first step in the direction of a political order in which ethnicity would eventu­
ally disappear.
The 1946 constitution was the outcome of this thinking. It made low-level 
provision for cultural rights, established a federation on the Soviet model, and 
sought to ensure the cohesiveness of the system through the political monopoly 
of the party. In relation to the prewar arrangement, it did set up the new federal 
republics with new frontiers. Serbia was divided three ways. Serbia proper was 
the largest segment and was populated overwhelmingly by Serbs, except for the 
Sandzak of Novi Pazar, where there was a local majority of Serbo-Croat 
speaking Muslims. The Kosovo had a sizeable Albanian population, which was 
still restive after the war from the aftermath of the 1944 uprising, which was put 
down by the communists. The Vojvodina was very mixed, with an absolute 
majority of Serbs, with a somewhat different tradition from those of Serbia 
proper, plus Hungarians, Croats, Slovaks, Ruthenes, Rumanians. The Germans 
were expelled, and their places were taken by Serbian and Montenegrin settlers 
from the impoverished regions of the south. In addition, the eastern half of Srem 
(Srijem), to which Croatia had a claim, was added to the Vojvodina. The Croats 
thus held only Western Srijem (Srem) and otherwise returned to the old Austro- 
Hungarian frontier, especially with Bosnia-Hercegovina, where there was no 
frontier change to speak of; in addition, the coastal area of the Gulf of Kotor, the 
population of which is partly Croatian, was given to Montenegro. The German- 
inhabited areas in Slavonia were settled in part by Serbs from the mountainous 
areas, including Bosnia. Only in Istria did the Croats probably get the better part 
of the bargain, where they gained some territory that could just as easily have 
been claimed by Slovenia. In one respect, however, the Croats made what 
appeared to have been a major gain. The plans to carve out an autonomous 
Serbian region in the Krajina were shelved, despite the fact that the Serbs had to 
make this concession in the Kosovo and Vojvodina. In the long term, this may 
not have been quite such a gain, as it gave the Serbs of Croatia a preponderant 
role in Croatia itself, which caused considerable resentment.
From the outside, then, communist Yugoslavia resembled a state based on 
élite accommodation with elements of consociationalism (non-majoritarian) 
built into the system. The mix also included a degree of territorial rearrange­
ment and linguistic realism. The federal system was to make provision for the 
former, and the recognition of Macedonian, indeed its active promotion, 
corrected a major anomaly.
At the same time, the new structures offered important symbolic satisfaction 
to the various different ethnic groups who made up the newly constituted state, 
albeit both Serbs and Croats had to sustain losses too (severe repression of 
culture and history in Croatia, a redivision of Serbia into three units). However, 
the real weakness of the system was that it swept the ethnic issue under the 
carpet. Ethnicity was not so much dealt with as declared non-existent. The
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MAJOR ETHNO-NATIONAL GROUPS IN BOSN1A-HERCEGOVINA
1961 1971 1981 1991
Serbs 1.41 1.39 1.32 1.37
Muslims 0.84 1.48 1.63 1.90
Croats 0.71 0.77 0.76 0.75
in millions
based on Ramet 1984 and Andrejevich 1991
MAJOR ETHNO-NATIONAL GROUPS IN SERBIA 
(INCLUDING KOSOVO AND VOJVODINA) 1991
Serbs 6.43
Albanians 1.69
Hungarians 0.35
Croats 0.10
Muslims 0.24
“Yugoslavs” 
in millions
0.32
Serbs make up 65 percent of the total population
Source: Tanjug, 20 December 1991
MAJOR ETHNO-NATIONAL GROUPS IN MACEDONIA 1991
Macedonians 1.31
Albanians 0.43
Serbs 
in millions
0.04
Macedonians constitute 65 percent of the population of the republic
Source: Tanjug, 2 November 1991
ideology of Titoist Yugoslavia, having for all practical purposes declared the 
issue solved (at any rate at the rhetorical level), found it hard to confront the 
issue when it reemerged on die political stage. The automatic response was 
repression.
In 1948, the new Yugoslavia faced its first major test. Stalin launched a 
political assault on the Yugoslav communists, whom he regarded as far too 
independent, and expected that they would crumple. They did not do so, on the 
contrary, they were able to mobilize support from virtually all elements in the 
country, very largely on the tacit argument that Yugoslavs had not fought for 
their independence in order to see themselves subordinated to the Soviet
Power, Ethnicity and Communism in Yugoslavia 13
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Union. This was effective, but it undermined internationalism, especially as it 
involved communist Yugoslavia in a conflict with the fountainhead of interna­
tionalism, the Soviet Union. This conflict represented the first shift in Yugo­
slavia’s ideology in the direction of relying on a form of nationalism, the 
ideology of the state as a state worth keeping in being for itself, in preference to 
having it merged in some kind of a proletarian super-state.
Emerging successfully from the confrontation, Tito and his lieutenants 
realized that they would need to transform their own legitimating ideology 
and, as much by good luck as by conscious planning, they hit upon the idea of 
a communism not dependent on the Soviet Union, something that was an 
epoch making innovation at the time. It boosted their legitimacy, especially 
when it was buttressed by self-management at home and nonalignment abroad. 
Both these ideas were used as differentiating factors intended to enhance a 
Yugoslav identity. As long as tight political control by the party—renamed the 
League of Yugoslav Communists in 1952, as a symbolic move away from 
Leninist democratic centralism, one that remained largely symbolic—was in 
place, ethno-national identities could not find any space for political expres­
sion. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the wartime killings, the strict 
policy of the party in clamping down very hard on anything that might 
remotely threaten its monopoly attracted a certain amount of approbation when 
it affected nationhood. The proposition that Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian and 
other identities should fade away, except perhaps as cultural relics, received a 
measure of popular approval (Shoup, 1968).
One move by the party, however, was to have far-reaching and ultimately 
fatal results, a classic illustration of the law of unintended consequences. This 
was the creation of a federal system. Initially, these newly established repub­
lics were no more then fa?ades. Real power lay with Tito, his close associates 
and the party. Gradually the republics acquired identities of their own and 
came to see themselves as real loci of power. In the early years it did not 
matter. There were no significant differences between, say, Slovenes and 
Serbs, and anything that arose could be settled by Tito. But by the 1960s, this 
arrangement would no longer operate quite as smoothly as it had before. The
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF CADRES IN FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 
AND ORGANIZATIONS 1969 (PERCENTAGES)
Sb Cr Sv Me Mg 1
Leading Cadres 32 15 9 7 9 28
Professional Staff 73 7 3 3 9 5
Technical Assistants 78 7 3 2 5 5
‘O’ includes ‘other’, ‘undecided’ and ‘unknown’
Source: Burg (1983) p. 113, citing Milan Matic, Republicki i nacionalni sastav 
kadrova u organima Federacije, p. 73
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origins of the 1960s crisis was a seizing up of both the political and the 
economic machinery.
In a sense, the communist rulers of Yugoslavia were the victims of their own 
success. They had stabilized the country, created a system which had more 
than a degree of legitimacy, as well as international recognition, and they were 
well on the way to industrializing parts of Yugoslavia, in particular the north­
ern republics of Croatia and Slovenia. A threshold had been reached in politics, 
economics and in society which would require a redistribution of power; how 
much, in what way and by what criteria then became a matter for debate. This 
debate was to give rise to the first really serious internal crisis of the post-war 
era, the Croatian crisis of 1971.6
The reforms o f the 1960s
The crisis of the 1960s, which was to culminate in the events of 1971, was extraordinarily complex and involved argument from democratization, 
Marxism, socialism, nationhood, efficiency, and marketizatiori. Its centre was 
the question of what kind of a state Yugoslavia was to be. No attempt will be 
made to disentangle any of this complexity here, nor any assessment of the 
crisis, only an examination of the way in which it impacted on the role of 
ethnicity and of the policies brought to bear on it. The key starting point is worth 
restating. All the participants, despite the subsequent rhetoric, started out from 
the assumption that Yugoslavia would remain in being as a state and that it 
would continue to be ruled by a self-managing Marxist ideology. The difficulty 
was that both these notions could be open to a variety of interpretations.
By the early 1960s, the Croatian communist leadership, supported by the 
Slovenes, but also by the liberal Serbian intellectuals, had begun to challenge 
the cerlfralizing, hard-hat Partisan generation, that took a view of change as 
being something threatening and could always block proposals for reform by 
reference to the communism that it controlled. Indeed, a wide variety of 
interests could be hidden behind the fa£ade of communism and by reference to 
the Partisan struggle. It should be understood here that the Partisans could 
hardly be accused of possessing a very high level of political sophistication. 
They had come from the villages to sweep away the old, corrupt, exploitative 
order, found a seemingly perfect recipe in communism, a tailor-made leader in 
Tito and carried with them all the baggage of the simple messianistic world of 
the epic struggle against the enemy. They were quite unfitted for ruling an 
increasingly complex society but were not about to yield power to those who 
were. Hence if the party condemned some manifestation of discontent as 
“nationalistic”, they simply accepted it and used the tough methods that they 
always had to eliminate it.
The preeminence of this élite was strengthened by another factor that was 
almost unique to Yugoslavia in the communist world. Not only was the ancient
6 Dennison Rusinow, 1977
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régime discredited, but its representatives had very largely disappeared. They 
had died during the war, or had gone into exile, with the result that the new élite 
had a fairly free hand in determining the patterns and codes of élite behaviour, 
which they took overwhelmingly from their radical peasant beliefs and from 
communism. Neither predisposed them to patience, subtlety and compromise. 
Yet if this élite firmly believed that it was creating a new, anti-national 
communist identity, in reality matters were more complex. Whatever people’s 
ostensible motives might have been, those affected by communist policies did 
not automatically abandon their ethnic identities, and a Serbian official would 
continue to be perceived as a Serb, however much he might protest that he was 
acting out of communist conviction.
Both Serbs and Croats have undergone the experience of genocide, in 1941 
and 1945, respectively. This has structured their attitudes to the past and the 
present, in as much as neither is willing to make any compromise for fear that 
the nation will suffer extinction. This means that their minimum position greatly 
exceeds anything that the other is willing to concede or, to be precise, there is no 
room for concession of any kind. Trust in the other is non-existent. This is not to 
imply any kind of moral equivalence between the two massacres, only to explain 
the utter intransigence of both. The fact that 1941 was committed by a régime 
long since vanquished, or that the 1945 killings were the work of the Partisans, is 
irrelevant in this context. All Croats are tain ted  in the eyes of the Serbs as 
legatees of the Ustasha state, and all Serbs are guilty as the beneficiaries of 
Titoism. Besides, the Croatian Partisan contribution is perceived as having been 
ignored in the calculus of death, while for the Serbs the summary identification 
of all Serbs from Croatia as “communist” ignores the reality that not all of them 
were supporters of Tito and, indeed, that some of them suffered discrimination, 
whether as non-communists or as pro-Soviet Cominformists. Perceived genocide 
and similar experience of perceived collective destruction leaves deep scars and 
makes the communities affected ultra sensitive towards anything, real or symbolic, 
that appears to threaten their collective existence. Some of the behaviour of 
Israel is explained by this memory—the utter intransigence and refusal to base 
anything on trust or good faith vis-a-vis the Arabs. Analogous patterns can be 
discerned among Armenians against Azerbaijanis.
This phenomenon was particularly acute in Croatia, where a clear ethnic 
pattern was established under the communist veil. The Serbs who joined the 
Partisans to escape the Ustasha massacres automatically emerged as the win­
ners in the postwar order and were highly influential in the Croatian party and 
the instruments of coercion. For them, these institutions were seen as a guaran­
tee that the Serbs of Croatia would never again be menaced by fascist genocide, 
as well as of the success of communism through which ethnic discrimination 
ended. It should be noted that not all the Serbs of Croatia were communists, but 
the leadership was very strongly so, and was able to impose its will in the rest 
of the community.
Thereby they simply ignored the unarticulated Croatian response, which 
was an expression of an experience of frustration and humiliation and resent-
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ment that Croats could not even be trusted to build communism on their own, 
but had to do it under Serbian tutelage. The fact that the majority of commu­
nists in Croatia were Croats did not disturb this picture. Nor was the Croatian 
view of the world helped by the widely propagated thesis about the “Ustasha 
nature” of the Croatian nation. For all practical purposes, any expression of 
Croatian identity could be branded and delegitimated in this way, regardless of 
the content and regardless too of other interests that might be served by such 
condemnation.
While in Croatia the Serbian minority’s economic interests had merged with 
the structures of communist party power, in Yugoslavia at large, two larger 
coalitions of interests had come into being by the 1960s, both of which had an 
ethnic, as well as a non-ethnic, base. At this time, the economy was beginning to 
slow down as extensive resources were exhausted, the political factories— 
enterprises subsidized for political purposes, mainly in the underdeveloped 
southern republics—were proving uneconomic, and the shift of excess rural 
population to towns was producing unemployment or underemployment. It was 
clear that this system could not be sustained for long without dire consequences 
and, in 1965, the reformers succeeded in pushing through a major economic 
reform; they were opposed by the conservatives, who recognized that their 
economic resources and sources of power and patronage would be threatened if 
the reform was successful.
Reform, conservatism and ethnicity
W hat was striking here was the line-up. The reformers were mostly concentrated in Croatia and Slovenia, though they also had some strength 
in Serbia, whereas the conservatives were in the other, less developed repub­
lics. Hence the republican structures, which Tito and Kardelj, the Yugoslav 
party’s long-serving ideologist, had intended to be nothing more than admin­
istrative agencies, were increasingly acquiring real political content and, given 
that the republics did have an ultimate ethnic base, the arrival of the ethnic 
issue on the agenda could not be long delayed. When it occurred, it showed that 
attempts to eviscerate the ethnic elements of nationhood, and to overlay them 
with an all-embracing Yugoslav identity, had failed.
Yugoslavism deserves a short discussion in this context. It was launched by 
Kardelj, who acted as a kind of ideological tailor for the Yugoslav party through­
out his long career—if the party needed a new ideology, he would run it up; if it 
wanted it shortened, or a tuck taken in, or a turn-up removed, he would invariably 
oblige. In the 1950s, the need was for a justification of federal domination and 
Yugoslavism met the bill. It had several aspects—history, language, class, in all 
of which a single Yugoslav variant was distilled and then declared to have been 
the authentic version and imposed on the population.7
7 On Yugoslavism, see Shoup, 1968
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While the attempt to construct “Yugoslav” identity through the rewriting of 
history and the merging of the Serbian and Croatian languages were largely 
failures, it did work in one respect—the creation of a category of Jugoslav 
identity within the country allowed individuals to opt out of rooted ethno- 
national identities. This proved to be an option of lasting value for a statistically 
significant number of people (see Tables). Various individuals, who found it 
difficult to determine themselves as, say, Serbian or Croatian, could escape 
from what they regarded as an ethnic constraint and avoid self-definition by 
calling themselves “Yugoslav, nationally undetermined”.
Those in mixed marriages and their children used this option voluntarily, 
but it was also subject to abuse. Conscripts, those living in ethnically mixed 
areas, who might be afraid to give their identity openly to enumerators, for 
example a sizeable number of Hungarians, could be put under pressure to 
declare themselves Yugoslavs. Professional soldiers, high party and state 
officials (see Table) did so probably out of conviction. It is, however, another 
question as to whether the category was recognized as authentic by all those 
professing an ethnically undetermined nationality. Certainly, once the civil 
war had begun in 1991, Serbs refused to to take Tito’s “Yugoslav” identity 
seriously and insisted that he had been a Croat; Tito himself had always 
stressed that he was a “Yugoslav” and didactically refused to refer to his 
Croatian birth, even to the extent of veiling his participation in the First World 
War in the Austro-Hungarian army in the campaign against Serbia. Neverthe­
less, the category had some validity. In the 1970s and early 1980s, younger 
Yugoslavs from urban areas recounted to me with some pride that Yugoslavia 
was a melting-pot and that a new identity was definitely emerging.
Yet despite some fifteen years of socialization, this endeavour failed, partly 
because of its inherent implausibility, partly because of the memories it raised 
of the interwar period, and partly also because of the crass way in which it was 
enforced. The proof of the pudding became evident precisely at the moment 
when the covert ethnicity of the 1950s emerged into the daylight in the later 
1960s.
The reformers discovered that, despite having the best of the intellectual 
argument, plus the windfall advantage of the own-goal scored by the conserva­
tives when Alexander Rankovic, the federal Minister of Interior, was found to 
have bugged Tito’s residence and was sacked, thereby removing many con­
straints on the political base was in the southern republics, fearful of the winds 
of market competition; in the armed forces, the JNA,8 fearful of republican 
power; in the veterans’ organizations, fearful of losing their privileges; and in 
the instruments of coercion, fearful of coming under direct political control. 
The result was stalemate, neither side was strong enough to defeat the other. In 
1969, the Croatian leadership sought to break the log-jam by using popular 
support, which automatically meant reference to ethnic aspirations. They 
moved in the first instance against their local conservatives (the Zanko affair),
8 Gow, 1991
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many of whom were ethnic Serbs; the affair was automatically interpreted by 
the local Serbs as an initiative directed against them. This was true, but again it 
was partly ethnic and partly to do with power derived from the communist 
victory. The difficulty was that the dispute could only be argued out in the 
discourse of Titoism, which of course had no room for ethnicity.
What transformed the reformist-conservative conflict in the 1960s was that, 
for the time being, Tito was neutral.9 This neutrality removed a vital curb on 
the Croatian leadership, which by 1970 was openly encouraging the population 
in its attempt to gamer power. Croatian opinion, long suppressed and grappling 
with the burden of humiliation, both symbolic and real, immediately began to 
push for a restoration of its national world, especially in the symbolic realm, 
much to the alarm of the Serbian minority. This development could then be 
used by the conservatives to delegitimate the Croatian strategy in communist 
terms. In effect, there was a conflict of codes, with the ethno-national discourse 
perpetually denied legitimacy by those who controlled power and thus the 
language of public discourse in Yugoslavia. In a sense this was understandable. 
The moment that a communist ruler permits the use of nationalist language, his 
own credibility as a communist will be undermined, given the theoretical 
incompatibility between nationalism (basing its ultimate rationale on culture) 
and communism (on class).10 1
The Croatian nationalists who challenged the party leadership did so on a 
variety of grounds. What threatened to be the most disruptive, or was perceived 
in this way, was the question of language. As suggested in the foregoing, 
philologically there is nothing to differentiate Serbian from Croatian, and this 
was given a programmatic quality by the Novi Sad agreement of 1954, signed 
by Serbian and Croatian intellectuals at the height of the campaign in support 
of Yugoslavism. This proposed that there was one Serbo-Croat language 
which existed in two variants, each of full validity. But when the Croatia] 
intellectuals began to inspect the dictionary of the language published in 
Belgrade, they discovered that words in the Croatian variant were frequently 
described as “dialect”, so much so that some of them denounced the agreement 
and began work on the development of a fully-fledged Croatian literary lan­
guage. An orthographical dictionary of Croatian was subsequently suppressed 
as a source of conflict between Serbs and Croats. The attempt to differentiate 
Croatian identity linguistically was a clear indication that self-definition by 
language retained its force as an expression of identity in Central and Eastern 
Europe, however artificial such initiatives might initially be. In the case of 
Croatian, the newly revived medium took root."
As the Croatian strategy unfolded, however, the Zagreb party leadership 
discovered an unpleasant reality deriving precisely from this point. On the one 
hand, they were put on the defensive vis-a-vis the conservatives, given that it
9 Pavlowitch, 1988
10 Gellner, 1990, Szporluk, 1990
11 Franolic, 1984
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was difficult for them to ward off charges of nationalism in a system that 
regarded—and had to regard—nationalism as a most serious deviation. Equally, 
on the other, they found that, however far they might go in placing themselves 
at the head of a national-patriotic movement, they could never be fully ac­
cepted as the authentic agents of nationhood, but were perceived as a means to 
an end. They were always vulnerable to being outbid by those who were 
genuinely nationalist, and this was exactly what happened. Nationalists, unlike 
the Zagreb leadership, were not concerned with heeding the limits and contor­
tions required of those who sought to enfold their national appeal in pseudo- 
Marxist language; they could appeal directly to national aspirations. This 
process immediately brought the key issue of communism to the agenda—a 
threat to the party’s monopoly of power, a challenge to the leading role of the 
party. It was this development that finally convinced Tito to throw his weight 
behind the conservatives and purge the Croatian leadership at the end of 1971, 
threatening them with military intervention. Tito then went on to eliminate 
“the rotten liberals” from other republican leaderships in an attempt to return to 
authentic Marxism. This heralded a renewed Marxist attempt to control the 
ethno-national issue.12
Republicanization and the 1974 Constitution
So far this paper has concentrated on the Serbian-Croatian conflict as the core of the national question in Yugoslavia, but it is appropriate at this 
point to expand the perspective and to look at the issues raised in the context of 
other national groups as well, because they tended to gain increasing saliency 
in the 1970s, particularly as a result of the 1974 Constitution (another of 
Kardelj’s excursions into the intellectual rag-trade). The new experiment 
sought to reestablish the central party as the dominant actor in politics, but is 
recognized that genuine forces were released in the 1960s which would require 
some satisfying. These forces would as far as possible be restricted to the 
republican level and even within the republics, self-management would be 
upgraded through greater power being given the communes (opstina) and the 
enterprises, in the hope that they would emerge as the true foci of power, 
loyalty and identity, thereby transcending ethnicity. The external limits of the 
system would be safeguarded by the armed forces, now formally declared the 
guardians of hratstvo i jedinstvo (brotherhood and unity), the code words for 
the integrity of the state against nationalist challenges. This political order was 
fleshed out by a revitalization of the secret police, the reintroduction of 
political criteria in employment through having to meet nebulous criteria of 
“moral-political fitness” for various appointments, the reideologization of 
education, and symbolic campaigns to reenact unity, for example in the num­
berless films churned out in the 1970s to celebrate the Partisan victory and
12 Burg, 1983
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thereby to reinforce the message of unity in arms under communist and thus 
anti-nationalist leadership. Trials of those accused of nationalism were particu­
larly tough in Croatia, with long prison terms of four years or more being the 
norm. This was the time when Franjo Tudjman served his first prison sentence; 
he served a second one in 1982-1984.
The crucial unintended consequence of the 1974 Constitution was republica- 
nization, a process whereby the republics increasingly became the true centres 
of power at the expense of the centre, something they were able to do through 
the introduction of the republican veto in federal affairs. By the 1980s Yugo­
slavia consisted of eight separate sub-polities (the six republics and the two 
provinces). The republican parties never lost control of their own nomenklaturas, 
but they were able to deflect some of the initiatives of the centre and increas­
ingly they had to legitimate themselves through a mixture of self-managing 
ideology and the republic interest. This latter was a curious hybrid of regional­
ism and technicity, inevitably so, given the original ethno-cultural content with 
which the republics had been endowed, so that ethnicity, which had seemingly 
been buried by the 1971 intervention, returned by the back door.
The republican constellation was not what it had been though. By the 1970s, 
the great innovation of Titoism, the creation of new nations as a means of 
resolving ethnic competition, i.e. by removing the object of such contests from 
the political scene through promoting the inhabitants of particular areas into 
nationhood, had begun to assume a reality and acquire authentic support from 
those affected.
Matters did not change immediately after Tito’s death in 1980. For a while 
the post-Tito leadership attempted to rule as if Tito were still alive. Various 
symbolic reenactments of his personal authority were tried and criticism of the 
late president was prohibited. Decisions were made collectively and consen- 
sually—republicanization meant the republican veto. But it was evident that 
this system could not work without Tito’s authority, as the republican interests 
were growing, without there being any effective countervailing force. It was 
now difficult to avoid the conclusion that the institutional arrangement left 
behind by Tito was deficient not only in that it required a semimonarchical 
figure like himself to make it work, but also that the absence of either an 
effective all-Yugoslav identity and an all-Yugoslav interest made the problem 
of constructing a new political formula insurmountable. The process of decay 
was accelerated by a number of contingent factors. Yugoslavia’s economic 
situation deteriorated steady, as it was ran out of extensive resources and the 
system proved weak in generating new ones; foreign loans kept the economy 
ticking over, but only at the cost of mounting indebtedness. Then, the party’s 
legitimating myths were beginning to wear out. Whereas in the 1960s, the 
Titoist package of self-management, foreign policy success through non- 
alignment attracted a measure of support, this was less and less the case by the 
1980s. It was much the same with the myth of the Partisan struggle; to a 
generation bom after 1945, what happened during the war had little relevance. 
And the key proposition, that the communists were the most effective in
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resolving the national question, was similarly under threat from republica- 
nization.13
Still, some of the successes of the Titoist solution continued to hold. 
Macedonia was one instance. Before the war, the Slavophones of the Vardar 
valley were described as Southern Serbs, and the area was run as a de facto 
colony by the Belgrade authorities. In the terms of the language they spoke, 
these Slavophones could opt to become either Serbs or Bulgarians or Macedo­
nians and, being Orthodox Christians, religion was not an impediment. During 
the war, Macedonia was annexed by Bulgaria and the Partisans, in order to 
mobilize support, promised the Macedonians that they would receive recognition 
as an independent nation in its own right. This move gave the Macedonians a 
vested interest in both Yugoslavia and in the communist variant of Yugoslavia 
that Tito established. Hence communism operated hand-in-glove with nation­
alism in Macedonia. Communist support for the declaration of autocephaly by 
the Macedonian Orthodox bishops (autocephaly has universally been seen as a 
mark of independent nationhood in the Orthodox world) was a good case in 
point. Macedonian intellectuals busied themselves with creating a new language 
different from both Serbian and Bulgarian and constructing a history and 
literature, again with considerable success, so much so that towards the end of 
communism, Macedonia was a stable factor in the Yugoslav equation, because 
their overriding interest was in using the Yugoslav state framework as a 
protection from Bulgaria, which did not even recognize its autonomous exist­
ence.
The evolution of a Muslim nationhood was a parallel and in some ways even paradoxical device used by the communists. Muslims of Serbo-Croat 
mother tongue, i.e. speaking the Stokavian dialect, and living in Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, had had a weak national consciousness before the war, and they 
tended to gravitate towards whoever was in power (before 1918, they were one 
of the bastions of loyalty towards Vienna). In the early years of Titoism, the 
communists did not really know what to do with the Muslims; in the 1953 
census, the only category they could use was “Yugoslav”, but by the 1960s, the 
category “Muslim” was introduced and, as a result, many of those who had 
previously defined themselves as Serbs, now declared themselves Muslim; 
some remained Croat. The net result was that in the 1961 census, they were 
returned as the largest ethnic group in the republic for the first time, at the 
expense of the Serbs, who took this shift rather badly.
On the other hand, the establishment of the Muslim national category did 
achieve a long term aim. It resolved the national allegiance of this group by 
giving it a separate identity and thereby ended the competition between Serbs 
and Croats, both of whom had entertained hopes that the Muslims would join 
them. During the wartime Croatian state, which included Bosnia, they were 
defined as “Croats of the Islamic faith”. Both Serbs and Croats entertained
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belief that at the end of the day, the Muslim would opt to join them. Had they 
been successful, they could have claimed the whole of Bosnia-Hercegovina on 
ethnic grounds at the expense of the other rival. This scenario was now 
bankrupt.
Yet at the same time, the notion of creating a nation on the basis of religious 
adherence, especially when it was promoted by communists, was astonishingly 
contradictory. It cut across the formal consistency of Titoism and weakened 
the legitimating power of its ideology, while it simultaneously moved ethnic 
criteria to the foreground of the public stage. This contradictory posture 
applied to Macedonian nationalism as well. There must have been at least 
some people in Serbia, Slovenia or Croatia who would have asked themselves 
why it was permissible for Muslims and Macedonians to promote their ethno- 
national identities, but it was a major political deviation when they did so.
Something similar applied to Kosovo, though with important variations. By 
the 1980s, the Albanians in the province had come close to achieving parity 
with the other nations of the country. This political shift automatically raised 
major and intractable issues, notably it questioned the tacit South Slav nature 
of the state. The word “Yugoslavia” means “land of the South Slavs”, and 
although under Titoism a Slav identity was never an overt symbol in the 
legitimation of the state, it undoubtedly existed at the affective level. Besides, 
Albanian assertiveness provoked serious questions about the very deep-seated 
emotional significance of the province in the Serbian view of the world, as the 
cradle of Serbian civilization. Matters were exacerbated by the near-colonial 
régime run by Rankovic and the secret police in Kosovo between 1944 and 
1966, which created far-reaching resentment among the Albanians. The dis­
proportionately high Albanian birthrate—the highest in Europe in the 1970s 
and 1980s—pushed the Kosovo Serbs into a demographic minority, to the 
extent that many of them concluded that they had no future in the province and 
emigrated. Finally, the reforms of the post-1966 period, like the establishment 
of an Albanian-language university in Pristina, permitted the Albanian intel­
lectuals to begin mobilization and to organize the population into a Yugoslav- 
Albanian national consciousness. In reality, there could be no long term place 
for such an identity in a Titoist or a Slavonic order.
The Serbian response
The processes described in the foregoing had a major unintended conse­quence—the rise of a Serbian separatism. The Serbs had seen themselves 
as the strongest pro-Yugoslav element in the country, but by the 1970s a group 
of Serbian intellectuals were beginning to question the value of this status. 
They argued that the Serbs had always made the greatest sacrifices for Yugo­
slavia, but had gained little from it; that as a nation they had sustained defeat 
after defeat (in Croatia, in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Kosovo); and, perhaps, 
that they might now reappraise their support for Yugoslavia, certainly as
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constituted at the time. This line of thinking was associated with the writer 
Dobrica Cosic and it found expression in the Memorandum of the Serbian 
Academy of Sciences in 1985,14 which subsequently came to be perceived as 
having prepared the ground for Milosevic’s strategy in the 1980s. Serbian 
separatism was relatively uninfluential until Milosevic took power in an inter­
nal party coup in 1987. Until then, it had had to compete with the remnants of 
Titoism, which enjoyed support in the federal administration (obviously, this 
justified its continued power) and armed forces (likewise); and also with a 
relatively well established liberal reformist current, which, despite the defeats 
of 1972 (the purge of Nikezic) still claimed the loyalty of a significant section 
of Serbian intellectuals.
One of the particular tragedies of the Serbian experience of Titoism was that 
it came to be identified with the territorial dismemberment of Serbia. A 
lingering sense that Yugoslavia was, after all, a kind of Serbia writ large, a 
poor alternative to Greater Serbia, incorporating all the Serbian-inhabited 
areas, never fully disappeared and was exacerbated by the sense of humiliation 
that Kosovo and Vojvodina had also been detached from the Serbian heartland, 
and that, in turn, was linked to a sense of defeat in the Second World War. As 
long as the Titoist order held, this sense of loss was not articulated, but with the 
decline of Yugoslav legitimation, it came to be expressed ever more clearly. 
For all practical purposes, the Serbs were suffering a “loss of empire” trauma at 
a time when the other national groups in the country regarded them with 
distaste on account of their unitarism and hegemonism (to use Titoist terminol­
ogy). And this affective current among the Serbs was easily transformed into a 
political resource by those challenging the established order. The outcome was 
that when nationhood returned to the political agenda, many Serbs perceived it 
in strongly territorial terms.
The situation was thus complicated by the fact that the Yugoslav state was 
perceived as only semi-legitimate at best by the different ethno-national groups. 
For the Serbs, Yugoslavia was meant to be a compensation for the loss of the 
Greater Serbian dream.
In reality, many Serbs regarded Yugoslavia as a dubious construct, to an 
extent superimposed on the Serbian nation, even while for the non-Serbs, the 
Yugoslav state was increasingly an ethnicized entity serving Serbian interests, 
the symbolic “proof’ of which was that the federal capital was Belgrade. Once 
the Serbs had entered upon this process of seeking their identity in territorial 
terms, there was virtually nowhere else for them to go but to define their aims 
in terms of the reattachment of these areas, i.e. a return to the “conquest” mode 
of perception, which had had such a strong historical role.
The year 1987 can be taken as one of the hinges of postwar Yugoslavia. It 
marked the moment when the republicanization process of 1974 culminated in 
an unbridgeable split on the future of the civic aspects of Yugoslav politics (as 
distinct from the ethnic ones) and implied that it would be increasingly
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difficult to maintain the state as a single polity. As already argued, 
republicanization was initially kept in check by the federal party, the armed 
forces and to some extent the federal government; until Tito’s death in 1980, 
his towering personality was more than enough to resolve conflicts, mainly by 
simple intervention. What he said went. Unfortunately, no one could succeed 
him, despite somewhat pallid attempts by the federal defence minister, Nikola 
Ljubicic, and the secretary of the party, Stane Dolanc, to don Tito’s mantle.
In reality, there was a stand-off between the centre and the republics. The 
former could no longer exercise superior power over the latter, once again, 
with consequences as sketched, viz. that in conflicts of this kind the republican 
leaderships increasingly referred to their tacit ethnic base as a source of power. 
Nevertheless, until 1987 the system was still broadly similar throughout the 
country, in as much as republican parties (Leagues of Communists) exercised a 
leading role and eliminated challenges to their monopoly. The results were at 
times highly contradictory. Central legislation was frequently ignored by the 
republics, even when they had actually agreed to it (e.g. with the stabilization 
plan of 1983) and, as the 1980s wore on, there were growing divergences in 
how the different republican parties interpreted their leading role. Some were 
neo-Stalinist (e.g. Bosnia-Hercegovina), others were very relaxed (e.g. 
Slovenia). It was clear even at the time that this state of affairs was so unstable 
as to be untenable. In fact, it was the Slovene party which broke ranks and 
gradually permitted a shift towards one-party pluralism.
lthough the Slovene changes were argued in non-ethnic terms, it was
understood in Ljubljana that Slovenia was in a position to determine its 
own fate and that this would be done regardless of the interests and opinions of 
other Yugoslavs. I received this message very clearly during a visit to Ljubljana 
in 1987. It was not clear whether those involved fully recognized that a move 
in this direction would mean accepting an ethno-national foundation for the 
new Slovenian order. One-party pluralism, as it turned out, was only an 
instrument of transition towards pluralism proper, and in a short period of time, 
the Slovenes were pressing for a far-reaching autonomy with an increasingly 
explicit ethnic message. A part of this message, however, was non-ethnic—it 
implied that Slovenia was committed to establishing a democratic order and 
that they felt that this could not be done within a Yugoslav framework.
This proposition was never spelled out, but it was unmistakable from the 
way in which the Slovenes approached the problem, in that they rapidly gave 
up any idea of transforming the rest of Yugoslavia, which would probably have 
been beyond their abilities in any case. Hence the Slovenes’ democratization 
project carried within it the hidden message that, as far as Ljubljana was 
concerned, the communist legitimation of Yugoslavia was finished and that at 
that point the sole alternative legitimation was national independence, coupled
Slovenia moves towards democracy
Power, Ethnicity and Communism in Yugoslavia 25
with statehood. The Slovenes did not, of course, shift in this direction over­
night, but their attempts to maintain a single Yugoslav state declined in 
enthusiasm as each of their initiatives met with a rebuff from Belgrade, both on 
nationalistic and on neo-Titoist grounds. The confederation plan of October 
1990 was the last gasp of Yugoslavism.
From the Serbian vantage point, the situation appeared to be quite different. 
Just as in Slovenia, the Titoist system was widely perceived to be, if not exactly 
bankrupt, certainly eroded in its capacity to command loyalty and support, but 
sources of this process of erosion were different. The catalyst was Kosovo, 
where demonstrations by the Albanians in 1981 were followed by a rising 
outmigration of local Serbs. This outmigration produced a deep shock in 
Serbia, something that was enhanced by the result of the 1981 census, which 
returned an Albanian population in the Kosovo of around 90 percent.
The reaction was an outraged Serbian opinion, which could not bring itself 
to accept that ethnically they had lost the game and that the most sacred of 
Serbian lands was now in no way culturally Serbian. The visceral, racist anti- 
Albanian response of the Serbs—strengthened as it was by the religious 
cleavage, as the Kosovo Albanians are largely Muslim—not only had its 
historical roots, with Muslim Albanians substituting for Muslim Turks in this 
mythologically suffused mind-set, but it was spread by the Serbian media, 
which used the Kosovo issue to claim autonomy from political control.
The simultaneous challenge of a sense of national injury, and the threat to 
communist power was exacerbated by the growing economic crisis, to which 
the Serbian leadership had no answer. It rejected proposals for moves towards 
democratization, like the redistribution of power and the introduction of mar­
ket conditions, as this would have undermined its power and privileges, as well 
as resulting in the probable collapse of many enterprises. In the event, Milosevic 
captured the leadership of the Serbian party and rapidly moved to consolidate 
his position by repeated reference to Serbian nationalism and the grievances of 
the Serbian nation. His liberal opponents were vanquished and the Titoists saw 
their opportunity to salvage their power by joining him. A new neo-Titoist- 
cum-Serbian nationalist political formula was well on the way to being bom.
Milosevic had Yugoslavia-wide ambitions. He rejected the democratizing 
programme of the Slovenes and insisted that only through a recentralization 
could the economic crisis be resolved. None of the other republics was pre­
pared to accede to this, especially as they increasingly understood it to be a 
revived Greater Serbian programme, albeit it was argued in terms of both 
Titoism and pan-Serbianism. Fears of the latter were enhanced by the way in 
which Milosevic dealt with Kosovo and Vojvodina; both technically provinces 
within Serbia but de facto enjoying the powers of a republic. In 1988-89, 
Milosevic put an end to this status. His supporters chased away the Vojvodina 
leadership—a coalition of hardliners and neo-Titoists who were united in 
seeking to maintain an authoritarian régime in Novi Sad—in the “yoghurt 
revolution”, so-called because the Vojvodina apparatchiks fled when they 
were pelted with yoghurt cartons by an angry crowd. Montenegro was an
26 The New Hungarian Quarterly
analagous case; it was a full republic, not a province of Serbia and its inhabit­
ants have always considered themselves Serbs, though a minority of Monte­
negrins have sought to develop a separate Montenegrin consciousness. The 
ousting of the Montenegro leadership began at more or less the same time and 
the Kosovo followed soon after, both processes being completed by the spring 
of 1989. Thus Milosevic effectively controlled the whole of Serbia and 
Montenegro as well, which put him in a strong position to dominate both 
federal, state, and party organizations.
Milosevic and the other republics
This assault on Tito’s legacy appalled the other republics, but they ulti­mately found themselves powerless to stop him. Milosevic successfully 
exploited the ambiguity of the situation, in which he could use party and state 
structures to promote Serbian nationalism. There was no answer to this, 
because the legitimating force of Titoism was largely exhausted and the only 
alternative was nationhood and democracy, the Slovenian road, but communist 
leaders lacked the ability and the plausibility to adopt this model. For all 
practical purposes, by 1989-1990, the future of Yugoslavia as a single state 
had a major question mark over it. If Yugoslavia could not be held together as 
a communist state, was there an alternative? It was evident that Milosevic’s 
Greater Serbian variant was unacceptable to the rest of the country and that the 
communists from the other republican leaderships would have to be replaced 
before an answer was available.
This answer was given in 1990. In essence, in parallel to, and to an extent 
influenced by, the collapse of communism elsewhere in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the Yugoslav communists were eliminated from power in republic after 
republic as free elections were held. Democracy represented the death-knell for 
Yugoslavia, because it implied consensus and there appeared to be no way to bring 
the Serbs to accept a compromise. Elections were held in Slovenia and Croatia in 
the spring of 1990, in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia in the autumn; in all 
cases the communists lost and ceded power to various nationalists, who proclaimed 
themselves democrats as well. In Serbia, Milosevic was well entrenched and was 
able to control the electoral process in December 1990.
It should be noted that in both Croatia and Serbia the electoral system 
influenced the ethnic composition of the new legislatures. The voting was a 
first past the post, two ballot system; this allowed large parties to maximize 
their votes, and produced the result that in Croatia Tudjman’s Croatian 
Democratic Alliance (HDZ) won 205 out of 356 seats (57 per cent) with only 
41 per cent of the popular vote. Nor did it help matters that the Serbian 
minority divided its vote between the reform communists and the overtly 
Serbian parties. In the Serbian elections, after two rounds Milosevic’s reform 
communists ended up with only 48 per cent of the vote, but this brought them 
194 out of 250 seats (77.6 per cent); the voting was marred by various
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irregularities and a boycott by the Albanians, which obviously boosted 
Milosevic’s total.
The previously mentioned confederal plan was put forward jointly by the 
Slovenian and Croatian leaderships in October 1990. It constituted the only 
attempt to transform the country on the basis of democracy. The plan proposed 
that the six republics become independent states in alliance, with some com­
mon institutions and all decisions to be taken unanimously. It was not taken 
very seriously by Milosevic and, conceivably, the authors of the plan knew this 
too, so that is was put forward more as an alibi than anything else. From that 
time on, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was no longer a question of if but of 
when.
In looking back on the process, it is striking that the key role in pushing for 
greater devolution leading to disintegration was played not by the Croats but 
by the Slovenes. Throughout 1988—1989, there was a shrill dispute between 
Belgrade and Ljubljana, which confirmed the Slovenes in their belief that there 
was little to be gained from persevering with Yugoslavia. They concluded that 
the Serbs in general, and Milosevic in particular, were incapable of compromise 
and step by step the conviction grew that they would be better off outside the 
Yugoslav framework. There was, indeed, a certain correlation between the 
growth of democracy and the turning away from Yugoslavia, above all because 
both the old and new leaderships found it more congenial to rule by consent, 
enjoying a popularity denied to communists, and this experience ineluctably 
pushed them to rely on their ethno-national base. As Slovenian nationhood was 
thrust further into the centre of the political stage, the Slovenes too found it 
more difficult to compromise or, at least, found fewer reasons why they should 
look for some kind of an agreement involving give and take. True, at no point 
was Milosevic ready to give; this made matters much easier for the Slovenes. 
Ironically, by contributing to raising the temperature the Slovenes ended by 
making matters much worse for the Croats. Slovenia could always be detached 
from Yugoslavia with relative ease, as it enjoyed a relative prosperity and good 
connections with the West, not to mention the fact that there was no minorities 
question to complicate relations, but for Croatia, as argued already, the Yugo­
slav connection was far more intricate.
Croatia and the armed forces
Two other factors require discussion—the fate of Croatia and the role of the last Titoist institution, the armed forces. During the period when the 
polemics and tension between Serbs and Slovenes were mounting, Croatia 
remained quiet, indeed it was almost a bastion of Yugoslavist loyalty. It took 
till the end of 1989 for the Croatian party to conclude that free elections, on a 
multy-party basis, could not be put off any longer. There were several reasons 
for this caution. It was far harder for the Croats to envisage full independence 
than for the Slovenes, given that there were Croatian minorities in Bosnia-
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Hercegovina and the Vojvodina; then, the Croatian leadership was full of 
trepidation at any move liable to lead towards democracy, because it under­
stood that this would revive the issue of nationhood, something which had 
caused the crisis of 1971; finally, the Croatian communist leadership must 
have realized that in the event of any real move towards independence, the 
whole question of the Serbs of Croatia would leap back to the agenda with a 
vengeance.
This difficulty did not trouble their successors, who in the first flush of 
victory in April-May 1990 behaved with complete tactlessness and incompe­
tence towards the local Serbs. Indeed, they adopted policies virtually calcu­
lated to mobilize Serbian opinion against Zagreb. They quickly adopted the 
symbols of the wartime independent state, on the proposition that these had 
always been the Croatian symbols, and ignored the Serbs’ susceptibilities. 
More seriously perhaps when they began to purge the nomenklatura, the Serbs 
went first and, in some cases, Croatian members of the nomenklatura remained. 
In general, they did very little to reassure the local Serbs that Croatia would be 
a democratic state in which there would be enough space for Serbs to live as 
they wanted, with their own ethno-national agendas and symbols, like the 
Cyrillic alphabet.
Possibly the greatest error of all was that Tudjman made no attempt worthy 
of the name to build up a moderate Serbian leadership in Croatia, with which 
he could do a deal. On the contrary, it was as if he was doing everything to 
polarize the situation. When the Serbs presented their demands, these were 
dismissed and they were told that only cultural rights were on offer, there could 
be no question of any territorial autonomy. And to rub it in, Croatian police­
men were sent to the heavily Serbian inhabited areas like the Krajina. In a very 
short period of time, moderate Serbs were marginalized and the hardliners 
from the rural areas seized the leadership. They were much less sophisticated 
and were not inclined to listen to argument about compromise. Indeed, in their 
world view, their worst fears were confirmed—for them it was return to 1941 
and soon the air was full of cries of “the struggle against the fascist Croats”.
From this state of affairs it was a very short step to the ad hoc alliance with 
the armed forces, which turned out to be the fuse that eventually set off the 
fighting in the summer of 1991. The armed forces for their part viewed the 
disintegration of the country with dismay. They saw clearly that without a 
Yugoslavia, they would have no role and their power and privileges would be 
transformed into an insubstantial pageant. From an early date in 1990, the 
armed forces intervened in Croatia ostensibly and to some extent genuinely to 
protect the Serbian minority—it was a good case of political actor looking for 
a role and finding it, regardless of the consequences.
The attitude of the JNA was a mixture of military professionalism, Titoism 
and, given that around two-thirds of the officers’ corps was made up of Serbs 
and Montenegrins, with many of the Serbs from the minorities outside Serbia, 
pro-Serbian sympathies. The armed forces, therefore, took the Slovenian and 
Croatian declarations of independence in June 1991 as acts of treason, and
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decided to put an end to it by direct intervention. In other words, they insisted 
that the protection of bratstvo i jedinstvo, with which Tito had charged them so 
long before, was still their valid role, utterly regardless of the vary different 
circumstances in the early 1990s.
This explains the initial intervention in Slovenia, which turned out very 
badly through military incompetence, and the subsequent intervention in Croatia, 
which seemed to have a much more definite purpose. In reality there were at 
least three such objectives—the restoration of Yugoslavia in the Titoist mould; 
the protection of the Serbian minority; and support for Milosevic’s strategy of 
creating a Greater Serbia out of the Serbian-inhabited areas of Croatia, Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, plus Montenegro, Vojvodina, and Kosovo. The armed forces 
vacillated around these three, something which helped to explain the hesitation 
and inconsistency with which it pursued the war. Without a clear political 
direction—and there was no government behind the armed forces to provide 
this—and without a political purposiveness of its own, the JNA’s involvement 
seemed senseless. It was almost as if it fought simply to demonstrate its own 
existence. Bellum gero ergo sum.
Conclusion
M ilosevic too found himself in the position of having to run ever faster in order to remain the same place. His particular genius in 1987 and after 
was to offer promise after promise of “salvation” to Serbian opinion, which he 
never had to keep, but to achieve this, he had to keep raising the stakes. It 
began with Kosovo, continued with Montenegro and Vojvodina, and then 
oscillated between a Serbian dominated Yugoslavia and Greater Serbia. To 
achieve his aims, he was perfectly prepared to use the JNA in Croatia, while 
fully understanding that their interests were only temporarily coincidental. The 
motives of the armed forces were vague and uncertain; Milosevic was protect­
ing his own power an power base. His legitimating ideology could not be 
anything other than a Serbian one and beyond a certain point, Serbian opinion 
would not support his project of a Greater Serbian Yugoslavia, hence his 
shifting between the two.
In the final analysis, the chances of converting Titoist Yugoslavia into a 
democratic Yugoslavia were never very good. The failure of the two previous 
attempts to hold the country together—linguistic-monarchical and commu­
nist—meant that the conditions imposed by the various actors would be severe, 
almost certainly too severe. The necessary agreement on the benefits of keep­
ing a Yugoslav state in being was absent, and communism collapsed too 
suddenly, act different rates of speed in the different republics, for the various 
republican élites to find common ground.
Then again, the democratic traditions in the different republics varied widely, 
with the Western aspirations of the Slovenes being in stark contrast to the 
volatility and political inexperience of the Serbs. The chance factor was also
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relevant—neither Milosevic nor Tudjman was fitted for the role of holding a 
complex state together at a time when it was riven by the deepest tensions and 
contradictions; Milan Kucan, the communist-tumed-democratic president of 
Slovenia was. And the one institution with a genuinely all-Yugoslav 
purposiveness, the JNA, had no interest in democracy. Keeping Yugoslavia 
together was always going to be a very difficult operation; a democratic 
Yugoslavia would always have been nearly impossible. And the nearly impos­
sible was not on offer when it was needed.
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Lóránt Kabdebó
A Protean Master: Victor Határ
I n nations where history constantly influences the shaping of private lives, the events in a man’s life affect style as well as subject matter. Such is, and 
has always been, the case in Central Europe. Victor Határ’s oeuvre may well 
be representative even from this aspect, simply because it contains the modem 
currents of literature crossing paths with direct historical determination. Határ 
would distance himself from all contingency of place or occasion, yet all 
aspects of an oeuvre created under the aegis of art as such display motifs 
inspired by the history of a place. That oeuvre is linked to contemporary 
aspirations and is open to the important concerns of philosophy, while main­
taining connections with Central European and specifically Hungarian cultural 
and literary traditions as well. At the same time, there is self-ironic understate­
ment in Határ’s complaining of being cut off from the subject matters of 
Hungary’s literature: “I have sinned, brethren, I have grievously breached our 
national code of literary good manners, and have done so more than once. I 
have written (also!) books that, apart from being written in our language, have 
nothing to do with my being Hungarian. Indeed, they could have been written 
in any of the Western tongues.” To my mind, however, there is more truth in 
the view held by friends, a view that one of them, a fellow poet, Sándor 
Weöres, communicated to him in a letter in 1956—speaking about one novel 
but providing a valid characterization of Victor Határ’s whole output: “(...) 
Once in the company of writers, we talked about whether there is a Hungarian 
novel that could become an international success, which would not sink into 
mediocrity in German, English or French translation but shine as a work of 
irreplaceable value. We took about half a hundred writers in turn, past and 
present. Some of them seemed likely to fall under the shadow of classic authors 
of world fame, appearing as secondary, the fault not being theirs, as a rule. (...) 
Most of them would give the impression as when entering a small town’s 
ethnographic museum where absolutely authentic local fish traps, gate posts, 
bodices, stools, bagpipes, spinning wheels can be seen by the hundred: they are 
very real but not at all interesting, such are the local variations of a fish trap,
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gate post, etc. and that’s that. Finally, to the great surprise of all of us, we ended 
up with your novel Heliáne: it is European without being Western, interest­
ingly Danubian without being provincial, if translated into a Western language, 
it would not sink out of sight into the backyard of some great predecessor.”
Victor Határ’s oeuvre is shaped by two extremes: he lives at a great distance 
from the continuity of Hungarian literature, yet he is linked to the peculiar 
world of one region. If I search my mind for authors in a similar situation, I 
would perhaps come up with the names of Eliade, Gombrowitz, Milos, or 
Nabokov. Not simply because Határ like them, has spent a considerable part of 
his life in exile, but also because his literary work (including the time spent in 
Budapest) has remained outside Hungarian literary life. Indeed, his exile 
seems to provide more of a link to Hungarian literature.
He was bom at the outbreak of the Great War or, rather, at the time when, as 
war hysteria in this part of the world had it, the soldiers were supposed to have 
returned home “at the time of the falling of leaves”, in the autumn of 1914. 
History, of course, thought otherwise: the war went on and the father, serving 
in the army, was not able to gaze on his newborn son. Later this father, an 
expert on printing paper, was to become a war invalid who had to be nursed 
throughout his long life. The family moved to Budapest, but the invalid father 
was unable to head or support it, even to keep it together. The young Határ 
soon had to support himself. The financial troubles of his early years taught 
him to create a life for himself apart from writing. Consequently, almost all 
aspects of Határ’s biography differ from the usual Hungarian writer’s life. He 
was a skilled architect, later his knowledge of languages (Greek, Latin, German, 
English, French, Russian, Spanish, Italian) made him a much sought after 
translator. He was able to maintain a standard of living above that of the 
average professional both before and after the Second World War, and yet to 
ensure enough time for writing. He studied music as well as architecture, and 
was regarded also as a philosopher in his own right. Meanwhile, he matured 
into a writer in almost total obscurity, avoiding journals and literary company.
His manuscripts of before the Second World War have been lost. He had 
been actively in opposition to the ruling Right in politics and was arrested. 
Manuscripts found in a search were said to contain expressions reviling Miklós 
Horthy, the Regent; they were sent on to the Regent’s office in the Palace and 
probably perished in one of the archives there during the siege of Buda. (In 
1945 Határ found the manuscript of only one of his novels in the bombed 
police archives, On the Outback of Eurasia, Land of Miracle, this, after revi­
sion, appeared in London in 1988, as two volumes of the Hungarian-language 
Aurora series. The political content of his novels drew a sentence of five years 
imprisonment on Határ. After Hungary was occupied by the Germans in March 
1944, he was involved in a political mutiny within a prison, from which he had 
a miraculous escape.
Although he had been actively opposed to the Right from before the war, he 
remained an outcast right from the start of the communist system as it emerged 
after the siege of Budapest. A volume of poetry (Liturgikon, 1948) and a novel
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(Heliáne, 1947) were pulped, the threats contained in a review of the novel in a 
leading literary journal made Határ fear for his life. In 1949 he was expelled 
from the Writers’ Association and had to support himself as a translator. 
György Lukács was prompted to quip: “Határ must be given many translations 
to do, this would be a double gain for socialist literature, for the man is an 
excellent translator and meanwhile, he would have no time to write works of 
his own.” His new novel, due to the political circumstances, was unpublishable 
(Az Őrző könyve—The Guardian’s Book, 1949; published by Aurora Books, 
Munich, 1974; later Életünk Books, Szombathely, 1992). Határ attempted to 
leave Hungary without a passport. He was caught, charged and sentenced to 
two and a half years in prison, after which he was interned. (He spent some of 
his sentence in the same prison where by then a memorial tablet honoured the 
anti-fascist prison mutiny he had participated in during the war.) As a result of 
a strike in protest against prison food, he was punished by a transfer to the 
dreaded maximum security prison at Márianosztra. There his dramatized hal­
lucinations formed the first version of Golgheloghi, his “world drama” in 9 
parts, that would later be considered his chef d ’oeuvre. (In exile Határ elaborated 
on the text his memory had preserved, and published it in book form first in 
1976, then Aurora Books, Munich in 1989 with illustrations by János Kass, 
and again, that year in the Szombathely Életünk series.)
On his release from prison, he worked as an architect for a time, then went 
back to translating for a living, producing an excellent Rabelais and brilliant 
versions of Sterne’s Tristram Shandy and Sentimental Journey.
After the crushing of the revolution in 1956, he and his wife left Hungary. 
For a time they looked around in Vienna before leaving to settle in London and 
work for the BBC’s Hungarian Section. He lives in a Victorian house in 
Wimbledon, called Hongriuscule. It is in London that he finally came to 
blossom: the novels written back in Hungary were published in succession; so 
too were those he wrote in Britain. Since 1986 Hungarian publishers have also 
taken him up. Once the change of the political system was effected, Határ 
became one of the authors best appreciated by his country, receiving, on his 
75th birthday, one of the highest honours. This was followed in 1991 by the 
award of the most prestigious distinction a Hungarian artist can receive, the 
Kossuth prize, the first exiled Hungarian writer to be given it.
*
A fter the appearance of his Heliáne in 1947, and the 1948 volume of poems, Liturgikon, Victor Határ was labelled a surrealist, Hungarian readers 
assuming him to be an avant-garde author. Although Határ no doubt knew of 
the avant-garde schools and made use of their trappings, his own work is linked 
to essentially different ways of creation. I consider the method that describes 
him best that kind of twentieth-century modernity which, maintaining the idea 
of the possibility of creating literary works, is aware of the poetic and 
philosophical experience which, following Musil, Joyce and Pound, questions,
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in both poetry and prose, its two foundations: the potential to express person­
ality and the author’s mastery over language. In novels written with linguistic 
wit and talented construction (and also in well-executed poems) he presents the 
impossibility of finishing a story and the impossibility of a finalized familiarity 
with the ways of the world. Határ’s language pleases and his composition is 
encouraging; yet, in and through them, one experiences the fragmentary nature 
of lives and may even be shocked to see how helpless man remains. He both 
frustrates and pleases at the same time.
The excerpts that appear in the current issue are good examples of the above 
qualities. His prose poem Vampire starts from an erotic sensation triggered by 
some physical feature, and displays the polyvalence of a sexual relationship, as 
well as casting light upon the mental operation in which the linguistic game 
invoked by words affects the working of the mind and may influence even 
instinct. Such is the reaction of art: etymologically and vocally playful qualities 
of words may transform or, to use a modem phrase, reprogramme even the 
most intimate events of a partnership. Just as in Finnegans Wake, language may 
become a world-creating principle based on the game principle. The sketch 
Spare Guest may be an example of shaping a story. The hyper-exact description 
that an almost baroque heaping of words performs, almost imperceptibly 
changes into its grotesque opposite. Everything described there might well 
happen, yet as a whole, a chain of events emerges that can never take place 
anywhere. This duality, also resembling Sologub’s sketches, creates in read­
ers’ minds a vibration that triggers the reader into reviewing the whole of his 
existence along different lines as well.
It is the prose author who is the definitive Határ. In addition to those 
mentioned above, his major prose works that he wrote while in Hungary are 
Pepito and Pepita (Aurora, London, 1984; Magvető, Budapest 1986, and in 
French from Julliard, Paris, 1963); Anibel (French translation in the Les Lettres 
Nouvelles series of Denoel, Paris, 1970; in Hungarian from Aurora, London, 
1984, and Szépirodalmi, Budapest, 1988); Eumolposz (Aurora, London, 1990). 
Then came Bábel tornya (The Tower of Babel), Hungarian Institute, Stock­
holm, 1966; Éjszaka minden megnő (Archie Dumbarton) At Night Everything 
Grows (Archie Dumbarton). French translation, Denoel, Paris, 1977; in Hun­
garian from Aurora, London, 1984 and Magvető, Budapest, 1986; Köpönyeg 
sors. Julianosz ifjúsága (Turncoat. Julian’s Youth) from Aurora, London, 1985; 
A fontos ember (A Man of Consequence), JATE Publishers, Szeged, and Aurora, 
London, 1989. Two collections of his short stories were published in 1987: 
Angelika kertje (Angelika’s Garden) and A szép Palásthyné a más álmában 
közösül (The Beautiful Mrs Palásthy Copulates in Somebody Else’s Dream), 
Aurora, London, 1987.
Avoiding the shape of the traditional 19th century novel, and ignoring the 
attractions of the grand recit, Victor Határ develops his individual form by 
linking with eighteenth century novels (say, from Candide to Tom Jones or 
Wahlverwandtschaften). He does not aim at describing the process of the 
education of man; instead, he surveys the circumstances of human existence by
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moving about different characters in different situations, contrasting them to 
one another and putting them into conflict. The fate of the scientist in science- 
fiction is a topic in his novels, just as the biological and ethical problems 
arising from the use of certain “methods” are {On the Outback of Eurasia, 
Land of Miracle, Heliáne, The Guardian’s Book and even The Tower of Babel 
and the fantasy At Night Everything Grows). The problem of community be­
haviour is also present in the stories, including the problem of man’s degradation 
and growing helplessness (imprisonment, torture, the termination of the rights 
of the individual) as well as the pathos of resisting humiliation {On the Out­
back of Eurasia, Land of Miracle, Heliáne, The Guardian’s Book, Cloak Fate). 
Examining the mechanism by which man finds his way in this world, Határ 
seeks to establish, by trial and error, the preserving power of the “refusal to 
serve” as against subservient existence; this he was doing at the same time as 
Koestler and Orwell, though his intentions were never directly political {Heliáne, 
1947! The Guardian’s Book, 1949!). Perhaps his most important work, Heliáne, 
serves for an example. Heliáne is the ironic description of an initiation cer­
emony, a satire declaring the author’s doubts concerning various kinds of 20th 
century intellectual sectarianism. Of course, it is much more too: beside 
questioning the validity of the initiation, he also looks at the extent to which 
individuals are free to act in a world where all individual activities are prede­
termined. He invokes a natural disaster, to place his figures in peril, yet even in 
such a situation he can only imagine a handful of people thinking morally and 
standing out, at least thanks to their gestures, in the controlled crowd. Let me 
quote here a curiosity: a precis of the novel, the genesis of which is just as 
adventurous as the novel itself. It was produced by a Miguel de Seabra, a 
Portuguese friend of Határ’s in exile, who learnt to read Hungarian for the sake 
of this novel. After the fall of the dictatorship in Portugal, he left for home and 
disappeared from the author’s horizon without a trace.
“The land of the Thousand Islands is called Panpesvalginesia; a never-seen 
island world of the South Seas, south of South were the timeless primitiveness 
of the jungle and the streamlined civilization of the Brazilian government’s 
representative office exist side by side. It has two faces: that of the native 
yunyuries’ superstitious world, and that of the capital city’s Bohemian society 
of painters, sculptors, dreamers, and maniacs. In the island world of 
Panpesvalginesia prevails an attitude impossible to find elsewhere on Earth, 
and a unique religion. Everything is ‘at the same time’ here, and time, while 
passing, stands still; everyone is fully aware of all the details of his fate, yet 
they accept the good and bad meted out to them with the same obedient 
fatalism. Seated on the summit of the island world’s Olympus, the Fate-God- 
Beast is to be found, the principle of chaotic irrationality. Fate-God is portrayed 
as a grey-haired huge buffalo. His beastly stupidity is the counterpoint of 
‘divine wisdom’: no human mind can penetrate its erratic streaks or the 
complete metaphysics of its stupidity.
“According to scientific forecasts, Panpesvalginesia is threatened by a 
cosmic catastrophe, in the passing of the Nigragor, that is, an attack by a swarm
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of comets which, incidentally, means the destruction of the Earth and the end 
of the world. As a matter of course, the society of the island world continues in 
the pursuit of its pleasures and excesses in wild excitement, even though the 
minds of most of its authors and artists are elsewhere: even in the last minutes 
of Earth’s existence, they want to be immortal. This is when Barnabás 
Bikomutusz arrives, with the mission and curiosity of Europe in his heart. An 
adventure of some kind drops him into the middle of the menagerie of artists.
“This living, communicating, wasting, tripping, laughing, drinking menag­
erie, its life arranged like that of a strict sect, is headed by a father-figure 
painter king, the two-ton Gábriel Gabrielusz. He may have a palette, but in 
principle, the several volumes of his unwritten but studiously blabbered works 
convince all and sundry that Gábriel is their destined leader, and Gábrielianism 
is the most universal, purest artistic and philosophical creed. Every member of 
the company is familiar with his or her fate, yet they all accept it in holy 
merriment, not even trying to escape. Thus, the ascetic and poet Ferenc Nein 
(an unhappy being, who was bom hanged on his umbilical cord) knows that he 
is going to be the victim and executor in a double drama of love. Nepomuk 
Prozeliusz, a much-respected dyer and falsifier of foodstuffs, knows that a 
falling brick will kill him—he even knows the house from which it will fall. 
Lulof, the bar pianist, a wastrel of a musician, and the modest supporter of 
many parasitic friends, dies of fright, the fright of being afraid when the comets 
passes. Hebaminte, the retired supervisor of the seas and inventor, survives the 
disaster, but while out walking, he contracts the pneumonia that takes him off. 
Actually, Hebaminte is the inventor of the ‘perfect state-machine’, which 
governs the state without any human intervention and turns natives into docile, 
‘overhead-contact’ subjects. Hebaminte escapes from home and circulates the 
news of his death in order to dedicate the rest of his life to his invention. His 
wife, the statuesque Mrs Hebaminte, believes that she is now a widow and 
looks after her tenant Barnabás with growing affection. Alas, on one of his 
aimless strolls, Barnabás falls headlong in love with Heliáne, one of the 
anointed maidservants of Holy Prostitution. Knowing that, according to the 
dictate of Fate-God-Beast, they may never meet or know each other, the girl 
takes flight. At the once a year Witches’ Carnival, however, the god provides a 
suspension of the Law of Fate and allows one day of free will. After their 
idyllic encounter, and before the carnival is over, Barnabás decides to snatch 
Heliáne from the grip of Holy Prostitution and take her to Europe, the home of 
free will. The unhappy and abandoned Mrs Hebaminte encounters her husband, 
the inventor, at the Carnival: with knife raised high, and shrieking rabidly, she 
announces that she is possessed, she is the Witch. The crowd parts before her in 
holy terror. The frustrated witch throws out her lodger, Barnabás, who is now 
faced with hard times.
“He clings desperately to the mysterious sagacity of the sect and the whole 
drinking gang; a breach soon occurs in the Gábrielian church, and the unhinged 
Barnabás is unable to choose between tyrannic schools of thought. The Euro­
pean Consolata Maientau, a girl with hazel eyes, arrives at the island on board
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the Transylvania. Drawn to Ferenc Nein, the ageing poet, she is alienated from 
him by Fleulaffen mother and daughter (Carenzia), for they have other designs 
on this pretty creature. In fact, the Heulaffens are good and heed the dictate of 
the Fate-God to be cruel in holy self-sacrifice; Barnabás hates them and strives 
to aid the odd couple.
“Soon he gets word of his old flame Violante’s far-fetched fate. A medical 
student, Violante is in correspondence with Viktor Szinapsziusz, a doctor 
serving in a Central Asian clinic, who asks her to marry him. For his sake, the 
girl takes up the study of tropical diseases and on graduation she sets out on an 
adventurous journey. As a result of some local wars, Viktor disappears and, 
Violante, overstaying her welcome, is forced by his relatives into becoming 
their maid and, eventually, their slave. With the help of the ‘good robbers’ she 
escapes to Nauru, the island of lepers, to be a nurse and to forget. Meanwhile, 
Viktor Szinapsziusz is taken prisoner by a robber lama, Dambin Dzhamczang, 
who accuses him of spying. Once the Reds march in, the doctor finds himself 
buried for some more years, this time in Communist prisons; Viktor and 
Violante will never meet however many letters they have exchanged. Witness 
to their lives, Barnabás is unable to provide an acceptable explanation of their 
impossible fate, even ‘in the light of Gabrielian philosophy’.
“The catastrophe takes place. Volcanoes are bom and islands are sunk. 
Nigragor passes through—yet the world fails to perish, far from it. As if it had 
not been them who had been the bearers of the bad news, those who had 
predicted the end of the world continue to denounce those who believed in 
their future—with the same unshakeable confidence as they had displayed 
when denouncing those who had no faith in them. Children re-invent agricul­
ture, shopkeepers re-start their businesses, Holy Prostitution is in business 
again. The Gábrielian sect already counts its dead. In a bout of jealousy, Ferenc 
Nein shoots the innocent Consolata and himself. Nepomuk Prozeliusz is hit on 
the head by his brick, as scheduled. Hebaminte survives the hell of Nigragor 
unscathed, only to die of the destined cold breeze. Barnabás rebels at those 
outrageous, stupid twists of fate, yet the Gábrielians pressure him with increasing 
intensity to submit himself to the Law of Fate and become a real Panpedelupeian. 
They put him to a ritual test by tying him to the Rock of Terror at low tide, to 
see if he is able to face the tide that, on the point of washing over him, releases 
him at the last moment; the day of initiation is already set—he will learn the 
fate that has been meted out to him. But Barnabás makes a terrible discovery: 
his idol Gábriel, steadfast advocate of full asceticism, has secretly bought 
Heliáne out of the brothel-nunnery and married her. The European in 
Bikomutusz explodes against the prison of fate that is the Thousand Islands, 
and runs amok. Pigs, geese, goats fall to his knife, while children flee screaming 
and the streets empty. Warriors start chasing the amok who is attacking the 
Law of Fate; the mob in pursuit is urged on by Heliáne herself. At the last 
possible moment, under a hail of spears, Barnabás jumps from a steep rock into 
the sea; there, owing to the miraculous and majestic intervention of (who else 
but) Fate-God-Beast, he escapes the swarm of boats. Bedridden on the peace-
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Lfül island of Roc-Y-Ioco, he tells his strange story to the local quack’s daugh­
ters in his feverish gibbering.”
Such is the plot, one that could well have resembled Swift or even be a 
variation on Candide, had not Határ taken the stories of his narration and 
telescoped them into a whole. These mosaic pieces are not individual stories 
that end properly: the whole novel rolls them along—and leaves each of them 
unfinished. Indeed, the actual names of the characters keep changing in the 
text, as pronunciation and phonetic form are separated in Határ’s presentation— 
one could even say his labyrinth. This method of handling story and characters 
might be best compared to that of Bulgakov, though the two created similar 
techniques unaware of each other’s existence. (All the same, there are many 
similarities in their biographical and historical circumstances. I can even 
identify common ground in their subjects: the theatrical world in Bulgakov’s 
The Master and Marguerite closely resembles the plots and atmosphere of 
Határ’s Anibel and Pepito and Pepita.)
In the novels written after Heliáne, Határ examines how a community dis­
solves in joint action (The Tower of Babel, The Guardian s Book). The 
Guardian’s Book contains a peculiar piece of futurology. During and after the 
Second World War, and after, when a Third World War was feared to be 
imminent, there were innumerable apocalyptic literary works dealing with the 
extinction of mankind in war. Határ compares the nuclear age with the warfare 
and raiding of the Age of Migrations which brought the ancient world to an 
end, rather than making a comparison with the Neolithic Age. In the novel, 
great powers fight with modem weapons, before breaking up; the history of 
mankind continues in the form of tribal wars. Határ wrote all this in 1949. With 
today’s hindsight, now that all this has, as it were, already happened, the book 
radiates prophetic power.
The novel’s story disentangles into a single “chronicler’s” mind and becomes 
a “message” there for the supposed future. The author is able to postulate a 
human mind in which a dissolving world history is resolved and interpreted. 
He works along similar lines in At Night Everything Grows. In this strange 
story of a certain Archie Dumbarton, a Willy Loman-type salesman, the author 
describes that kind of spiritual elevation that enables one man alone to save the 
entire world. The world around this man suddenly turns dead. In that solitude 
(and this is the plot of the novel) he deduces that what he has to do is to repeat 
the Cmcifixion, so that through his sacrifice the earlier order of the world 
should be restored. The novel is both a degradation of “miracle” and the 
apotheosis of human generosity.
His most recent novel, Köpönyeg sors (Turncoat), is concerned with the 
youthful days of the Emperor Julian. This is the life of a young man who must 
find his way and overcome his enthusiasms, all the while awaiting assassination. 
For political reasons his life is superfluous. Here Határ describes endangered 
man learning tolerance: at the outset, the reader encounters an Arian Christian, 
who gradually embraces the mythology and the gaiety of the ancient world. 
Language overcomes the ugliness of history in a novel that allows the revealed
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pomp of linguistic-rhetorical education to prevail over a world of primitive 
imagination and style.
Apart from his novels, Határ’s output as a poet is also significant. His 
collections stand as important events in Hungarian literature: Hajszálhíd /-//. 
(Gossamer Bridge) Aurora, Munich, 1970; Lélekharangjáték (Deathbell Chimes) 
Aurora, London, 1986; Medvedorombolás (The Purring of Bears) Aurora, 
London, 1988; A léleknek rengése (Soul Quake, selected poems) Magvető, 
Budapest, 1990; Halálfej (Death’s Head) Aurora, London, 1991.
His stylistic and rhythmic talents help him display the irony of human 
existence. As a poet, he is one in opposition with his friend Sándor Weöres, as 
both create worlds through the sparkling linguistic wit that permeates their 
work. Yet Weöres constructed his poems according to the laws of myth- 
creating; by means of myths the individual dissolves into a spiritual wholeness, 
thus both extending and destroying himself. Határ, on the other hand, moves in 
the opposite direction: he writes poems in which, out of the elements of 
civilization and discarding mysticism, he conjures up an independent world 
around the individual, then sits back to enjoy how man can come through in 
that world created around him. Here, man plays with language but language 
also plays with man: where the two games meet, a poem that characterizes both 
man and language emerges.
A good example of his poetic world is “Identifications”, dedicated to the 
English poet George Szirtes, Határ’s friend: if words and rhymes were capable 
of performing magic, identifications could actually take place. After all, every 
individual creature would like to become something or somebody else. Look­
ing spurs desire, desire is manifested in the text—the world created in a 
different way is reorganized in the poem. But irony lets Határ know that this 
restructuring of the world is possible only in sorcery. Thus the poem becomes 
both pantheistic and pessimistic: through the poems man can achieve everything 
while still being forced to remain within his factual reality. Határ’s poem is 
thus both a soaring ode and a resigned elegy. That duality is balanced in the 
poem by irony.
The stories degrading man and the playfulness of the language which carry 
these stories, provide the opposition that forms Határ’s dramatic world. A first 
reading of these twelve plays, collected in the two volumes of Sírónevető 
(Laugh and Cry) Aurora Books, Munich, 1972, plunges the reader into a 
desolate and aimless world. Yet if the reader pays heed to the linguistic 
sophistication of the plots and the sparkling wit of the dialogue, the pleasure 
and mirth of playfulness come to the fore.
I can only mention in passing his work in philosophy which, beside the tract 
Intra Muros (in which he forecast and deduced the inevitable fall of Bolshevism 
some decades ago), includes the musing Ozön-közöny (Cosmic Unconcern), the 
three volumes of Szélhárfa (Aeolian Harp) of philosophical comments, along 
with Az ég csarnokai (The Halls of the Heavens) and Filozófiai zárlatok 
(Philosophical Cadences). He published studies in three volumes under the 
title Rólunk szól a történet (The Story is about Us). A familiarity with all those
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is required to fully interpret and appreciate Határ’s most important piece, that 
summary and unifier of his oeuvre, the play-cycle Golgheloghi in its entirety.
Taking place at the close of the first Christian millennium, it deals with the 
transformations of Golgheloghi, the hero who assumes different parts (and, 
through him, Man as he appears in history), which recall the most important 
roles occurring in history. The dramatic and tragic, the farcical or circus-like 
horizons of human existence are revealed as crossing one other in the scenes of 
the play. The universe becomes a circus tent, where the operator/conductor is 
at best an Oz-like magician-craftsman. As observed by one of Határ’s critics, 
György Gömöri: man and his creator are both fallible figures who keep each 
other in check, threatening each other with the coming of “the last judgement”, 
the destruction of the world. A circus tent and the universe: man simultaneously 
suffers the pains of his human existence and enjoys the miracle of an existence 
that keeps on renewing and transforming itself. In the play the author embraces 
the never-ending work of both struggling Man and the director of that struggle, 
the craftsman working the potter’s wheel.
Meanwhile, above all that, there sits Satanael on his throne, viewing this 
world with “immeasurable indifference”, but supporting it as well. According 
to his last words, “Using the majestic privilege of a supporting column, I am 
retiring to my crowned indifference and, while you display your miserable 
brilliance, I shall have the power of sea and sky over you—in a princely way.” 
This power, external and internal at the same time, is the determining factor of 
Határ’s art: language itself dominates his oeuvre. His extraordinary knowledge 
of the history of human culture, philosophy and style is intertwined in his 
linguistic ingenuity and power. That is the supporting column of his entire 
work: it contains everything, and simultaneously steps aside “in a princely 
way” from everything, shrouding itself in “crowned indifference”. It struggles 
along, and also supports the struggle itself.
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Victor Határ
Poems
Translated by George Szirtes
The Shot Hare
Lőtt nyúl
Hare Like
He flies before the volley, riddled through 
As I, my Lord, being wounded, flee from You
On Film
A vast crowd gathers to observe the game 
As you release the safety catch, take aim
Screen
The gamekeepers are cherubim; they ring 
Us round in choirs, wildly signalling
The Kill
Your angels too forget their customed hymns: 
From lofty tribunes rise their mingled screams
Three
I leapt three Himalayas, but I found 
None of Your vaunted mercy, no safe ground
I Fear
My ears pinned back, I strain hare-ears to hear 
(The hare’s own shadow knows enough of fear)
Report
The firing stills my terror. “Brave wee chap!
His glossy coat would make a winter cap 
To crown the Milky Way.” The hammers tap,
They nail me up, but I ’m not quite done in:
My skin may yet suffice to save my skin.
(1950)
The Flame Gone Out
Kilobbanásra
I loved you, world, I loved you desperately 
I loved you, I doted on being alive 
you guided me to gather and make thrive 
unquenchable, first real reality
you commanded me to love the terrible
dangers of existence, light of your sun
and night of your moon, my wholesale consumption,
for you I was insatiable
this was how the bondage of becoming 
became for us a cursed affair 
your task for me was prayer: 
fidelity and beauty blossoming
I had to beseech you: let me still continue!
I dote on living: distribute life and weigh it!
I ’d round up your numbers, make them complete 
do not scorn my wolfish greed for you
not in my loves, not in music, nor 
in the thundering of heavy artillery: 
in your scheme of Last Things let me 
try to melt back, separate no more.
I clutched and held as much as I could grasp:
this pittance in the palm of my brain
through the glass of indifference, my glass faith may gain
a new reality in death, one I can clasp
My eyes grow wide consuming you, prostrate 
I will not seek you, nor swear by my success, 
in ambiguities, delusions, deviousness 
be merciless, transparent distillate
with one crack of your whip, you whipped me into line 
eyes, ears, all five senses I gained by your grace 
so you became the vast expanse of space 
an endless prodigal bank of fact and sign
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I merely catalogue you, reckon up your all 
bewitched, inscrutable phenomenon, 
whelping forth, productive daily cauldron! 
pediment topped by sun or star-dial!
no lees from the wine-press could compense us for your loss 
no wretched deathly post hoc of the soul, 
but you within me, and I within the whole: 
let being enter being in one round cosmos!
however slyly approaches the hour
with its monsters and cancers whatever the choice
only for you will I raise my voice
cry, hold on! to perception and to power!
unquenchable, first real reality 
you guided me to gather and make thrive 
I loved you, I doted on being alive 
I loved you, world, I loved you desperately
London Lament
“for a tyrant” 
Londoni gajd
She runs her gamut of enticements, wields her treacly charms 
my deariedums, my sweetikins, my love-come-to-my-arms
so lavishly she pets and preens, so lavishly she flatters 
she gives her all, asks no returns, it’s yours, it hardly matters
her strictly legal honeycombs, her paradise of treats 
who’d argue with a tyrant so replete with scents and sweets
demands are couched in gentle terms, obsequious request, 
her discipline is just as mild: your study, room arrest
Poems
prodigal with her radiance, her panaceas of cheer 
the lady with the linament! one glance—pains disappear
like horses they stand, neck on neck, frozen in a kiss 
and would remain so evermore, epitomes of bliss
they’d stay like this for ever, requiescat in pace,
their feet resting on little dogs, one stone dog for each party
two guardian angels to prepare their beds in the stone choir 
inscribe: Behold! Here lie the Lord and Lady of the shire
*
but when the fit is on her then her fiery eyes grow mean 
the steely glance becomes a blade, Madame la Guillotine
her mood flares florid, frosty roadsides brook no interruption 
her ready fret and fury shows the tyrant in eruption
It isn’t done? Where have you put it? Am I supposed to find it?
(She makes it clear what is your stuff and where she has consigned it.)
spend all this money? pay so much? when this won’t feed a fly? 
such trivial botching? this? you call this housework, darling? why?
so this is how a man does housework? what is so amusing? 
the dusty sideboard, the creased pillow both look on accusing
a filthy mess, a leaking pipe, a fire in the attic? 
a fine homecoming! you are so annoying, so pathetic
and when she flings her locks back and shakes them in a fit 
be sure she’ll smack her babyboo, she’ll lord any lady it
a dripping rope, a cycle chain—mechanics of command 
sirrah, the whip! the fool is beat, the lash lies close to hand
though other times it’s sweetiepie, or sweetiedums or sweetie, 
should gravy slop on his new suit the treatment’s beyond entreaty
a soft boiled egg might smear his cuff eliciting a slap 
black forest gateau sadly slip and slither in his lap
She only has to turn the key, her footsteps are a caution 
—when they are heavy—he can forecast what will be his portion
sweetiepoops's shirt’s askew, his bellybutton peeping, 
let him scuff and potter about all night without sleeping
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moustache is a bedraggled tail, his duck’s arse mane is spiky, 
infuriating his whole being, his coxcombly psyche
sweetiepoops but opens his mouth in unpropitious dither 
a hefty swipe makes one ear ring, the wall slams on the other
should he grimace or should he grin, he shifts from foot to foot 
his essence shrinks and fits her palm, he’s shrivelled and minute
heel already bound behind him, waist snapped, suicidal 
the strap off his own back provides a useful bit and bridle
a thumbscrew wanted? it’s on tap no need to go and fetch 
behold the female tyrant, public hangdame, Ms Jack Ketch
*
but when the turning of the lock portends a gentler mood 
you’ll kiss the gilt edge of her cape with mild solicitude
she goes on tiptoe, little scamp, her little hooves clipclopping, 
comes dripping with a Christmas tree and gifts of copious shopping
here are twopence-coloured books, postcards in profusion 
(the tyranny is inhumane yet blessed with constitution)
no need to eat and drink she’ll blithely waive necessity 
in her be-gateauxed, clownish, imperial capacity
like horses they stand, neck on neck, frozen in a kiss 
and would remain so evermore: epitomes of bliss
they’d stay like this for ever, requiescat in pace,
their feet resting on little dogs, one stone dog for each party
smiling, all-embracing, serene, all things at her beck 
the swelling cello of her hips the viol of her neck
it is a yoke, it weighs one down and yet how it bewitches 
a sleight of hand decapitates, the headless body twitches
her burden’s joy, her tyranny diversion in a wife,
you’ll snug down with her in her nest within the Tree of Life
Poems 47
Vampire
Vámpír
once in the course of my stealthy expeditions, my 
capacious cloaked circumambulations, I happened on a heart- 
rendingly beautiful Neck of Improbable Length
my eyes glued to it I lapped up this vision of the Neck 
and like a drunk mathematician calculated the three possible 
uses to which I could put it
the first. I would kiss it until it choked and she expired 
in my Kisses Appropriate to Long Necks
the second. As we adhered to one another in the course of 
the kiss I would sink my teeth in and bite through Longstem
the third. Instead of kissing her to death or biting her in 
two I would hold her at arm’s length, strangle her and visually 
enjoy the long death agonies of Longstem
in the end I chose the fourth course. I married her
ever since then, day and night, I have lived under the 
spell of this Neck of Improbable Length. I can never exhaust my 
appetite for its contours
often it happens that I cling to her in such a mad ecstasy 
of love that I forget to listen to what she is saying and I 
don’t understand her. Then she gets very angry:
You’re not listening to what I am saying. What did I say? 
You pay no attention to me...
Silently I hear out the buzz of her accusations but my 
ears are tuned to her neck now rather then her throat, and—
say it now! say it now! once more!—I cry. And she repeats 
her accusations gurgling and cackling under my kisses
48 The New Hungarian Quarterly
(by the way) partly, (since it is through my sensuous 
parts I have proceeded part by part along her and tasted all 
the flavours of her neck), partly through my kiss-sensors I have 
sought out her jugular. Now! Now! the thought has flashed 
through my fangs, now I ought to cut short her life, to put an 
end to her struggles. Now! Now!... but she dropped her fourfold 
blonde portcullis over my eyes and I found myself in a golden 
cage. As Odysseus clung to the ram that saved his life, so she 
battened her arms and legs around me in a brainstorm of embra­
ces; though I was practically there, her carotid pulsing between 
my canines—too late. I had the perfect opportunity and missed it. Instead, 
scorpion fashion, I injected my stinging tail into 
her from below, and once I was sure that I could penetrate no 
deeper I released my paralysing poison. I ordered the flooding 
of her cavities and marshalled an ejaculation
she gave herself up to death by ecstasy and obediently 
accommodated her pelvic rhythm to our mutual dying. When we 
woke from our corpses there were three of us; but only in an 
emblematic sense, heralding only a pair of twins, otherwise 
there might have been a whole army of them like a set of organ 
pipes. And beside me on the pillow there still stretched the 
long slender junoesque Neck
—You obstinate, you roughneck!—I continued gently, 
twisting the rough word into her neckverse, just as I had 
always sharpened my knowledge of vernacular rhetoric on her.
You Neck! You’ve got a “neck”: even without your ornaments you 
have an Ornamental Neck!
—And you, you’re all tongue: leave me alone! You cling to 
me like a necklace...! I
I don’t remember her face, I never saw it. I carried the majestic vision of 
the Neck with me into my cinerarium which is 
cast in the form of Isis the Earth Mother, and I mingled my 
dust with hers in the jar—eternal peace measured to its 
precise length.
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Identifications
Azonosulások
monkey monkey monkey monkey 
locked away in monkey shape 
myself am locked up under one key 
inside a solitary ape 
consciousness self knowledge cannot 
worm however hard it tries 
out of its monkey skin and phizzog, 
monkey fur, face, ear and eyes.
spider will remain a spider,
catfish gawp as catfish do, 
you’ll not cut yourself from inside or 
shed your skin by slicing through! 
ants are ants and have to stick it
gladly though they’d flee the heap 
walk two legged through the wicket,
or sprout avian wings and cheep—
on your neighbour’s skull go knocking: 
its chitin armour will not give! 
friend! my body needs defrocking!
one must change if one’s to live!
How keen we are to swap our tallies 
with any likeness! Oh our dust 
might yet be human, though our bellies 
heave with the old toad of lust
life gulps, grasps, slobbers, croaks and jostles: 
all gut! a thousand mortal tussles! 
and from disgust’s amphibian roe 
the glooms of pantheism grow.
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Victor Határ
Spare Guest
(Short Story)
e looked around the magnificent antique shop in wonderment as the
smooth-skinned, elderly proprietor followed our curious gaze, his hands 
folded priest-like above his stomach. This would-be-nice-to-have. Wouldn’t- 
have-that-even-if-it-were-free. This one over here if-only-it-wasn’t-so-expen- 
sive. That one over there handsome-but-not-quite-our-cup-of-tea. My wife 
was inspecting a dog. It was an enormous guard-dog, a Newfoundland, sprawled 
sociably on a thick wool rug, but underneath the black jowls lurked neck­
crunching jaws that boded ill for intruders. It was only by the enamel lustre of 
his eyes that you could tell he was made of terracotta and not alive after all.
“Used to be very fashionable at one time,” said the soft-spoken antique 
dealer officiously.
“We shouldn’t be holding the gentleman up,” I said to my wife, “there’s a 
customer been waiting to be served here for goodness knows how long.”
And I pointed at the distinguished-looking gentleman in a shiny coat sitting 
with his back to us.
“Him!”, said the dealer, lowering his voice still further, perhaps so as not to 
embarrass his costumer. “Him?!” And he led me between stacked crates of 
antiques to bring me face to face with him. “Take a good look”.
I let my eyes rest upon him a moment, then quickly looked away. My wife 
gave him a passing, stealthy glance, nonchalant, indifferent, as though she 
were looking at something quite different.
“Take a closer look—take your time”, the shop owner urged in that throaty 
voice. I wished I knew what to make of his reverential whisper, but I took him 
at his word. Now, as I stood facing the customer, his eyelids seemed to flicker 
as he gave a slight nod, registering our presence, but waiting calmly, patiently. 
To be introduced.
“A collector?” I asked in a whisper, for the manner of the antique dealer 
seemed infectious, and began making guesses as to which category of curioso 
hunters the ruddy-cheeked stranger, sprawled so comfortably in his chair 
should be included: as a collector of watches or of stuffed birds, bronzes or 
mounted butterflies?
“Him?” the antique dealer stared at me, feigning surprise. “He’s no collec­
tor. He’s a collector’s showpiece.”
I did my best to conceal my shock and now gave the seated gentleman a 
thorough looking-over.
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“Good God!” cried Kornélia, and her hand flew to her mouth in an effort to 
stifle what she had just uttered in the manner that truth dawning upon one is 
generally portrayed in old novels.
“That’s right. Madam, you’ve got it,” the dealer said, confirming her infer­
ence in a meaningful whisper.
He was a gentleman of between thirty and forty, dressed somewhat in the 
fashion of the last century—though these days, when it is no longer in fashion to 
be fashionable, it could as well have been the fashion of tomorrow as that of 
yesterday. The colours, the cut and the material of his clothing all bespoke of 
quality and faultless elegance alien to cheap modem shoddiness. Brown and red 
checks; tobacco-coloured (or perhaps well-used meerschaum-coloured) spats, 
cherry-red patent-leather shoes, a velvety silk smoking jacket with lapels and 
facings, ruffled shirt-front, cuffs that flashed diamond struds, and tapering slim 
fingers toying-fidgeting with a talisman dangling from a watch-chain, legs 
nonchalantly, elegantly crossed. What made me think he was closer to forty 
were the first crow’s feet around the eyes, though the face was mischievously 
youthful with a boyish half-smile, the suspended smile of a man who knows too 
much about the world to... but who is still young enough to... I sensed an 
imposing private library behind those eyes, rows upon rows of leather bound 
volumes, that the owner of that civilized brain had absorbed all the erudition 
worth assimilating. Familiarity with the ways of men and serenity radiated from 
this captivating person—from the distinguished, silvery-white, downy side- 
whiskers (which have come into fashion again)—this man knew the tribulations 
of ecstasy, the fiery bitterness of libertine epicureans faced with the purity of the 
gospel, the pleasures of forgiveness, and the art of chasing the everlurking 
Tempter away. Travel, contentment, a wide circle of influential relatives, family 
and parliamentary connections, blasé dalliance with a paramour, the taste in 
one’s mouth before and after assignations, and moderation in the arrangement of 
these trysts that begin at home with a bath, a rest and end with the reading of a 
Greek author, musing upon this and that while reading, dipping into the book 
now and then while musing; and the only reason that the much-sought man 
about town, the esteemed causeur does not now practice the art of converstion is 
that he is at present sharpening the sword-blades of his wit—the dreaded dagger 
of raillery—on the grindstone of melancholy; which grindstone is the dearly 
acquired spoils of the worldly-wise and is granted only to those who, sitting 
quiet and still in such a cushioned, ample, scarlet plush armchair, gazing out of 
palatial windows, can range their eyes over woodlands and snowcapped moun­
tains that they can call their own, the likes of which we, ordinary mortals can 
only rarely, reverently view on the occasion of conducted tours of great houses, 
in snowy woodland heights in which age does not entail proprietory rights.
“I warmly recommend him,” the proprietor continued in a whisper, and 
adjusted the price-tag peeping out from beneath the fringed trimming of the 
armchair at the back, in order that it should escape our attention.
“What is it?” Kornélia and I asked almost simultaneously, thinking the same 
thoughts, as old married couples used to each other tend to do.
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“This? It dates back to the last century. Seventies or eighties. Dogs I always 
keep in stock, they had many of those made. They were life-like enough to 
scare off burglars prowling around the house in the twilight, they made 
hundreds of dogs. This is something different. It’s a rarity. The price, naturally, 
is proportionally...”
The antique dealer was in high spirits and in his element, but would say no 
more.
“Yes, but what is it?”
“Take a look at this, if you will. There is no flaking, no cracks or flaws, the 
glaze is still perfect. If you would just step over here, Madam, and take a look 
from over here, in semi-profile. Who’d say he wasn’t alive?”
“You’re right. Who would? It’s not only that he seems alive, his mouth 
seems ready to speak, I can almost hear what he would say...”
“Or if he doesn’t say it,” continued Kornélia, “it’s only because he is biting 
it back so as to let someone else speak, wishing to be tactful and considerate.” 
“The gentleman! The ideal guest!”
“The Platonic idea of a guest!”
“That’s right, sir. You have hit the nail on the head. That is what he is, 
absolutely.”
“Absolutely what?”
“A spare guest.”
We turned to face each other, Kornélia and I, and laughed, enchanted. A 
spare guest! How glorious! The dealer continued to explain in his throaty 
voice:
“That’s right. A spare guest. Lends itself particularly well to. For example. 
One of your guests should unexpectedly cry off at the last minute. Or refuse 
your invitation, or accept but forget to turn up after all. You just carry your 
spare guest in from the store-room, put him in the drawing room, seat him in 
the missing guest’s place.”
“Carry him in? We’d break our backs. He must weight a ton.”
“Trundle him in.”
“You mean the armchair goes with him?”
“Not only is it included in the price, it is all of a piece. They are built 
together, an entity, so to speak. It is included. In the price.”
My eyes met Kornelia’s. We were thinking the same thought. It would be 
terrible. Carrying him around like a corpse. And how are we to know that he 
isn’t a carefully mounted corpse beneath that modem plastic-embalmed poly­
vinyl coating? It gave one the shivers. All the figures in a waxworks are coarse, 
clumsy botched pieces compared to this, our spare guest, individualized with 
biological exactitude and perfection, minutely detailed and delicately tinted, to 
the cobweb-fine wrinkles, the pores of the skin. He does everything but 
breathe.
The dealer continued to enthuse, still in a whisper.
“It can be trundled in, sir, of course it can, on the original brass castors. 1 
should think so! Oh, the laughter there is when the guests find out just what he
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is: conversation livens up at once. Just think, sir, Madam, just imagine. But 
there need not be other guests. Just roll him in, seat him between the two of 
you. Nod to him now and then, smile at him, wink at him, offer him coffee, 
urge him to have another slice of cake. Listen to music together, in the cosy 
company of three. The illusion of hospitality, entirely. A spare guest can make 
life brighter. Give life meaning. Make it more intimate.”
My wife and I exchanged a meaningful glance.
“And the price?”
“I will tell you directly.”
The proprietor disappeared into his glass cubicle to look up the price of the 
piece in his book while we, in pleasurable anticipation over our purchase, 
strolled about the shop and looked round, happy and excited. As one does when 
one has resolved that—cost what it may—the desired object shall be acquired.
We paid no heed, indeed hardly noticed the light carriage, nor when it 
arrived. It was suddenly there. Kornélia discovered it, pointing with her gloved 
hand through the medley of the display: look, a carriage. Though it was most 
peculiar looking, for a carriage.
A glossy-coated black horse pawed the ground pretentiously between the 
lacquered shafts, the coachman sat in state high up at the back above the 
ornamented bird-cage-like coach-box; a key-and-crown on the coat-of-arms 
on the door, escutcheons of gold. We heard the swish of a cloak and the slap of 
a stick beating age-old dust (the proprietor did not even look up from the book 
he was perusing). The unknown gentleman got up from his plush velvet 
armchair and, his amiable expression unchanged, straightened up. He was 
taller than one would have thought on seeing him seated.
“Good God!” said Kornélia for the second time, but this time near to 
fainting. I, too, shivered as I stared after the tall figure striding towards the 
door.
At the door he turned back and gave me a last glance side-ways—looking 
me straight in the eye. I could not suffer his gaze, it cut me to the bone.
“Have it wrapped for me.”
And he pointed at me with his carved ivory walking stick. With blithe 
superiority, supreme indifference.
Upon hearing the husky deep baritone, my sympathy changed into 
unsuppressable repulsion. I ’d show this impudent cad!
“Hem! Hem! Hem!”
The words came out disjointed, unintelligible. (Was I imagining it? Or did I 
only wish I were?) The antique dealer was already standing in the door of his 
glass cage, his spectacles pushed up on his forehead.
“I have it! Here it is! The price...”
He was cut short.
“Is of no account.”
“At your service.” There was no hint of surprise in his throaty, hoarse 
whisper. The eye-glasses hanging from a cord slipped back on his nose; he 
lowered the book. “Both of them, Your Lordship?”
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“Only the fellow.”
“Only the one, then.”
“It’s a good likeness.”
“Six hundred and fifty thousand—it’s unique.”
“On account of its being such a good likeness—such a stupid, fatuous face.” 
“At your service.”
“And have it sent to the town-house.”
“As you wish, Your Lordship.”
A deep bow accompanied by a catarrhal wheeze.
A snap of the fingers from the doorway (one-two!) and the Newfoundland 
laboriously scrambles to its feet, and shaking its shaggy coat, follows his 
master, glossy-bright. Outside it leaps lazily into the carriage which shudders 
under his weight, engulfs him and his master—and is gone.
I stand benumbed with shock: I cannot speak, cannot even stammer. Cannot. 
And in a few moments, when the numbness should by rights be wearing off, I 
become aware that it is not abating at all. That I really cannot produce a sound. 
This makes me number than ever. An incomprehensible oppression weighs on 
my benumbed brain, a crystalline dimness descends upon it.
Through this glazed luminosity all I can remember is some hulking shop 
assistant catching my Kornélia up and slinging her over his shoulder. Kornélia 
lies stiff as a beam across those shoulders and if a cry for help froze on her lips, 
her unseeing eyes reveal nothing as they meet mine. She swings awkwardly, 
lumpish on her way into the stock-room.
I am swathed in rustling brown wrapping paper, tilted, laid flat and tied up 
with string, caught up and carried—by whom or where I do not know. In that 
shaking, shuddering comer (if it was that, but even the rumble of the carriage 
only seemed to be; it was not meant for me) I stared into that inner darkness 
where I was last—but could not see myself anywhere.
Translated by Eszter Molnár
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Boldizsár Nagy
The Danube Dispute: 
Conflicting Paradigms
I. Modern vs. postmodern
T he community of the handful Hungarian public international lawyers at the moment is under fire from two sides: devoted environmentalists claim that 
the termination in May 1992 of the 1977 Treaty on the establishment and 
operation of the Bős (Gabcikovo)—Nagymaros barrage system has come too 
late, whereas diplomats and other “realists” sometimes express disagreement 
with that unilateral step, one which they feel was not justifiable. What is wrong 
then, was it too late, too early, or is this not a legal issue at all and no legal 
response can therefore be adequate?
To save the reader’s time, let me first propose the conclusion, as in a court 
judgement, and after that the justification of the dictum, for those who are 
willing to examine to what extent law is capable of serving as a vehicle of 
postmodern action on a large scale.
The thesis I suggest is the following: the dispute between Hungary and 
Czecho-Slovakia is a conflict between incompatible paradigms.
This can easily be summarized in the comparisons laid out on the facing 
page.
The Hungarian government’s views represent a postmodern, not growth but 
preservation oriented approach. It is ready to face a loss of 30 billion forints 
(approximately $370 million) or more now, in order not to have the barrages, 
in order to save incalculable billions of forints in the future, which would have 
to be spent on purification, alternative drinking water resources, and on the 
maintenance of an enormous construction and its associated dikes, dams, 
power stations, weirs, locks, etc.
The Czecho-Slovak government1 is dominated by a modernization driven and 
growth oriented approach. In addition, it uses the genuinely myopic argument that 
the project must be operated because it is already there. Politicians in Prague have 
repeatedly admitted that in the light of present knowledge the investment would 
not be started now, but since it is close to completion, it should be operated. *
Boldizsár Nagy is a public international lawyer teaching at the Law School of 
the University o f Budapest.
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Hungary Czecho-Slovakia
Perspective Long term perspective Short term perspective
Value
assessment
Discount rate low: high 
present value of future 
drinking water, near natural 
conditions.
Discount rate high: hardly any 
value in the present of assets, 
resources to be consumed in 
remote future. Does not want 
to invest now for a return in 
fifty years.
Posterity Care for future generations, 
their life supporting systems 
and basic natural resources.
Does not contemplate the 
situation of generations to 
come. “They should care for 
themselves, as we do for 
ourselves” mentality.
Risk-
management
Adoption of the precautionary 
principle regulating prudent 
behaviour in circumstances of 
uncertainty: according to this 
principle, lack of full and final 
scientific proof of future 
damage is not an entitlement 
to go ahead; projects should be 
stopped even if there is “only” 
a high probability, not cer­
tainty, of damage.
Belief in the technical solution: 
man is master of the universe, 
whatever he destroys he can 
correct, nothing is irreversible. 
Mere likelihood of immense 
future loss is not a reason to 
endure a qualitatively smaller, 
but certain present loss.
Market 
economy or 
else
Goods with no market value 
(scenery, the presence of 
irreplaceable archeological 
sites, rich biodiversity) are 
nevertheless valuable, they 
deserve sacrifices, including 
financial ones.
Market economy dictates 
“reasonable market 
behaviour”, tradeable services 
like energy and navigational 
improvement have priority 
over symbolic values.
Survival vs. 
growth
The goal is balance with 
nature, sustainable existence 
(not necessarily development 
in terms of growth).
The goal is modernization in 
industrial terms, growth, 
expansion, domination over 
nature.
Politics There are no hidden political 
objectives involved in stopping 
the project.
Confessed and unstated 
political goals dominate the 
decision to proceed.
1 When this article was written (mid-November, 1992) Czecho-Slovakia was the only subject 
of public international law. Neither a separate Czech republic nor Slovakia existed legally. 
Therefore throughout this paper I shall denominate the other party to the dispute as Czecho­
slovakia, being very well aware that in practice already for the last year it was Slovakia and the 
Slovak political leaders who shaped political and legal developments.
The Danube Dispute: Conflicting Paradigms 57
Can international law help? Can this dispute involving incompatible para­
digms be solved by invoking a third paradigm, that of the law and the mecha­
nism for settling legal disputes? How can these positions be reflected within 
international legal discourse? The following will give a brief survey of the 
possible Hungarian arguments.
The International Court of Justice in the Hague will involve itself in three 
distinct fields of international law: those of treaties, of responsibility and 
liability, and of environmental laws.
The essence of the case is simple. Hungary claims that it is no longer bound 
by the treaty of 1977 since its fulfilment would produce such environmental 
damages and economic losses on a scale that performance would amount to 
self-destruction. According to Czecho-Slovakia, the rule that treaties must be 
kept, pacta sunt servanda, prevails over any environmental or economic con­
sideration, therefore Hungary cannot be relieved from the treaty obligations.
There is a further—at the moment more painful— aspect of the conflict, namely 
the unilateral diversion of both water and international navigation to Czecho-Slovak 
territory. This is dubbed “the provisional solution” or “variant C” by Czecho­
slovakia, implying that the barrage at Cunovo and the dikes recently completed 
exclusively on the Slovak side, which are for the diversion of the water and which 
leave almost 40 kilometers of the old Danube bed with ten per cent of its original 
water-flow, are merely temporary technical measures taken to realize the goals 
mutually adopted by the parties back in 1977. Hungary emphatically rejects this, 
arguing first that the 1977 treaty has been terminated, so no provisional measures 
may and can be taken for the execution of a non-existing treaty. Further, Hungary 
also claims, that even if the original agreement establishing the barrage system were 
in force, this provisional solution could not be seen as an execution of that treaty, 
since it violates many of its vital provisions and produces a fundamentally different 
factual and legal result than the consequence of the original treaty would have been.
II. The termination of the 1977 treaty establishing the barrage system
T his treaty reflects the late Brezhnev period: an obviously irrational under­taking, based on the industrialization goals of the fifties, but only put into 
effect in the agonizing seventies, when symbolic monuments had to demon­
strate the superiority of socialism in a period when its inferiority in the non- 
symbolic sphere could not be hidden any longer. It is useful to recall the turns 
in the way the enormous investment was justified: first it was shipping, the 
improvement of navigation and flood protection, then, after the first oil shock, 
energy was written on the banner. As the recession started to hit Central 
Europe and the growing number of factory shut-downs made it clear that there 
would not be a real increase in energy demand, proponents of the barrage 
system started to emphasize the complex potential of the project, referring to 
not only the previously mentioned elements, but environmental protection and 
regional development as well.
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None of the justifications holds water. That, however, in itself could not 
have justified the termination of the treaty, since bad commitments are as valid 
as good ones. The reasons which did entitle Hungary to discontinue construc­
tion are the following:
A/ Treaty law arguments
1. Czechoslovakia was in breach of the treaty which entitled Hungary to 
withhold performance.
Czecho-Slovakia did not fulfill the obligations included in Articles 15 and 19 
of the 1977 Treaty, according to which “the Contracting Parties ensure that the 
quality of the water in the Danube is not impaired as a result of the construction 
and operation of the dam system”, and “ensure compliance with the obligations 
for the protection of nature arising in connection with the construction and 
operation of the dam system”. Most of the purification plants essential for 
public and industrial waste water treatment on Czecho-Slovak territory were 
not even designed, let alone built. Without them the silt deposited in the 
reservoir will be heavily polluted, with anaerobic dynamics, iron and manganese 
mobilization, and infiltration of toxic materials which will pollute the ground 
water reserves of the Szigetköz and Csallóköz, islands which hold drinking 
water reserves for five million people. Considering that these facts imply the 
violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object and 
purpose of the 1977 treaty, Hungary can invoke “a material breach of a 
bilateral treaty... as a ground for terminating the treaty.” These are the words of 
the Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted in Vienna in 1969 (henceforth, 
the Vienna Convention) to which both Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia are now 
parties, and which reflects rules of customary law. This latter point is impor­
tant since, for technical reasons, the Vienna Convention does not directly apply 
to the 1977 treaty. It only entered into force for both states in 1987, and has no 
retroactive effect.
2. Fundamental change of circumstances.
This principle has a long history in international law and is also included in the 
Vienna Convention. According to Art. 62. par. 1 of the Convention, a funda­
mental change of circumstances, which has occurred with regard to those 
circumstances existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was 
not foreseen by the parties, may be invoked if
“a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the 
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty”.
The preamble of the 1977 Treaty stated explicitly that construction of the 
dam system would “significantly contribute to bringing about the socialist 
integration of the member states of Comecon”. Obviously, the changes that 
took place in both countries in 1989 could not be foreseen in 1977 indeed, until
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1summer 1989. These changes resulted in a complete turnaround of the domes­
tic and international situation, including the dissolution of Comecon and the 
discarding of the idea of “socialist integration”.
Radical changes in the assessment of the state of the environment, including 
the relative value of drinking water stocks, have also taken place. These 
changes made it possible and necessary to have environmental considerations 
become a priority, at least in Hungary.
So, it is not political changes themselves which are used as an argument for 
terminating the treaty because of the fundamental change of circumstances, but 
the disappearance of those specific conditions and goals which were mentioned 
in the 1977 treaty—Comecon and the strengthening of socialism.
3. General rules of international environmental law.
The treaty of 1977 is incompatible with so many rules, principles and require­
ments of nature conservation and environmental protection that its fulfillment 
would not be allowed, even if the previous violations of law or the fundamental 
change of circumstances did not serve as a basis for termination of the treaty.
The rules of general international law on environmental protection, which 
have developed since the adoption of the plans for the system, take precedence 
over treaty provisions which were adopted earlier or are contradictory to them. 
These norms have recently been expressed in a number of international docu­
ments. Just to quote one out of many: principle No. 3 of the World Charter for 
Nature, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1982, declares that “special 
protection shall be given to unique areas, to representative samples of all 
different types of ecosystems, and to the habitats of rare or endangered species”. 
It also states that “man’s needs can be met only by ensuring the proper 
functioning of natural systems”, and that conservation of nature must become 
an integral part of the planning process. By not destroying the unique ecosys­
tems of the Szigetköz and Csallóköz islands, the riparian states would only 
fulfill what is required by modem environmental law, which a fifteen year old 
treaty envisaging large scale nature destruction cannot be in conflict with. Both 
Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia are under an obligation to protect nature, non­
renewable natural resources and the environment, therefore the choice is not 
between legality, that is the performance of the 1977 treaty, and breach of law, 
but between different obligations and different breaches. The 1977 treaty 
demands large scale nature destruction, general environmental law demands 
its protection. Hungary has chosen to perform the latter obligation—which 
emerged later in time—Czecho-Slovakia insists on performing the earlier 
bilateral treaty and thus on breaching general international law.
These arguments were related to the termination—not denunciation or 
abrogation!— of the 1977 treaty by Hungary. If these arguments do not satisfy 
and it is desired to insist on the performance of the treaty, then the arguments to 
be turned to should be based on the law of responsibility, enunciating reasons 
which exclude the wrongfulness of non-performance of a treaty.
60 The New Hungarian Quarterly
B/ Law of responsibility, circumstances precluding wrongfulness
The construction and operation of the dam system causes an ecological state of 
necessity. The state of necessity precludes the wrongfulness of the termination.
This norm of general international law appears, first of all, in Article 33 of the 
Draft on State Responsibility prepared by the International Law Commission 
of the United Nations. According to paragraph 1 of this Article, a state can 
invoke the state of necessity as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of 
its act if a) “the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest 
of the state against a grave and imminent peril;”, and b) “the act did not 
seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards which the obligation 
existed.”
For the Flungarian State, grave and imminent peril would follow from the 
operation of the dam system. In the commentary appended to the above- 
mentioned Article (to which there was no objection by the representative of 
Czecho-Slovakia), the International Law Commission pointed out that, “ref­
erence can be made to the state of necessity... as a ground for State conduct not 
in conformity with international law in cases where such conduct proves 
necessary by way of exception, in order to avert a serious and imminent 
danger which, even if not inevitable, nevertheless, a threat to a vital ecological 
interest”. Since the environmental danger would be just as significant in 
Czecho-Slovakia as in Hungary, termination of the Treaty would not seriously 
impair an essential interest of the Czech and Slovak Republic.
III. The unilateral diversion o f the Danube by Czecho-Slovakia on
October 23,1992
This step has led to a deterioration of the situation, giving ground for further arguments.
1. The diversion of the Danube violates Hungarian sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.
The Danube is an international river, which upon leaving the area of Bratislava 
becomes a border river between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia. Thus, this 
section of the Danube is under the territorial jurisdiction of the two states, as 
regulated by a set of international treaties. Consequently, a state may not 
change the course of the river unilaterally depriving the other state of the 
control over this natural resource and strategically important constituent of its 
territory.
2. The diversion of the Danube violates the provisions of the treaties fixing the 
borderline and its character between the two countries.
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According to Art. 1, par. 4 (b) of the Paris Peace Treaty, “the frontier 
between Hungary and Czechoslovakia is hereby restored as it existed on 
January 1, 1938”, subject to a few minor alterations. These 1938 borders were 
identical with those that had been determined by the 1920 Trianon Peace 
Treaty. According to Art. 27, par. 4 of the Trianon Peace Treaty, the border of 
Hungary is “le cours principal de navigation du Danube.” Art 1, par. 4 (c) of 
the Paris Peace Treaty, as well as Art. 2, par. 3 of the later bilateral Treaty on 
Regulation of the Regime of State Borders of 1956 between Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary, uses the same expression. According to Art. 3, par. 1 of the 1956 
treaty on borders, any change that would result in the alteration of the border­
line would have to be by the mutual consent of both parties. Unilateral 
diversion alters the character of the border completely because the main course 
of navigation no longer correlates with the borderline, depriving Hungary of its 
lawful jurisdiction over a major economic lifeline.
Czecho-Slovakia’s “provisional solution” infringes its bilateral Agreement 
with Hungary on the Management of Water-supplies of Border Waters, con­
cluded in 1976. According to Art. 3, par. 1 of the Agreement, the two states 
agree that “a) ... without mutual consent they do not take any action in the 
management of water-supplies that would unfavourably interfere with the 
mutually determined conditions of the waters and, b) ... they make use of 
riverbeds... in such a manner that they do not cause damage to each other”. 
According to Art. 4, par. 3, “a preceding approval is required by both parties, in 
accordance with their domestic legal rules for an action of management that 
would result in the alteration of the line or character of the State borders”. 
Thus, clearly, any unilateral action by either Hungary or Czecho-Slovakia is 
unlawful.
3. The “provisional solution” violates the rules and principles of customary 
international law that regulate the status and utilization of transhoundary 
environmental resources such as international rivers.
The “provisional solution” deprives Hungary of its due share of water quantity, 
water quality and power potential, and substantially impairs the quality and 
quantity of other natural resources, such as the forests of the flood area, the 
water table and the genetic diversity of the region, all of which form an integral 
unit with the watercourse. According to well established principles and rules 
of international environmental law, any state act affecting a transboundary 
resource must be in conformity with certain principles and rules of customary 
international law.
Without going into details or citing legal documents for all but the most 
important maxims, let me name some of these principles:
—States shall maintain ecosystems and related ecological processes essen­
tial for food production, health and other aspects of human survival.
—States are under a duty to ensure the survival and promote the conserva­
tion in their natural habitat of fauna and flora, in particular those which are
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rare, endemic or endangered. Among others, the World Charter for Nature and 
the IUCN Draft Covenant on Environmental Conservation and Sustainable 
Use of Natural Resources provide support for the wide-spread acceptance of 
this principle. Studies have demonstrated that the “provisional solution” would 
cause the disappearance of species diversity and genetic varieties, and that 
eventually eighty or ninety percent of the flora and fauna would vanish.
—States shall co-operate in good faith in the implementation of the princi­
ples affecting transboundary resources.
—States shall use transboundary resources in a reasonable and equitable 
manner. Art. 5 of the United Nations International Law Commission’s Draft on 
the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which has 
been submitted for governments of the member states of the United Nations 
after its completion by the expert members of this renowned codification 
commission, specifically includes this principle, entitling states to use a rea­
sonable and equitable share of the waters of an international watercourse. If 
conflict arises between uses of an international watercourse, the ILC Draft Art. 
10 par. 2 states that it has to be resolved with reference to a great number of 
factors, “special regard being given to the requirements of vital human needs”.
—States planning to carry out activities which may entail significant adverse 
effects in an area under the jurisdiction of another State shall provide that State 
with timely notification. Such notification shall be accompanied by available 
technical data and information in order to enable the notified state to evaluate 
the possible effects of the planned measures. Czecho-Slovakia has never 
provided Hungary with appropriately detailed notice, through official channels, 
of its planned actions. Nor has Czecho-Slovakia officially provided Hungary 
with the technical data and information to assess the full damage that will 
occur upon implementation of the “provisional solution”.
—States shall take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize 
damage to their transboundary resources and mitigate adverse effects.
—States are responsible under international law for a breach of an interna­
tional obligation relating to the use of a natural resource and are under an 
obligation to cease the internationally wrongful act and re-establish the situa­
tion which would have existed if the act had not taken place. It must provide 
compensation for the harm which resulted from the wrongful act. Similarly, 
states are bound to the fundamental rule sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. This 
rule implies the broader duty not to cause significant harm to other riparian 
states in any manner, independently of fault. A state is liable for damages even 
if its act did not amount to an internationally recognized wrongful act, to a 
violation of a binding rule. The judgment of the International Court of Justice 
in the Corfu Channel case in 1949, the Trail Smelter arbitration award in 1941, 
and, most recently, Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, incorporate this 
principle. The “provisional solution” violates a number of Czecho-Slovakia’s 
international legal obligations and causes exactly that type of prohibited harm.
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4. Minor issues: jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, state suc­
cession
Although both countries are parties to the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), this is not enough to establish the Court’s jurisdiction. The 
parties themselves have to empower the Court to decide their case. If any of the 
parties to a dispute has not made a unilateral declaration recognizing the 
Court’s jurisdiction in relation to any other state accepting the same obliga­
tion (see Art 36 par. 2 of the Statute of the ICJ), and there is no treaty provision 
obliging the parties to submit a dispute in connection with the treaty to the ICJ, 
then the jurisdiction of the court has to be established on an ad hoc basis, by 
specific agreement of the interested states. Hungary first tried to achieve this 
by submitting an application on the 23rd of October 1992, hoping that Czecho­
slovakia would accept jurisdiction by responding to the substance and not 
simply deny jurisdiction, later signed a protocol with Czecho-Slovakia on the 
28th of October 1992, in London, to negotiate a common special agreement 
formulating the questions the Court would be called up to answer, (compromis, 
as it is called technically).
The Court will have to decide on both legal issues raised above. If the fifteen 
or—together with the ad hoc judges appointed by the parties themselves— 
seventeen member body finds that either the termination of the 1977 treaty by 
Hungary or the unilateral diversion of the Danube and the main navigation 
channel by Czecho-Slovakia was not in conformity with international law, it 
will have to decide upon the consequences of the wrongfulness. Both Hungary 
and Czecho-Slovakia claim that they have suffered and—in case of the operation 
of the project—will suffer enormous material losses. The Court will be faced 
with an array of extremely interesting legal—and moral— questions, starting 
with the value of a working hour of an East European labourer in the 1970s, 
and ending with the present value of a glass of drinkable water in the year 
2000.
Before entering on the merits, the Court will have to decide an issue without 
precedent within its own practice: does the submission to the jurisdiction by 
the federal state of Czecho-Slovakia extend to the successor states or not. If the 
answer is in the affirmative, then a further dilemma emerges: is it only 
Slovakia—where the whole project is located, and which claims to benefit 
from its operation— which has to participate in the procedure and bear the 
consequences of the sentence or should the other successor state, the Czech 
Republic also be held responsible and liable for injuries inflicted on Hungary 
before the separation? There are forceful arguments supporting both options 
and I do not wish to prejudge the wisdom of the Court.
5. Winding up
This wisdom of the Court will have to be almost inexhaustible considering the 
enormous importance of the underlying problem. These decent and respected
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public international lawyers will have to reconcile the conflicting paradigms, 
they will have to decide on the moral and social dilemmas concerning the 
preferred way of our resource use. In a period of rollback against environmen­
tal thinking and practice, non-radical judges, equipped with the fairly con­
servative rules of a status quo protecting international law, will have to prove 
that long term survival, sustainable existence and preserving values, which are 
not tradeable on the world market, are dear to the wise men and politicians; 
they will have to prove that, in the words of Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration 
adopted in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on the Environment and 
Development:
“Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. 
They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature”.
This is a conflict between technological systems, driven by growth-oriented 
industrialists whose maximum attention span is that of an election period, and 
the biological systems represented by humans who recognize themselves as 
embedded in processes covering several generations at least. Let us hope that 
the latter will gain a further argument by a decision of the Court. No doubt, a 
judgement based on the precautionary principle, favouring natural resources 
over nature—degrading industrialization, would be praised far beyond Europe, 
in all quarters of our planet where stock of drinking water, wetlands, habitats 
are disappearing at a frightening speed.
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János Martonyi
The EC and Central Europe
N o question concerning Hungary’s foreign relations and its future role has been discussed in the last year or two at such length as possible member­
ship of the European Community. The discussion is concerned with the con­
ditions and the required preparations and the consequences of membership of a 
European Community, that symbolizes the unity of Europe and which despite 
its crises, continues to grow in strength and size, and will soon be replaced by 
the European Union. This is a question that will decide the country’s future, 
and how it is decided may well in itself change that future.
Full EC membership has become an earnest of the catch phrase “returning to 
Europe”. This can be taken as self-evident since the Community, especially for 
outsiders, stands not only for what we value when we use the term European, 
but also for peace, prosperity, successful integration, and the absurdity of 
armed conflict. It is thanks to its success that the Community has become a 
channel of crucial importance for the process of unifying Europe, chiefly 
responsible for the future of Europe and just about every country in Europe 
outside it has made joining it a prime objective.
Full EC membership is clearly a central factor in Hungary’s foreign policy 
aims as well, and there is a clear national consensus regarding the basic issue. 
The when and how, however, are the subject of debate. Unfortunately, the 
differing views have not yet been clearly articulated and tend to avoid details. 
Nevertheless, there is a growing need for the clash and articulation of different 
approaches and views, since this is the most important question facing Hungary 
at the end of the century. The future of the European Union and Hungary’s role 
within it will determine the nation’s future for a long time to come.
Thus while there seems to be agreement on full membership, as a goal, there 
have been, and will be, voices that, though not questioning the long-term goal, 
suggest alternative ways and means. It therefore makes sense to establish 
whether there is any possible alternative to EC membership, be it only on a 
theoretical or hypothetical level.
The only realistic option
Some time ago the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) appeared as an alternative on the computer screens of Hungarian trade policy think
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tanks. The latest version of that policy argues that the country should find its 
way to the European Community via EFTA membership rather than by entering 
an association agreement and gradually deepening and developing the process 
of association. That was an unrealistic idea in the first place, and has now 
become meaningless. The seven EFTA member countries have signed an accord 
with the EC on creating the European Economic Area, (EEA) thereby a special 
transitional period leading from twenty years of free trade relationship to full 
membership, the short-term goal of most EFTA countries. The last few months 
have seen an acceleration in this respect: Austria, Sweden and Finland have 
already applied, Norway and Switzerland can be expected to do so as well.
The Community ’s strategy for extension, in a stage of preparation, will very 
likely give priority to the EFTA members in the large pool of potential 
candidates for EC membership. That will probably bring forward admission 
for those countries that have already applied for membership; they may well 
successfully conclude their talks on joining the EC as early as 1994. In such 
circumstances, the EEA accord (still in an early phase of a rather lengthy 
process of ratification) will itself lose some of its importance, retaining hardly 
more than the function of seeing that accession, welcome all round and 
promising to be troublefree anyway, will be even smoother. (There are, of 
course, those who, reflecting on historical experience, say, ce nest que le 
provisoire qui dure.)
It is therefore unnecessary here to rehearse the arguments concerning EFTA 
as it is an illusory alternative. Those countries will already be EC members 
when Hungary starts abolishing customs dues that is, creating free trade under 
the conditions of the agreement of association. Hungary has so far been unable 
even to reach an asymmetric free trade agreement with EFTA member countries, 
who seem to insist even more on protectionism in trade in agricultural products 
than the Community itself; the steps they take are not being influenced by the 
political vision necessary to rise above narrowly interpreted economic interests. 
Thus the EC-EFTA alternative is, owing to recent developments, less realistic 
today than it had ever been.
Another—purely theoretical—notion, so far not mentioned by economists, 
is that if the process of Hungary’s joining the EC should fail completely, or 
become bogged down for a considerable period for outside reasons, policy­
makers should cease to long for what cannot be achieved and, taking the hint 
from far from official American suggestions, enter into a free trade agreement 
with the United States. The essence of this “Israeli” model would be for 
Hungary to establish free trade with both the EC and the US, the world’s two 
greatest trading powerhouses, and enjoy the advantages of doing so, while 
staying out of the European integration even where economics are concerned.
Naturally, remaining outside the European integration would mean that, 
quite apart from being squeezed out of the economic community, Hungary 
would be left out of the future security and defense integration as well. 
Participation in European integration cannot be compared with free trade even 
from the aspect of the economy, since free trade does not include the very
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essence of integration: the implementation of a common policy and the exten­
sive set of community rules that are to be directly applied in the member states. 
Thus such an alternative would mean Hungary giving up the idea of participat­
ing in the European integration and that would contradict the country’s basic 
objectives. Yet the possibility described above cannot be completely ruled out 
for the future, especially if the seemingly inevitable temporary but spectacular 
setbacks to Hungary’s efforts to join disappoint some people.
A third theoretical alternative, not mentioned so far in its purest form, is to 
create a kind of Central and East European integration. The energy needed to 
start thinking in that direction could be provided by the frustration stemming 
from Hungary being temporarily denied entry to Europe, even though the 
economic and political conditions of such an integration are absent and will 
continue to be absent. In their absence, this alternative is not worth considering. 
Another and far more intriguing question is the level current Central European 
efforts towards some integration should reach prior to joining the European 
Community, and the role such forms of cooperation will play in the process of 
joining the European Community (or, rather Union). This question requires 
close attention but this is not the place for it since what I have in mind is not an 
integration to replace the EC; the question is rather what strategy and tactics 
the countries in the East European region should employ in order to make 
effective their desire to join in the speediest possible way.
There is, therefore, no realistic strategic alternative to joining the European 
Union. It is essential for Hungary to regard all dimensions of the integration, 
cooperation in the economy, in politics and security, as an integral whole. No 
solution is feasible which means progress in only one field or another. Partici­
pation in economic integration without a political dimension is just as unac­
ceptable, as any however new and enticingly wrapped offer for Hungary to join 
an exclusively political integration. Joining such a Union would determine the 
future of the country for centuries. It will therefore be necessary to make this 
the subject of a debate that will closely consider not only the economic 
consequences of such a step, but the political, security, institutional, legal, 
cultural, psychological and other consequences as well.
The starting point of such considerations, however, must be that the most 
important aim and aspiration is to modernize the country, bringing it up to 
European standards. This major national aspiration is not inspired by a lust for 
power, nor does it aim at territorial expansion or a growth in influence. 
Successful participation in the concert of nations is something to be achieved 
by improving economic, cultural and scientific performance.
Timing
O pinions differ both in Hungary and among EC member states as regards the necessary and possible date of joining. In Hungary, the view that 
“speedy and premature” joining would cause tremendous shock waves to a
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Hungarian economy unprepared for the event, with the ensuing damage ex­
ceeding the advantages, is expressed ever more frequently. That anxiety is 
connected with the argument for greater protection for the products of Hungar­
ian industry against foreign competition that, in other words, a more forceful 
market and industrial protectionism is called for.
In a mood of growing reluctance to expose the country’s economy to the 
shock of EC membership, it was most refreshing to hear the National Associa­
tion of Entrepreneurs argue that it was a grave mistake on the part of the 
government to apply for membership in coordination with the Visegrád Three, 
expressing the Association’s firm belief that Hungary could, together with 
Austria, become an EC member within two years. The increased self-confidence 
of some entrepreneurs is pleasing, of course, even though the target they set is 
clearly illusory today. A realistic perspective for Hungary’s joining the EC will 
unfortunately occur only much later. There is no doubt, however, that the 
shock of joining is stressed more than justified, as indeed, it indirectly feeds 
outside voices using the argument of the country’s unprepared state as an 
excuse to postpone the EC’s extension into Central Europe for as long as 
possible. A noteworthy development occurred in the last two cases of entry 
where the aspects of different levels of economic development and the candi­
date countries’ level of preparedness were given much smaller weight, and it 
became clear that conditions for joining the EC are qualitative rather than 
quantitative. Clearly, the candidates’ political and economic systems must 
meet certain basic qualitative requirements that are in close association with 
the essence of this system. The level of economic development and the 
quantitative indicators in connection with that level cannot be decisive by 
themselves.
The argument of the shock effect should not be excessively emphasized, not 
only because it would eventually rebound on Hungary, but also because in this 
form it is simply not true. By signing the agreement of association, the country 
has already accepted the scheduled abolishing of restrictions against the influx 
of foreign goods. Further steps will be taken by Hungary, by signing free trade 
agreements with members of EFTA and with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. 
With the advance of the process of association and the implementation of those 
free trade agreements, the great majority of Hungary’s imports will reach the 
market without duties or quantitative limits, irrespective of when the country 
may become a full Community member.
Regardless of that, however, there is indeed a danger of integration shock, 
caused by the obligation to adopt the full set of regulations as well as by the 
new freedom in services, trade and capital movement. That obligation, though, 
is nothing less than a guarantee of Hungary’s reaching her most important 
goals in economic and social transformation at an accelerated rate. It is 
fortunate that the current European situation offers up a solution that means an 
inevitable acceleration of the process of modernizing these areas and also aids 
this by external means. At the same time, it must be remembered that, at the 
time of joining the EC, Hungarians will be overwhelmed only in principle and
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generally by the whole system of rules already established and by the opera­
tional mechanisms of integration, in other words, by the acquis communautaire 
to be unconditionally accepted by new members. Like newcomers of old, 
Hungary will have a relatively long period of transition, probably longer than 
ever before, possibly even ten years, in which she must gradually adopt the full 
system of Community regulations, meaning a gradual end to temporary 
deregulations and deviations that the treaty of accession will permit.
Thus, as far as one can tell today, the time of Hungary’s joining the EC is a 
dilemma not for Hungary but for the other side. The shock of integration would 
entail real dangers to the country only if, owing to some miracle, the doors 
were opened within the next two or three years. But that, alas, is unlikely. The 
EC’s strategy of expansion, currently in preparation, will certainly not specify 
a date, but make it clear that the extension towards Central Europe must be 
separated from the relatively problem-free extension embracing EFTA. The 
obvious consequence is that the countries of Central Europe will not be able to 
join before the closing years of our century. Many would love to postpone that 
date to even later. Refraining from making this explicit, they count on the 
benevolent argument of unpreparedness being useful at any time to justify 
further delays. It is clear that the present discrepancy among economic devel­
opment levels will not be much smaller in the year 2000; any decrease is all the 
less likely since, by then, average per capita GDP within an EC enlarged by 
EFTA-member states will be essentially higher than today. The less industrial­
ized member states are anxious about their financial advantages (amounting to 
billions annually), while rich members fear a rise in the demand for financial 
resources allocated for this purpose. The financial support inflow to the Visegrád 
Three would be considerable enough even in terms of the system currently 
applied; thus rough calculations made so far put the annual support to be 
allocated to Hungary within the framework of the current mechanism at 2bn 
Ecus. That sum does not include resources whose flow to the less industrialized 
member states will be taken care of by the common budget as part of the 
cohesion fund.
Maastricht and Visegrád
Another question concerning the date of entry but, from the aspect of Hungary’s foreign policy strategy, more crucial and intricate, is whether 
Hungary should construct her strategy for joining the EC on her own, deter­
mining all the steps to be taken for that purpose, attempting to become a 
member of the European Union by herself at the earliest possible time; or 
should she accept partnership in the interest group formed around at least some 
countries of the Central European region and, on that basis, harmonize her 
strategy and steps with the other countries concerned. Clearly, the other 
countries here concerned are the Visegrád Three (or, Four).
This is a far from simple question and ought not to be removed from the
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context of the whole of Hungary’s long-term national foreign policy strategy, 
embracing, as it does, all the country’s basic aims and aspirations. A full 
analysis would cover the historical dimensions, for the dilemma has its origins 
far back in time and will stretch far ahead into the future. The problem of alone 
or together is ultimately related to whether or not Hungarians believe in a 
genuine rebirth of Central Europe and accept that, after the dissolution of the 
East-West division, Central Europe is truly more than what György Konrád 
labels as “a cultural counter-hypothesis.” (Attila Melegh, 1989.) Now, with the 
Berlin Wall gone and “the revolution of human dignity”, as István Bibó put it, 
successfully achieved, does Hungary profess that a genuine real community 
has been created which has a reason, a political and economic role and, mainly, 
a separate identity hidden perhaps in its linguistic, historical, religious, etc. 
heterogeneity? (György Gyarmati, 1989.) If we are to accept that the artificially 
created “Eastern Bloc”, that was imposed on the region from the outside, is 
gone for good and that the “East-West dichotomy” (Géza Jeszenszky, 1989) 
was something forced and transitory, then we must accept what György Ránki 
said years ago, that “there are objective bases making the concept (of 
Mitteleuropa) functionally interpretable in the wider context of Europe and of 
the world economy”. (György Gyarmati, 1989.)
Indeed, the cooperation of the Visegrád Three is simply a determined 
attempt to transform the cultural, historical and geographical reality of Central 
Europe into a political and economic reality. These countries are dependent on 
each other, they are doomed to the same fate and they have identical interests: 
economic and political cooperation between them would considerably facilitate 
and promote their most basic national aspirations, their modernization and the 
relatively speedy and harmonious fitting of their societies and economies into 
the European integration. It is equally important to achieve that cooperation in 
order to prevent a revival of traditional structures of confrontation of the period 
between the two world wars. In the light of growing nationalism throughout 
the region, that danger must not be underestimated.
It is in the vital interest of every one of these countries to seek cooperation 
instead of confrontation, and to ward off the latter temptation by establishing a 
multiform and gradually strengthening cooperation which will be capable of 
surviving minor and major crises, and which will increasingly embrace the 
economic microsphere as well as direct human relations. From the aspect of 
Hungary’s future, this is just as important as the country’s entry into the 
European Community. In fact, the two strategic aspects, strengthening coop­
eration in Central Europe, banishing the possibility of historical confrontation 
and joining the European integration, are not competing goals; rather, they 
complement and reinforce each other. European unity will understandably 
reject the conflicts of Central Eastern Europe but will be able to admit partners 
that are able and prepared to cooperate among each other as well.
Naturally, Visegrád is not the same as Mitteleuropa: for one thing, the bor­
ders of the latter cannot be drawn unambiguously. Some countries are already 
outside it, with their course taking a happier turn in the 1950s than that of
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Hungary (though Hungarians cannot be blamed for that), while others are still 
outside it, having not yet made the value system and the actual standard 
embedded in the Central European idea, as represented by Visegrád, their own. 
The fact remains, however, that the Visegrád cooperation is the best expression 
of that identity without, of course, aiming at any sort of exclusivity.
The commonplace that gratitude and sympathy are not political categories is 
also true of international relations. Hungary would not do well to rely upon the 
sympathy and understanding of others in pursuing her aims. International 
political and economic links are as much determined by interests today as ever 
before, however sublime and long-term they may be. To achieve success, a 
policy needs to harmonize its goals to the largest possible degree, not only with 
its own set of standards but with those of the other party as well, while 
effectively making the other party aware of their mutual interests. With the aim 
of fully joining the European integration, this means that priority has to be 
given to an exploration, more thorough than ever before, of the role and 
importance of the Central European contribution to European integration. The 
point is not only that “the current geographical distribution of the Twelve is 
absurd both in the political and economic senses” (Ralf Dahrendorf, 1991), 
meaning it is absurd to speak about a unified Europe that does not include 
Vienna, Prague, Cracow, Bratislava or Budapest; in this specific historical 
situation, these countries offer a special bonus, a unique dedication to Europe, 
whose crucial origin lies in the almost full coincidence of their national and 
European aspirations. That dedication might release the extra amount of energy 
that is so badly needed, even at the current phase of the great work of 
constructing Europe.
As a result of the coincidence of national aspirations and the dedication to 
integration, these countries today are far more willing to accept the obligations 
that go with a unified Europe than many present member states of the European 
Community as it is now constituted.
For example, the Visegrád states would not for a moment hesitate to unques- 
tioningly accept the principle of finalité politique, understanding that the alpha 
and omega, the root and final objective of the European integration is a politically 
unified Europe. That political vision was at the back of the whole undertaking 
and, having laid the foundations of economic integration, it will soon be time for 
Europe to return to the starting point and make the critical decisions needed to 
create a unified Europe. The Maastricht treaty pointing in that direction is still 
half-hearted and ambiguous, as political union has largely remained confined to 
intergovernmental cooperation. However, consistent decision-making on such 
subjects cannot be delayed too long. It must be clearly defined whether Europe 
wants to spend the next thousand years as a structure of sovereign national states 
or as a uniform structure based upon genuine community and shared sovereignty. 
Central Europe is simply indispensable in this parturition. Its historical experi­
ence and tragedies (interchangeable terms, indeed) impell it towards the shedding 
of the logic of power exercised by national states, and direct its national 
aspirations to the economy and culture, while maintaining the indispensable
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categories of nation and national identity. And here we are, back at the determining 
principle of Hungarian foreign policy, the essence of her national aspirations.
Naturally, proving a dedication to Europe will not be as easy in practice, 
since we have dealt so far with a set of values rather than everyday realities. 
This is why some hard thinking must be devoted to not only what the finalité 
politique actually means to Hungary but also to the meaning of the acquis 
communautaire, that is, the acceptance by, and implanting into, Hungary’s 
economic, legal and institutional system of the Community’s system of regu­
lations and mechanisms developed over the years. In some areas the gap is 
huge, though in others Hungarians are not as far behind as they are inclined to 
believe. They must accurately survey their present situation, the steps to be 
taken, the sacrifices to be made, the internal and external hurdles to be 
overcome, be these in their economy, legal system or even in their thinking.
If, for instance, Hungary would resolve herself to gradually adopt the 
“derivative right” prevailing in the European Community, she would do what 
the EFTA-member signatories to the accord of May 2, 1992 on creating the 
European Economic Region have undertaken to do. In the fields of consumer 
protection, social policy, environmental protection, to name just a few, Hungary 
is faced with a tremendous amount of work and with the covering of the 
ensuing costs. No delay can be brooked, since the acquis communautaire is 
widening rather than shrinking; when the time comes for Hungary’s entry into 
the Community, it will be far more extensive than it is today, regarding 
economic and financial union, the creation of a common currency, uniform 
citizenship, a “welfare Europe”, and the labour law deriving from that, etc.
The criteria fo r  joining
A ll the necessary steps must be taken, all the necessary tools must be employed in order to achieve Hungary’s full membership as soon as 
possible. The country must demonstrate her commitment to integration, her 
willingness to fully accept the political aims and the established structure; at 
the same time, she must ask to be provided with an approximate schedule for 
the individual steps required by the process, as well as the criteria and conditions 
under which the Community would want to measure the success of changes in 
Hungary and the extent to which she is prepared for the integration.
A detailed definition of the criteria of joining would in fact serve the 
interests of both parties. For the candidate it would clarify the demands that 
have to be met; for the Community it would supply a guarantee protecting it 
from flimsily-based applications for admittance by countries left outside. 
Naturally, if admittance is to be considered to depend exclusively on present 
members’ unilateral discretion, that is if it is considered a unilateral act, then 
no such guarantee is necessary. But joining cannot be considered to be a matter 
for such a unilateral decision, either from the political or the legal point of 
view: the EC must remain open on principle to all European countries. In itself,
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joining is a result of an agreement, a treaty of joining bom out of bilateral 
negotiations. The criteria are basically linked with the essence and quality of 
the candidate country’s political and economic structure, and thus cannot be 
quantified.
As to the political conditions, they are mainly linked to the commitment to 
Europe already mentioned, and to the set of values whose unconditional 
acceptance is indispensable, both to carry out the obligations arising from 
membership and to the operation of the Community. More is needed here than 
just ensuring that a candidate country adopt the known requirements of a 
democratic political system and constitutional state as laid down in many an 
international document (including as a matter of course the enforcement of 
human and minority rights). The main conditions include harmony between 
the concerned country’s set of values and aspirations, and the future image of 
Europe that determines the shaping of the integration even today. What is 
needed is cooperation instead of confrontation, tolerance instead of intolerance, 
self-restraint and readiness for compromise instead of insistence on the en­
forcement of selfish interests.
The economic criteria are also relatively easy to define. The country wishing 
to join the community must clearly have an operable market economy, where 
the development of market mechanisms has reached the critical threshold that 
is imperative for the transnational liberation of economic factors. Private 
ownership will play a decisive role in that economy, all the more so as its 
absence would block the way to creating a lasting political democracy—the 
most essential of the political conditions. The country’s currency must have 
the level of convertibility needed for the free movement of goods, services, 
individuals, and capital. The stress is on quality compatibility rather than on 
the level of economic development. These criteria must be distinguished from 
the expanding elements of the acquis communautaire. The quality conditions 
of admittance may remain unchanged, which provides security for both parties, 
but the acquis communautaire will evidently keep on changing, so that the 
country intending to join the Community will obviously have to accept and 
adopt whatever is the current system. The same is true for institutional and 
legal criteria. The legal system must therefore be able to adopt European law as 
concerns both the decrees to be directly employed and the principles to be 
implemented by the national legislatures, all to be done in a way that refrains 
from disrupting that legal system’s integrity.
To create legal compatibility is outstandingly important, especially when 
one remembers that, since its birth, the EC has always regarded legislation as 
the chief tool for implementing the integration; indeed, the economic integra­
tion itself is built up through a delicate, finely chiselled, system of rights and 
duties, created by legal norms. By now Community legislation has gone far 
beyond economic lawmaking and is gradually embracing new fields. Again, 
the main demand on a candidate country is not the immediate adoption of the 
entire system of regulations but to make the quality of its legal system capable 
of integrating the laws of the European Communities.
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The main strategy of Hungary’s drive towards integration is to satisfy the set 
of criteria for the country’s integration as soon as possible, preferably at an 
accelerated pace. In international economic relations Hungarians have advanced 
a fair way: almost half of Hungary’s foreign trade is with EC member countries; 
the admittance of EFTA members will increase that proportion to two-thirds. 
Half of the foreign investment in Hungary also comes from the EC, but the US 
maintains a much higher rate in investment than in trade. Currently under 
elaboration, Hungary’s strategy for joining must define the elements of quali­
tative compatibility and the means necessary to achieve it in every sphere. 
Placing the process of adaptation in an overall strategy and accelerating things 
as much as possible is the road which will lead to success in joining the 
European Union. That course will not be all smooth: Hungarians will debate 
for long among themselves as well as with outsiders. What they must do is 
clarify their basic objectives and agree on the main points that might serve as 
common denominators in their discussions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ralf Dahrendorf (1991): A Conference Report, Richard McAllister, Edin­
burgh, April.
György Gyarmati (1989): “Magyarország Közép-Európaisága” (Hungary’s 
Central European Nature) Századvég. Special Issue pp. 42 and 44.
Géza Jeszenszky (1989): “A magyarság és a három Európa” (Hungarians and 
the three Europes) Századvég. Special Issue p. 48.
Attila Melegh (1989): “Előszó egy válogatáshoz, Kell-e nekünk Közép-Európa” 
(Preface to a Selection. Do We Need Central Europe?) Századvég.
Special Issue p.57.
The EC and Central Europe 75
John Lukacs
Two Worlds
H u n g a ry  is my mother. America is my wife.
1990. Sometimes after dinner I walk out to the grassy slope beyond our terrace. 
At those moments the charm of the present is inseparable from a satisfying 
sense of the past, because it is good to know that nearly everything I now see is 
still the same landscape that the American ancestors of my children saw 50, 
100, 150, 200 years ago. The sense of the future, I am afraid of it.
Will my children inherit this landscape? One hundred or 150 years ago our 
ancestors hoped that the railroad or the telegraph or the new highway would 
come close to where they were living, the sooner the better. In our time the 
news that a new highway or a new pipeline or a new development or a new 
shopping mall is coming close puts fear and loathing in our hearts.
I am not alone in this. Most of my neighbours feel the same. That is why, for 
the past twenty years or more, I have served on the Schuylkill Township 
Planning Commission. Each month my colleagues and I spend a long evening 
poring over the plans of subdivisions and developers that we may or may not 
recommend to the supervisors. All of our discussions are constrained by the 
technical and legal categories of definitions—matters, however, that ever so 
often are thick cloaks thrown over deeper personal, political divisions, divisions 
of differing views of the world. Most of us know how often development 
amounts not to opening up but to closing in, how it means the eager spreading
John Lukacs is a Budapest-horn historian living and teaching in the U.S. 
since 1946. His most recent books include Budapest, 1900 (Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, New York, 1988), Confessions of an Original Sinner (Ticknor & 
Fields, New York, 1990) andThe Duel. 10 May-31 July 1940. The Eighty-Day 
Struggle Between Churchill and Hitler. (The Bodley Head, London, 1990; 
Ticknor & Fields, New York, 1991.)
This is part of a chapter, altered and edited for NHQ, from John Lukacs’s 
forthcoming hook, The End of the Twentieth Century—and The End of the 
Modem Age, to be published by Ticknor & Fields (Houghton, Mifflin), New 
York, in February 1993.
76 The New Hungarian Quarterly
of cement and the indifferent razing of the land. We know how often construc­
tion means destruction—not only of trees and meadows but of certain ways of 
life. “Are you against progress?”, people sometimes ask me. The time has 
surely come to rethink the meaning of that word.
I have been living in this township and on this piece of land for thirty-seven 
years. But I am not a native American, I came here from my native country, 
Hungary, forty-four years ago, fleeing the imposition of a communist regime 
by the Russians. I thought then that this would last at least fifty years. But 
history is unpredictable. I did not know then how its dissolution would happen. 
That it would happen I began to see many years ago.
I have not been involved in émigré affairs or in Central European academic 
politics. At the same time I have kept close to a few old, trusted friends. One of 
them is an old priest, Monsignor Béla Varga, a leader of the prewar democratic 
Small Holders’ Party (of which I was a youthful member forty-seven years 
ago). He was the last speaker of the freely elected Hungarian parliament. He 
fled Hungary forty-three years ago. He is now eighty-seven years old and in 
frail health, the chaplain of a convent in New York, where I go to see him every 
time I am in that city.
And now came another, unpredictable coincidence. Elections were held in 
Hungary this spring. The largest party would form the new government; their 
candidate for prime minister is the son of Monsignor Varga’s ally and friend 
during the war, when both of them did a heroic job saving and protecting 
Polish refugees, escaped French prisoners of war and many Jews from the 
Nazis; and the candidate for the new foreign minister is a historian friend of 
mine. The monsignor and I followed the developments in Hungary, though not 
very closely. From more than four thousand miles away we wished them luck.
And then one day in April, the routine of our lives changed. Things were 
speeding up. I was at the Planning Commission meeting when Béla called my 
wife. The new, freely elected parliament would meet on the second of May. Its 
leaders wanted him, and me, to be there. What follows is a necessarily 
breathless (though perhaps not superficial) account of those days and of my 
thoughts, in diary form.
*
April 18, Wednesday. Fairly long Planning Commission meeting. This de­
veloper (to whom I spoke on the phone yesterday) is unusually eager to push 
his development through. Try to pin him down on how much of the woodland 
he will destroy. This is not easy. Details to be attended to: Trees with a 
diameter exceeding six inches must be shown on his plan. Two of the building 
setbacks on each plot missing. Ingress and egress of plotted driveways: Penn 
DOT approval required. Behind these things looms the menacing shadow of 
Big Brother—i.e., the Valley Forge Sewer Authority—not to speak of the 
restive steamroller of the Fernley tract. The latter is gathering strength before 
the bulldozers are ready to roar.
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April 19, Thursday. Béla calls from New York. Antall (the incoming prime 
minister), Géza (the incoming foreign minister) called from Budapest. They 
implored Béla to come and speak. Béla still reluctant. Doctor says he can go, 
provided that fatigue is kept to a minimum and all medications properly taken. 
He asks me to help with his speech. He says that I must come with him. Am 
reluctant—have millions of things to do here—but Stephanie says, “If he says 
so, you must.” Details to be attended to: must get airline seat next to him, 
Hungarian visa (not easy: cannot go up to consulate in New York). Write and 
xerox circular letter to a few friends in Budapest. Have no idea where I’m 
going to stay once I’m there.
April 28, Saturday. Wakeup with a hangover. Reason: drank a bottle of 
champagne last night, in order to celebrate first harvest and glorious consump­
tion of white—yes, white—asparagus spears cut last afternoon, something that 
I tried to grow for nineteen years in vain. (White asparagus is green asparagus, 
except that it must be planted much deeper. Asparagus expert told me it won’t 
work, white asparagus is a different strain. Expert was wrong.) I talk to R. and 
T. about coming Supervisors’ meeting on Wednesday, May 2. I ’ll be in 
Budapest then, at the first meeting of the new parliament of Hungary. Plenty of 
problems at both meetings. Here: Big Brother, i.e., the Sewer Authority, at it 
again, with its local allies who long to develop the entire township, pouring 
concrete over what’s left of open space. There: Big Brother, i.e. the Soviet 
Union, largely gone, but plenty of ambitious politicians wishing to pour 
rhetoric over what’s left of open space in Hungarian minds.
First day of historic journey. I take the train to New York, to Béla’s convent 
apartment. Nuns stand on the steps, with tears in their eyes, waving goodbye. 
Limousine to America’s number one concentration camp, Kennedy Airport. 
Thought occurs to me that I was in a sort of concentration camp in Hungary 
forty-six years ago. Fellow inmates preferable to mob at Kennedy.
April 29, Sunday. Arrival very moving. Bright windy morning. Béla comes 
slowly down the steps, leaning heavily on his cane. Government delegation on 
the tarmac, with flowers, also Béla’s old sister. His return to his homeland after 
forty-three years. I keep back, with tears in my eyes. Must say that this way of 
arriving is agreeable. No customs, no passport examination, limousines wait­
ing for us at the plane. Antall arranged that Béla and I will stay in a Government 
House. We drive into Budapest, the industrial suburbs giving way to streets 
lined with those old, sooty apartment buildings with their smoky, vinegary 
smell. We cross the Danube. Government House is high up in the Buda hills 
(not far from where my grandparents’ villa was). Now my big job begins— 
fending off people from this old priest after his wearisome journey. I wave a 
reporter away, unsuccessfully. Turns out to be editor of a newspaper, to whom 
an interview was promised. So Béla sits on an uncomfortable sofa, answering 
stupid questions. (“What did you think when you first saw the Hungarian 
flag?” Plenty of Hungarian flags in the United States.) The township reporter 
of The Evening Phoenix is much more intelligent.
Staff of Government House more than helpful. They are evidently personnel
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of previous communist government, probably including former secret police­
men, all anxious about their jobs now. After we settle Béla down, I ask them to 
call a taxi for me. “Sir,” they say, “there is a car and a driver and a bodyguard 
at your disposal here.” Car at my disposal is a Lada (Russian Fiat), bodyguard 
a policeman in civvies for whom proper adjective is “burly”. (There are clichés 
that are true.) Not knowing where I ’ll stay, I had telephoned I. to get me a hotel 
room, also told her that I ’ll come straight to her apartment. The streets leading 
down to the city are green and gold and all the trees in leaf. I tip the driver and 
tell him not to bother to come back for me. I ’ll just take a cab. I.’s small 
apartment, in which she survived more than three decades of communism, is a 
perfect combination of elegance and coziness (not House and Garden stuff). That 
kind of survival is what is best about Hungary and Hungarians. Later that day I 
meet an American diplomat. “Tell me one thing,” he asks. “Why is it that every 
Hungarian I meet is deeply pessimistic but at the same time they enjoy life so 
much?” That is a very intelligent question. Finally I come up with an answer. “I 
can’t tell you why. I can only tell you how.”
Back to Government House again. Large, semi-opulent furnishings rather 
unbeautiful. Béla rests through the long afternoon. Telephone keeps ringing 
without cease. Staff keeps telling me that they will serve food and drink for us, 
whatever and whenever we like. After all, only a few guests in the building. 
When George Bush came to Budapest last July (for a single day), his staff 
consisted of at least five hundred people. (Is this what the Republicans mean 
when they say they are against Big Government?)
At night descend to town again. Dinner with I. and L. We are told about great 
economic distress in Hungary, but the restaurants are crowded. I fought jet lag 
all day and now take a sleeping pill and collapse into bed. I address a request to 
the former secret policeman: breakfast in my room at eight o’clock, please. 
April 30, Monday. I am awakened as huge breakfast arrives on huge tray at 
7:59:60.1 had thrown off all my sheets and find myself naked on top of bed. (It 
is not always wonderful to have obsequious servants.) I dress and walk out on 
terrace, heavy smell of lilacs in the air. Between the trees, the roofs and towers 
of the city, four miles away, scintillating in the sun. Garden not too well kept. 
Thoughts of all of the mowing I’ll have to do when I return home. Staff, who 
had no idea who I was when I arrived (perhaps American secret policeman, 
accompanying the main guest?), now have been told by someone to call me 
Professor. (Well, I ’ve known many an American professor working for the 
CIA.) Read Hungarian newspapers, find them quite good. One cartoon worthy 
of the old New Yorker. Farms in Hungary were collectivized by communists, 
but through the years peasants have done rather well, everyone doing his own 
thing in those collectives. Cartoon shows well-dressed couple in well-fur­
nished apartment with large TV, VCR, lots of furniture. Man reading the paper, 
turning with a worried face to his wife: “They are returning our land to us. 
What are we going to do?”
At night, dinner at apartment of my friend the incoming foreign minister. 
Could not send flowers to his wife, since all shops closed, this being a holiday,
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the eve of May Day. (Will it remain a holiday?) Dinner party consists of many 
of his friends, some of them future ambassadors and ambassadresses. I drink 
less than usual, to E.’s considerable surprise. Am flattered to hear that many of 
them know me, having read my articles and books published in America and 
England. Does not happen in Philadelphia or Phoenixville, but perhaps no 
great loss. Cannot find a taxi, but walk through the warm liquid midnight air to 
the Intercontinental Hotel, its doorway still crowded with loud—very loud— 
Germans. I say something to the doorman in Hungarian and get a taxi ahead of 
the Germans. Great improvement, this: not so long ago it was better to speak 
English if you wanted to arrange something in Budapest. Suggests a rise of 
national self-confidence, without which most political changes turn out to be 
meaningless.
May 1, Tuesday. Hurried call from superintendent of Parliament Building, to 
look over and arrange Béla’s arrival, seating and speech tomorrow. This 
superintendent is an excellent man. The building is splendidly refurbished. I 
am touched by a sense of historical continuity: the intaglioed woodwork, the 
1900 lettering, the frescoes, the heavy gleaming brass ashtrays set into the 
windowsills of the corridor for the convenience of the honorable members. The 
Parliament Building has twenty-four gates. Béla will arrive at Gate Six, from 
where the walk is shortest and there is an elevator close to the entrance. Then 
we will rest in a chamber and have coffee and refreshments; and then through 
the high, Gothic-eaved corridors into the main chamber. Below the rostrum are 
the red velvet armchairs of the government ministers. Will Béla speak from 
there? For there is a microphone at that place. Or will he be able to mount the 
rostrum? Well, yes. It is only eight steps and has a strong brass railing. But 
there is no place there for him to sit. And now the superintendent produces a 
standing desktop that will be perfect. Béla can lean on it as he holds his speech 
in his old, lovable, trembling hands. That is how it will be.
This was the largest parliament building in the world when it was finally 
completed in 1901. Now I am playing a part in it, as I am playing a small part 
in the government of Schuylkill Township, which has one of the smallest 
township buildings in Chester County, surely bereft of intaglio, scagliola, 
marble, and red velvet. Now—without so wanting—I am involved in politics 
here, too. There are pressures on us to do this or that with the speech, to add this 
or that to it. The pressures involve the historical prospects of my native 
country, Hungary. It is surely different from my involvement in the Compre­
hensive Plan of Schuylkill Township, Chester County, Pennsylvania. Now I 
am involved in the final wording of summary judgments on previous centuries, 
on an entire nation’s relationship with Europe and with the Russian empire, 
with allusions to some of the deep differences and fissures within the democratic 
Hungary now emerging, with suggestions heavy with meaning—not with tree 
callipers, roadside berms, ultimate right of way, side yard setbacks and lot 
averaging.
Two kinds of politics. Two very different places. Two very different occa­
sions. And yet—ultimately the essence of these matters is the same.
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First and foremost: the history and the essence of politics are a matter of 
words. This may sound strange in this age of pictorial presentations and 
numerical computerization, but so it is. In the beginning was the Word, as the 
Bible says, and so it is still. It is words that move us, hurt us, inspire us, depress 
us, because we think in words. In this historic speech a change of one word or 
two, the omission or addition of a single phrase, could make all the difference. 
It could affect not only the tone but the entire meaning of the message that this 
old and honorable man addresses to a nation. His words most probably will not 
change the course of world history. But within my lifetime there were words 
that did change the course of history: Hitler’s words to which an entire nation 
rose to respond, ready to bear arms; and Churchill’s words that made another 
nation ready to respond, to resist Hitler even when it was largely bereft of arms.
It strikes me that the future of Schuylkill township also depends on words. 
Not on “facts”, because there is no fact in this world that exists apart from the 
words with which it is expressed, or thought. It is words—about zoning, about 
wetlands, about lot lines, about soil configurations—that decide the fate of 
what may be built and where, and of what may be preserved or where; it is 
words that a judge will use when he makes a legal ruling, deciding a case for a 
developer or for a township. The law consists of words.
Right now I am making a great deal of fuss because a friend wants us to 
change one sentence to be heard tomorrow in the parliament of Hungary. Last 
year I made a great deal of fuss because the consultants whom the township 
supervisors had employed to draft the new Comprehensive Plan had chosen to 
define unbuilt parcels of land in Schuylkill Township as “vacant lands”. I rose 
up against that. “Vacant,” I said, means abandoned, empty, useless. Does this 
mean that every single plot of land of ten acres or more in this township that is 
not yet covered with buildings is abandoned, empty, useless? Some people 
thought that I was making a mountain out of an empty lot; or that perhaps I was 
only speaking as a professor. No, the matter was not that of the traditions of 
language. It was the preservation of honesty and decency—in the Schuylkill 
Township building as well as in the National Assembly of Hungary in Budapest.
Words are inseparable from ideas. Communism is gone in Hungary because 
for many years no one believed in it, including communist party members, and 
now including the present leader of the Russian empire. That is why Hungary— 
thank God—has gone through a bloodless revolution; not because Reagan and 
Weinberger forced the Russians into an armament race that the latter could not 
financially afford. In Schuylkill Township the battle will be won once people’s 
ideas—not merely their feelings, those are already changing—change to the 
extent that they recognize the outdated vision of technological progress that 
would make the entire world into one gigantic suburb, with endlessly sprawl­
ing shopping malls or airports.
The second essential similarity between these two places is that of the 
human element in politics. The main political division in Hungary now exists 
between two large political parties, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the 
Association of Free Democrats. The literal sense of these words means noth-
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,ing, just as in the United States, where there are no monarchists or aristocrats, 
only Republicans and Democrats. The real divisions go deeper. They exist 
within the parties, not among them—in Hungary as well as in Schuylkill 
Township. There are good eggs and bad eggs in both parties. And who are the 
bad eggs? Well, whether in the Danube basin or in Chester County, Pennsylvania, 
they are the same kind of people: people who are moved mainly by envy and 
resentment—envy of other people who are (or who seem to be) more respect­
able or successful than they are, resentment of people who are (or who seem to 
be) better off because they seem to know more of the world. Such people exist 
within the majority party in Hungary, as they exist among the majority party in 
Chester County. They are a minority, but sometimes a hard minority. That is 
exactly what is missing in the numerical configurations of the pollsters. A hard 
minority may—I am not saying that it will—exert an influence beyond its 
numbers, let alone the quality of its component men and women, because when 
there is not much more than a soft majority in its way, a hard group of people or 
a well-organized lobby can give the public impression that it represents the 
popular and respectable majority. That is the danger of populist democracy in 
Hungary, between East and West, as well as in Schuylkill Township, between 
Phoenixville and Valley Forge.
In the history of Hungary, Dr. Johnson’s famous phrase has been, alas, often 
applicable—patriotism having been the last refuge of scoundrels. In America 
too, to which I must add that free-enterprise patriotism is often the last resort of 
developers. The danger to democracy is not political extremism. It is the kind 
of ambition that is fueled by resentment and greed—and greed itself is a 
consequence rather than a cause, a consequence of a sense of fear. That fear is 
not really a fear of financial insecurity. It is a fear of personal inadequacy. The 
father of greed is vanity—in Budapest and Hungary as well as in any American 
small town or suburb.
May 2, Wednesday. A brilliant May morning, full of promise. I am worried 
about the arrangement: Has my old friend taken his pills along? Will he bear 
the strain of standing up so long? But all goes well, including my secondary 
worry: Since I am not a former member of parliament, but only his companion, 
will there be a seat for me in the gallery once he is escorted to the parliament 
floor? But then I am led to one of the six ceremonial boxes on the floor itself, 
each with four red velvet chairs. I sit next to Princess Walburga von Habsburg, 
daughter of Otto von Habsburg, who is also here. The son of the last king of 
Hungary, he is a well-liked figure in the country now. The princess is hand­
some and tells me that she has one of my books on her night table in their house 
in Bavaria. Before I have a chance to feel flattered, we all stand. The national 
anthem is played. It could not be more appropriate at this moment. (At some of 
the supervisors’ meetings in Schuylkill Township we recite the Pledge of 
Allegiance, which I do not find quite appropriate there; but then here, too, an 
actor goes to the platform and recites a poem, “To the National Assembly”, 
written one hundred and forty years ago, and I find his tone and his declama­
tion not quite proper.) Finally my old friend Béla rises and slowly walks to the
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rostrum. His speech lasts not more than eight minutes. They fly by. At the end 
is a passage that is as fitting for Hungary as it is for the United States—for my 
native country as well as for my adopted one. He says that the Nazis and the 
communists incarnated a pagan barbarism from which Hungary is now freed; 
“but ahead of us are perhaps the shadows of a new, technological paganism, 
threatening the nature of our homeland, our continent, our mother earth”.
There is a standing ovation. Two other, much longer speeches follow. Then 
an intermission. There is a champagne reception in the presidential chambers, 
above the Danube. The sunlight pours in. Béla is tired. He will not stay for the 
rest of the long first session of parliament; he wants to go back to the house and 
rest. I will go with him; I say goodbye to some of my friends and acquaintances 
and to Walburga; “Je vous prie de bien vouloir soumettre mes hommages á 
Madame vőtre mere.” I wished that my mother had lived to see this day and 
that my American wife were here, but that was not to be. Back in Pennsylvania 
dawn is now breaking. It is the second of May, the monthly supervisors’ 
meeting. What is happening in Budapest is the celebration of the end of a long, 
painful chapter and the beginning of a new chapter in a nation’s history. What 
will be discussed in Schuylkill Township is many petty matters but, after all is 
said, the preservation of something that means more than a few acres here and 
there; the preservation of a countryside, of a landscape, of a way of life, of a 
country.
All of the world’s great newspapers are here. I give the correspondent of the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine my English translation of Monsignor Varga’s speech. 
The next day the paper prints a precise account of it. This never happens in The 
New York Times or even in the Philadelphia Inquirer, though it does happen 
sometimes in the Evening Phoenix, not to speak of the Schuylkill Township 
Civic Association’s Newsletter, where all the details do count.
1991. Nine months later I am, surprisingly, in Hungary again, teaching in the 
university, living in a spacious rented apartment. My roots are here—and in 
America. This is a physical impossibility but (as with my other human phe­
nomena) not a spiritual one. I am not a hybrid. I belong to both places. But 
America—more precisely, Pennsylvania—is my home now.
I write English better than I write Hungarian. I find it easier to lecture in 
English than in Hungarian. Now that I am here I can talk Hungarian as well as 
I can talk English. I read Hungarian as fast as I read English. As I read, I find 
that I am exceptionally sensitive to the nuances in Hungarian journalism, 
detecting—often without wishing to look for them—the underlying suggestions 
of animosities and disaffections, the opportunisms latent in so many words— 
the choice of every word being less an aesthetic decision than a moral one.
All day I speak and hear and listen to and read Hungarian. Then, at night, I 
pick up Trollope or Jane Austen from my night table. Reading Emma at night 
in Budapest is like drinking cool, pure, clear water in a crystal glass. That 
purity amounts to more than innocence, the rosy innocence of that wondrous 
English girl (I mean both Emma, and Jane Austen) of nearly two centuries ago. 
That English prose is full of subtleties and insights, it is elegant and modem.
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Two hundred years ago it was far ahead of Eastern European prose (probably 
no longer true of most English prose—this is perhaps sad).
Another night I flip on Hungarian television. A 1942 movie with Fred Astaire. 
Against his loose-limbed elegance (and the swinging music) the silly script 
does not matter. Oddly, or perhaps not so oddly, I am moved by it.
28 February 1991. Bush comes on the television. I was against the Gulf War. 
I thought that it was none of our (“our”: I can seldom use that American 
pronoun with ease) business; that the Near East was, and remains, a quagmire; 
that Bush’s way of speaking is lamentable, it reflects the puerility of his 
thinking. But now, for once, I am moved by one of his phrases: “This war is 
now behind us.” That simple sentence touches me. For a moment I feel very 
American.
One afternoon I see a Hungarian flag, on a thin long pole, flying over the 
northern bastion of Castle Hill, and I am moved as I think that this simple 
national flag has somehow prevailed. It is 1991 but it might as well be 1848. 
There is something so historic as to be almost eternal about it. That lone banner 
is not assertive or grandiloquent. I feel no exhilaration, no nationalist pride; I 
feel the presence of the endurance of something decent and modest and good. 
31 March 1991. Dinner at the familiar apartment of X. I know most of the 
people but I do not quite feel at home there now.
9 April 1991. Dinner with Dervla Murphy, at the residence of the British 
ambassador. I know few of the people but I feel at home there because it is a 
very beautiful house, it once belonged to the Scitovszkys, an old Hungarian 
family, of a world that is now gone.
Gone, too, is that large part of the old Hungary of one thousand years that 
was tom off and given to other, new states after World War 1.1 am sensitive to 
the evocative power of certain place names, old American place names such as 
Cinnaminson, Christiana, Sumneytown, though not Wounded Knee. And now 
of old Hungary: Vihorlát, Görgényi havasok. Something in these names is 
more than music. When I read their names in print (or on a map), my imagination 
crystallizes. But it is not only imagination. I see those windswept, morose, 
lonely mountain ranges in what is now Slovakia, the other in what is now 
Rumanian Transylvania. Alone, mysterious, with their largely unvexed forests, 
with a few sparse paths trod by poor peasants and paced in the winter by 
hunters. So they were, still of a very old world, that other world, before 1914, 
they belonged to us, to the other Hungary, before I was born; but these things 
are within me. Forever. “A nation cannot be an object of charity”—that is, 
love— Simone Weil once wrote. “But a country can be such, as an environment 
bearing traditions which are eternal.”
The apartment that I rented in Budapest in the late winter and spring of 1991 
was very comfortable and well furnished but of course not beautifully, on the 
Pest side of the river. (I would have preferred Buda but I was fortunate in 
having secured this kind of apartment, after all.) It is not more than a half mile 
away from the sanatorium where I was bom, and a quarter of a mile away from 
a house where my family once lived for a short time. Both buildings no longer
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exist, they were destroyed by American bombs in the summer of 1944, in a 
neighbourhood that was otherwise largely unharmed by the war.
So often I walk through the streets here on grey winter evenings, with the 
streetlights spraying a thin misty halo through the pearly fog. This was once an 
upper-middle-class neighbourhood, with most of the houses built between 
1890 and 1910, semi-palatial villas having one or two apartments on each 
floor, with large, high-ceilinged rooms, stuccoed or coffered ceilings, French 
windows, parquet floors—an atmosphere containing soupcons of pretentious 
elegance and a solid essence of bourgeois comfort. Some of these houses were 
impressive, with a limited majesty of their own, a few of them built in the then 
Parisian style, emulating the nouveau-riche villas and apartment houses of the 
belle époque, of the Bois, Auteuil, Neuilly (unlike elsewhere in Budapest, the 
Austro-German architecture of private houses was not ubiquitous here).
Then came 1944-45, the last dreadful year of the war, with the bombings 
and the protracted siege of Budapest; and soon after that, four decades of 
darkness—literal darkness—of the communists’ rule. The once owners and 
occupants of these houses and apartments disappeared. They came to be 
occupied by new, unsure, dark-faced tenants: by newfangled functionaries of 
the ruling party; by Mongolian or Vietnamese embassies; by head offices of 
trade unions. About five years ago came another change. The communist era 
was fading. Some of these apartments were occupied by new families again. 
Unlike fifty years ago, the curbs of these streets are now lined with automobiles. 
The Automobile Century had not fully arrived in Budapest then; it has surely 
arrived now.
In that wintry fog there are not many lights casting a pleasant glow into the 
street from the small crystal chandeliers of those second-floor drawing rooms 
or family rooms. So many of the windows are dark. Perhaps ten years hence 
much of this will change. A new class rises on the ruins of communism in 
Hungary, the latter having been a foreign-imposed episode that was almost 
unbearably long for those who had to live through it but, really, not so long in 
the history of a nation.
It snowed again, and I walked through these streets to a restaurant and then 
back again. Now the evening was beautiful, the snow illuminated through the 
arcs of the streetlights and then resting on the pavements, the air metallic and 
clean. There was no breeze, the falling snowflakes had a quiet, unbroken 
quality of something silent and endless.What was missing was the contrast 
between the snow and the houses, between the peacefulness of the winter 
outside and the warm interiority inside.
I love winter because of that contrast, whether in my Pennsylvania country 
or in a European city. Now, in Budapest in 1991, there is little of that. A few 
pale curtained windows, a greyish rather than yellowish (is it the flicker of 
television?) light filtering through. Of the ten, twelve, fifteen French windows 
opening onto the streets, perhaps two or three are lit here and there, suggesting 
the impression of private life inside. How different from fifty or sixty years 
ago, with the then promise of comfort and some impressively beautiful rooms
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and furnishings, once one had entered the massive front doors and found 
oneself in a well-lit foyer or vestibule, aware, after the snow-laden silence of 
the street and the chilly staircase, of the high chatter of people, or of an entirely 
different warm silence, the muffled breath of well-brushed rugs and tobacco- 
brown plush.
All I can see here and now is some kind of restricted living, a huddle under 
high ceilings, not much of an interior life, not even that of comfort. Yes, 
“privatization” will come. Some of these buildings will be vacated by the 
present occupants and institutions and offices; new nouveaux riches will 
occupy them. That has happened before. And, no matter how one may have 
disliked the nouveaux riches then, it behoves one to know how quickly (that 
also is very Hungarian) those then nouveaux riches learned so much about taste 
and fine things. Within one generation these palatial houses became occupied 
by families worthy of them. But now this will not happen again. There will be 
no more haute bourgeoisie—not here, and perhaps nowhere else in the world. 
The offices, too, will remain—indeed expand, with fluorescent tubes glaring 
from those high stuccoed ceilings. Computers, giant television screens pushed 
against the now dulled boiserie wainscoting. One kind of bureaucracy replac­
ing another. Elegance, no. Never again.
The great, profound moral shortcoming of anti-ccommunism—that is, anti­
communism from a safe distance— springs from two sources. The first is a 
sense of self-satisfaction: knowing that one is on the right side, on the respectable 
side, together with all of those right-thinking people. The other is the exag­
geration of the diabolical powers and machinations of communism and com­
munists.
The exaggeration of the powers of someone or something alien is a frequent 
human shortcoming. It is different from paranoia, which exaggerates the 
powers of someone or something that is, or that we think is, our determined 
opponent, someone or something that we know. Most anti-communists are not 
paranoid. Paranoids indulge in their fears, an indulgence that is masochistic 
and not particularly satisfying. Anti-communism at a safe distance is self- 
satisfying; it may even be turned to personal and occupational profit. Of course 
this is not true of people who live under communism, who are oppressed by 
communists or threatened by them. Their opposition to communism is admirable.
I have criticized the ideology of anti-communism often, the insidious incli­
nation -to consider it as if it were identical with patriotism. I wrote about when 
and how anti-communist ideology resulted in a misreading of the intentions of 
Soviet Russian foreign policy, or when it damaged the essential standards of 
traditional American institutions. I alluded once, briefly, to the sense of insecurity 
and inferiority that I saw among so many communists in Hungary in 1945 
when, as a matter of fact, they were either in power or about to come to power. 
I knew that they would come to full power, which is why I left Hungary in 
1946.
A year or so later the communist regime was cemented into place. Around 
that time, in 1948 or 1949, the then new residents, with their organizations,
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institutes, consulates, and embassies, moved into these abandoned and se­
questered semi-palatial villas allotted to them. They did not enter these build­
ings in high spirits, with the sureness of self-confidence.Three years after the 
war and the sordid tragedies that had befallen Budapest, these buildings were 
deadeningly dank, empty and cold, their walls peeling, with no sign of human 
presence except perhaps for a few pieces of furniture left behind. They were 
not like the Smolny Institute or Kseshinskaya’s palace three decades earlier, 
swarming with excited revolutionaries. It was not like Brest-Litovsk either: 
these new ambassadors, ministers and council presidents were second- or 
third-rate former intellectuals, not peasants or workers. And they were not 
alone. Unlike the revolutionary communists of the past, they did not bring their 
own personnel. They were made dependent on a staff assigned to them by the 
real masters of power, the bosses of the secret police. Those janitors, mechanics, 
drivers, waiters, telephonists, and secretaries were often of working-class or 
peasant origins, culled from volunteers coming forth from the dregs of the 
proletariat, satisfied with the stroke of fortune that had come to them, instinc­
tively aware of their power over their present superiors. They were—often 
with the kind of contempt with which a crude servant watches a weak master— 
watching the latter as they were sitting and shuffling along beneath those cold 
high ceilings.
That new ruling class: the men and women whom Americans (including the 
CIA) saw as idealist fanatics, committed to a world-revolutionary ideal, to be 
combated with fire and poison, “the communist totalitarian international 
revolutionaries of the world”. At most, they were ephemeral beneficiaries of 
power, but not for long. They knew that. Their positions, their dwellings, their 
titles and their perquisites depended on whom they could not hope ever to 
control. They knew something else too—another contribution to their sense of 
inferiority. They knew (without, of course, ever saying so) that everything that 
was Russian and Soviet and communist was second rate. That is why, even 
around 1950, in the peak years of untrammeled Stalinism and the iron curtain, 
the high moments of self-satisfaction in their social lives occurred not when 
they were invited as guests to another communist embassy reception, say a 
Bulgarian or even a Soviet one, but when they were allowed to appear at a 
“Western” one: not American or British, of course, but perhaps a French one; 
say, a reception given to a fellow-travelling Paris intellectual or filmmaker. 
They knew that everything in the West was better and richer._They did not for 
a moment doubt that life (or an assignment) in Moscow or Peking was not 
preferable to Paris or Brussels, though they hoped (well, perhaps some of 
them) that sooner or later the communist part of the world might reach those 
Western standards or even improve them—once, say, France would become 
communist; but I think that deep down they knew that would never happen.
Those thoughts and ambitions and tastes—of an ephemeral new class of 
communist bureaucrats, in their urban compounds, run-down and fear-rid­
den—those evenings in those villas in the 1950s! t here will be no Balzac to 
describe them, and not only because of the decline of literature. There is more
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to this than my imagination, or the fragments one now knows about life among 
the communist high officialdom at that time. Now it is 1991. Almost every day 
1 pass the Albanian embassy as I go to the Andrássy Avenue subway station. 
The building is locked tight, with one Peugeot at the curb with its diplomatic 
license plate, covered with dirty snow, looking as abandoned as most of that 
embassy building behind its forbidding, heavy iron railings. Now there is 
hardly anyone in sight except for the occasional presence of a couple of 
unshaven men squatting behind the fence, stubbing out their cigarettes, talking 
in an unintelligible language, with their sharp suspicious eyes, their smoky, 
gap-toothed, stubbled, half-feral faces.
April 1991. A three-day trip to northeastern Hungary with S. and Dervla. I rent 
a car, a Lada, the cheapest available. Made in the bowels of Russia in a giant 
factory planned and constructed by Fiat engineers in the early 1960s, when 
even Khrushchev had to consent to the mass production of private cars. (He 
had been against that originally, having seen traffic jams in the United States— 
had that in this Automobile Century, been one of the reasons for his fall?) This 
brand-new Lada is about forty years behind Western standards, impractical 
(the ignition requires poking under the wheel with your left hand), but the frame 
and steel are much heavier than those of Japan-made cars. (Perhaps that was 
the key to the success of Russian tanks during World War II: primitive but 
solid and heavy.)
The Hungarian countryside is better kept than ever before. This was already 
so twenty years ago, under the communists, when the human reality (this 
family is in charge of this field, that yard is yours) was more important than the 
official categories of collective farming. Now, in Eger, in the beautiful narrow 
streets beneath the old fortress walls, every second house is being restored, 
repainted, refurbished.This is the essence of real hope for Hungary, this kind of 
private ownership and enterprise, that is: enterprise for the purpose of owner­
ship (as is the case of so many Americans who work on their own houses) and 
not the reverse (as is the case of developers). I can imagine living here when 
getting old, a cozy existence, ambling in a big sheepskin coat on clear cold 
evenings on my way to a tavern; expecting in the morning guests from far away 
and knowing that I can drive once in a while to Budapest or Vienna, or fly to 
Kandersteg or Bruges from there; and walking in the town cemetery once in a 
while, not too deep in thought.
We drive on to Sárospatak. We have an extra two hours, so we drive across 
the mountains—they are very lonely on this cold April afternoon—to Lillafüred, 
to the Palace Hotel, where I spent five fantastic days and nights in January 
1944. We stop there in the chilly spring twilight. The hotel is fairly intact. The 
Russians used it as a military hospital during the last months of the war and for 
some years thereafter. Then it became an official resort for trade unionists. It is 
still that, but the ownership is now in question, and the hotel takes guests again. 
It is smaller than I had remembered it—as is everything else from one’s youth. 
The dining room, now empty, with its fake-medieval carvings, is the same. My 
heart twitches only when I see that curve along the first-floor corridor whereto
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I hurried down night after night on the back stairs to the room of a woman I was 
madly in love with then.
There is an exhibit of largely yellowed photographs of the opening of the 
Palace Hotel in 1927, and guests from the early 1930s. I am surprised how 
incredibly far away this seems now. The photographs evoke a past, people 
whose names I knew and recognize very well, but—unlike in other places of 
the world—none of this is recoverable here. In so many other places, with so 
many other people, fragments of the past are still alive. Here the past is dead.
In Sárospatak we find a good small inn, originally a convent in the seventeenth 
century. The Rákóczi-Windischgraetz castle next morning, made into an ex­
cellent museum (Lajos Windischgraetz, that dubious prince, had turned it over 
to my mother and stepfather for a week, their honeymoon in 1932; surely it 
could not have been the entire castle). Then we drive and stop and find a 
muddy lane, three miles out of town, leading to the country house where I spent 
a, perhaps magical, summer at the age of ten, in 1934. Well, I find the house. I 
walk on its empty porch. Someone must live in one of its back rooms. But it is 
a dead house.
On the way up, tramping through the mud, I find and talk to a family of 
workers in the vineyards. In this part of the vineyard the vines are held by wires 
strung up between concrete posts. (Farther uphill they are still trained on 
wooden poles.) What they tell me about the conditions, the advantages and 
disadvantages, of “private” ownership and belonging to the “collective” only 
confirm how these categories are full of holes; that reality hardly corresponds 
to these definitions; that ownership, possession, income and profit have now 
thick and uneven layers of different meanings, and that it will be a long time 
before these things are newly defined and accepted by those whose lives 
depend on them. Ten minutes with these workers confirms again my basic 
optimism about my native people: that they have risen in intelligence and self- 
confidence; that they are a people with great, perhaps potentially very great, 
talents.
Next day, after a dreadful and dreary lunch at Nyíregyháza (where I find 
Krúdy’s birthplace and have S. photograph me there), we stop along a ditch of 
the two-lane highway going east. Dervla and I take down her bicycle from the 
roof of the car. She tells us to leave, since it will take her at least half an hour to 
mount her panniers astride the back wheels. She will cross into Rumania at 
night along a dirt track, avoiding a frontier post, skirting the paved roads. If the 
Rumanian police or soldiers catch her, she will show them a letter (translated 
into Rumanian) from her (and before her, Byron’s) publisher John Murray, on 
London office stationery, with a big rubber stamp on it (the latter is very 
important in Eastern Europe). What is even more risky, she carries in her 
rucksack the Hungarian videotape I got in Budapest, a two-hour tape showing 
the Rumanian mob attacking the Magyars in Marosvásárhely, from a sad and 
bloody two days of incidents. It is extremely dangerous to travel with such a 
videotape in Rumania. But she stuck a label on the cassette that now reads La 
Traviata.
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Yet this farsighted and admirable Dervla is not altogether inclined to favor 
the Magyar side in Transylvania. Only one of her explanations makes sense to 
me: she says that, being Irish, she has a natural inclination to at least understand 
and at best sympathize with the underdog—that is, with the people who are 
often being looked down upon. She says that in some ways the Magyars are the 
way the English have been, and the Rumanians the Irish. But, Dervla, I say: the 
Rumanians have ruled the bloody place for more than seventy years now, and 
they suppress the Magyars! She says that there are two sides to this; the 
Magyar complaints are often imprecise and exaggerated (perhaps true?); and 
she finds something about Hungarians, even in Budapest, that she does not 
quite like. They are unfriendly. Or: less friendly than are Rumanians. I cannot 
see this, which is why I cannot agree with her. Yet she is so observant, so 
perceptive, so intelligent and so honest that I am disturbed: there must be 
something in what she says. But I do not know what, and how much.
Hospitality in Europe, especially in Eastern Europe, and in Hungary. In 
Eastern Europe people are exceptionally hospitable to foreign visitors. There is 
an oriental element in this. They want to impress those visitors; and—in most 
cases not quite consciously—they think that they might benefit from this kind 
of hearty (and it is hearty; nothing false about it) hospitality, sometime, 
somehow. At the same time, they will invite you only when they think they can 
(and must) offer you substantial hospitality. (Of course there is a reason for 
their anxiety: their cramped apartments and living quarters.) This is now a 
handicap for foreigners. To come over for a drink, to take potluck with us— 
that is very American, missing here (but also in Western Europe). That is a 
pity, since there are few coffeehouses, clubs and taverns where one can 
otherwise get together in a convivial fashion.
One thing that I miss now: a well-appointed American bar in an American 
city, downtown, with a serried array of twinkling bottles, plenteous and deco­
rative with the glimmer of dark wood and pleasant lights, around six o’clock in 
the evening, waiting to meet someone there before dinner—one of the moments 
of mundane American life at its best, rich and easygoing as the alcohol lifts 
one’s spirits higher, though that is merely incidental.
Budapest has an immense problem that would require literally billions of 
dollars to fix. The city (especially on the Pest side) rose quickly, it grew out of 
the earth in an extraordinary burst of energy, with the result that an overwhelm­
ing majority of its houses were built almost exactly one hundred years ago, and 
are now in need of the most essential repairs. And this is Europe where space is 
limited. Unlike in a fast-growing American city, these houses were not aban­
doned or allowed to become slums in one generation after their first dwellers. 
People have been living in them, crowded, anxious and jealous to preserve their 
homes through decades. Had 1 speculated about their future fifty years ago I 
would have imagined that by 1990 or 2000 vast tracts of these Mietkasernen 
would, indeed should, be torn down and a new city of sunlit modernity, replete 
with glass surfaces, would or should arise. Not now. That is no longer desirable. 
They must be rebuilt, carefully, made livable and enduring, so that one hundred
90 The New Hungarian Quarterly
years from now people and tourists will say: “How beautiful this all is, this late- 
nineteenth-century city!” (This is one of those things that I find to be conceiv­
able as well as imaginable. (I fear it won’t happen, except here and there.)
On the Körönd, the Rond-Point of Budapest. Those magnificent—ugly but 
magnificent— 1890 palaces of apartment houses, with their Wilhelmine-German 
towers. In one of them, in April 1940,1 was at a party of young people, one of the 
jours anxious mothers gave for their daughters, inviting boys and girls from their 
dancing schools. Now the gigantic iron railings are msty, the weeds are rank and 
high in the courtyards, it is almost like mins of the Altstadt in Dresden I saw six 
years ago. But there are a few lights in the windows, so people are living in them.
The neighbouring, lower-class streets have more life, with young people 
and older people, the latter with grim, hard-bitten mouths and faces, not so 
different from the past, except perhaps for the poison-sweet ubiquitous smell 
of diesel fumes in that otherwise thin and dry continental, eastern air.
What is well preserved in this city is very beautiful, because of the dedica­
tion of people in charge of it. The Museum of Fine Arts, for example. That, too, 
looked monumental to me fifty years ago. Its interior spaces and its facade are 
still impressively large, but now I see and know that its size and proportions are 
near-perfect, and smaller.
May 1991. Even if my home and my family were not in Pennsylvania, I do not 
think that I could live happily in Budapest (except perhaps in the event of the 
immense luck of finding a small apartment on Castle Hill with Biedermeier 
furniture and one large French window over the Castle Walk, facing west. 
Even then, only for part of the year. The reason is politics. I would become (I 
already am) too deeply involved, upset, with the stupidities and the demagogue­
ry and the opportunism of political jostling. I see how, step by step, the 
television news and other programmes are tightened more and more, their tone 
changed degree by small degree by the nationalists, mostly of the governing 
party. Most people may not notice this, since the selection of what is and what 
is not shown on television is a hidden and technical manipulative process, 
difficult to pin down.
Is my telephone being tapped now? I do not find it impossible.
But this native people of mine are a very talented people. In the long run 
they were not damaged by the last fifty years. Of course this is an immense 
generalization, without accounting for their suffering and their damages, physical 
and mental and spiritual. However: just as Gorbachev and Co. have already 
proved better than Kerensky and Co. in 1917, in Hungary, too, Imre Nagy, the 
once communist peasant, martyr and hero of the 1956 rising, was braver and 
more manly than Admiral Horthy, the once aide-de-camp of Franz Joseph, the 
Regent of Hungary from 1920 to 1944. I have often (and at the risk of 
unpopularity) defended Horthy. But when in 1944 he was forced by the SS and 
the local National Socialists to abdicate, he signed that paper. (The life of his 
son was threatened, though not his.) In 1958 Imre Nagy went to the gallows, 
when not only his life but his private freedom would have been spared by a 
single signature or statement that he refused to give.
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I am not an admirer of athletes as they are interviewed on television; but as 
I watch some Hungarian soccer players answering a reporter, I find that they 
are intelligent and fairly modest; they express themselves so much better than 
American sports figures before the camera, spitting out a few inept phrases 
while chewing a gum.
My worst Hungarian students (those who do not do the readings and who 
fudge the answers in their written examination) write better than my best 
American ones. Here the reason is simple: despite their evident deterioration, 
the Hungarian high schools still require more work and higher standards than 
American ones. Still, hordes of young and even middle-aged Hungarians chew 
gum, masticating without cease. The worst habits of the “free world” are extant 
and spreading. The once most elegant street, Váci utca, is now a semi-oriental 
bazaar.
I had planned, carefully and expressly, a Reconstruction—more than a 
Remembrance—of Things Past. Circa 1943, when I was a student at the 
university, I would occasionally stride through that street of the Inner City, 
meeting my beautiful mother at Gerbeaud’s, she fresh from her weekly hair­
dresser’s appointment at Femina’s (that hairdressing salon still exists, in the 
same place), and then sitting with her and her friends for a short half hour 
before riding home on the bus. I told S. and L. about my plan, but somehow the 
arrangement did not work. I abandoned it. However, instead, I asked S. to wait 
for me at a café in Váci Street. We’ll meet there after I finish my class at the 
university a few hundred yards away, and then go to dinner. We do this once or 
twice, and the knowledge that I am walking down that street to meet her at a 
café fills me with an ineffably melancholy sense of pleasure. One’s life is a 
pilgrimage, not a work of art (which is why some of the most intelligent 
aesthetes and hedonists so often mess up their lives). Still, once in a while God 
allows (and inspires) one to add a small bit of pentimento to one’s life: an 
overlay (rather than a reconstruction) of something that is beautiful, sad and 
nostalgic.
But I cannot end here. There was this episode, a precious little memorable 
resurrection of a fragment from my past, an achievement with a psychic, if not 
altogether spiritual, purpose. But getting there was different. I do not mean the 
obvious difference between myself at twenty and at sixty-seven. I mean: 
traversing the same street, Váci utca, then and now. I must not overemphasize 
or sentimentalize the smartness in 1943. Yet, it was a smart place, with well- 
dressed men and women in the midst of Europe in the midst of the horrible 
Second World War, with all kinds of people in its espresso bars, and “a fevered 
undercurrent of social strivings and snubbings.” (It had even then a Central 
rather than a Western European look.) Some of this has remained (or rather, it 
prevails, again and again): the facades of some of the buildings, a few superfi­
cially elegant shopfronts of new boutiques, the same florist’s shop, and two 
good bookstores, though not the wonderful ones where I spent my (and my 
father’s) money nearly half a century ago. But the people in the street now 
consist of unkempt tourists padding amidst sinister groups of moneychangers
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and other half-criminals, hardly disturbed by a few ill-dressed policemen. Both 
sides of the street are lined by a chain of poor women and a few men from 
Transylvania, or God knows where, holding up their wares for the tourists: 
pieces of sheepskin, gaudily embroidered tablecloths and vests. A semi-oriental 
bazaar this once smartest street in the Inner City has become. The café-bar 
whereto I hurry for my rendezvous with my pretty cheerful wife is neither 
pretty nor cheerful, full of dubious people and groups of tourists sprawling on 
the low and uncomfortable modem settees. But then, there is no longer 
anything very Eastern about this: soon all Europe, all of the Western world, 
will be like this too.
Two Worlds 93
HISTORY
Ignác Romsics
Edvard Benes and the 
Czechoslovak-Hungarian Border
P rovisions of the Trianon Peace Treaty relating to the Czechoslovak-Hun­garian border left more than three quarters of a million Hungarians on the 
Slovak side. (According to the 1910 Hungarian census the number of Hungar­
ians concerned was: 1,066,000; the Czechoslovak census of 1921 recorded 
761,000 Hungarians. No more than 200,000 Slovaks remained in Hungary. 
Hungarian statistics recorded 142,000 in 1920 and 105,000 in 1930. Count Pál 
Teleki, the Hungarian prime minister, estimated their number in 1921 at about 
180,000.) In addition, while the Hungarians of Slovakia and the Carpathian 
Ukraine lived in an ethnically and linguistically compact area along the border, 
the Slovaks of Hungary mostly lived in scattered villages, about half of which 
lay a long way from the Slovak-Hungarian border, in the southeast of the 
country. 1
This Czechoslovak-Hungarian border was established as a compromise 
between the Czech and Slovak politicians in exile and the victorious great 
powers.
The demands for Hungarian territories which Masaryk, Stefanik and Benes 
himself, expressed between 1915 and 1917 went well beyond what was accorded 
by the peace conference. The maps, memoranda and other propaganda mate­
rials issued by the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris—written, compiled 
and, as far as the maps were concerned, commissioned mainly by Edvard 
Benes—placed the desirable frontier between Czechoslovakia and Hungary 10 
to 30 kilometres further south than the final version. Hungarian towns like Vác, 
Balassagyarmat, Salgótarján, Miskolc, and Sátoraljaújhely were to be part of 
Slovakia, Benes and his colleagues proposed. Sub-Carpathia was also to be 
part of the newly founded Czechoslovak state, and an 80 to 120 kilometres 
wide strip in Western Hungary extending from Pozsony/Bratislava/Pressburg 
to the River Mura/Hurje, (the so-called Slav corridor) was to be partly under 
Slovak, and partly under South Slav control.2
Ignác Romsics is Professor o f Modern History at the University of Budapest 
and author of several books on twentieth century Hungarian history, among 
them a political biography of Count István Bethlen.
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The ethnic composition of the Slovak, Sub-Carpathian, and Western Hun­
garian territories claimed was naturally still more complicated than that of 
those territories finally granted to Czechoslovakia in 1919. Should the demands 
of Czechoslovakia have been fully acceded to, the ratio of ethnic Slavs in 
Slovakia would have been far smaller than 50 per cent according to 1921 
Czechoslovak data, or less than 40 per cent according to the Hungarian census 
of 1910. In the Western Hungarian counties of Moson, Sopron, Vas and Zala 
the ratio of Slovaks and Croats was about 6 per cent in 1920 (of an overall 
population of 1,136,000,65,000 were Croats and 1,127 were Slovaks).3 It should 
be borne in mind that the main argument of Benes as regards the positioning of 
a Slovak-Hungarian frontier was the principle of ethnic justice, whereas his 
claims on Austrian and German territories rested on historical bases. The 
argument was obviously based on a very liberal interpretation of available 
Hungarian figures and even on their occasional replacement with unfounded 
and exaggerated estimates. Let me give a few examples. The area Benes claimed 
from Hungary as part of Slovakia reached from Pozsony/Bratislava/Pressburg 
to the River Ung in the east, and to the line of Vác, Miskolc, Tokaj and Záhony 
in the south. The area amounted to 59,000 square kilometres, with a population 
of about three and a half million. According to the Hungarian census of 1910, 
about one million were Magyars, so the number of Slovaks could not possibly 
exceed two million. However a document compiled by the Czechoslovak 
National Council in Paris spoke of 2,300,000 Slovaks and 500,000 Magyars 
resident on the same territory. This document also claimed that the number of 
Slovaks remaining in Hungary would be 400,000, nearly three times as many 
as the figure adduced by Hungarian statistics and more than twice as many as 
an estimate found acceptable by the Hungarian Prime Minister Pál Teleki in 
1921. The Slav corridor in Western Hungary exemplified a still more liberal 
treatment of facts. Where Hungarian statistics contained a figure of 66,000 
Slavs, Benes referred to “almost 200,000” Croats and Slovaks.4 What is more, 
a map issued by the Paris Council, “Carte ethnographique de l’Europe”, 
alleged an outright Slovak and Southern Slav majority on the West-Hungarian 
territories claimed.5
True, ethnicity in censuses and other kinds of statistics were invariably 
subject to the national bias of the administration in question and they still are, 
at least in this part of Europe. This helps to explain the significant differences 
between the data of the Hungarian census of 1910 and censuses taken by the 
successor states after 1920. There was, however, no such difference between 
the actual situation and the results of the 1910 Hungarian census as Benes 
supposed; this is shown by the censuses taken by Austria and Czechoslovakia 
after 1920. One may therefore assume that Benes’s claim was a piece of delib­
erate propaganda, based on the long-established psychological device, that if 
something is repeated again and again, and with sufficient emphasis, it will 
ultimately be believed, however untrue it may be.
For that matter, Benes did not refrain from distorting history in his overem­
phasizing kinship between Czechs and Slovaks or that between Slovaks and
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Ruthenes, while concealing or minimizing differences. The difference be­
tween Czechs and Slovaks was next to nothing, he said, Slovakia had once 
been part of the Czechoslovak state, “They share the same language and 
history, and there are simply no problems in religious and political life”.6 The 
Ruthenes, the argument went, “were close relatives of the Slovaks, lived under 
similar conditions, and were bound to them by so many ties that their union 
with the Republic of Czechoslovakia would pose no problem at all”.7
Besides ethnic justice, another often repeated argument was security. In 
order to prevent German expansion towards the Balkans, the Allies must 
weaken Austria and Hungary, and strengthen the future Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia. This was one of the basic ideas in the well-known D etru ise z  
I’A u trich e-H o n g rie , issued in 1916, and in English in 1917. The same idea is 
also expounded in a volume containing the territorial claims of Czechoslova­
kia in detail (L es re v e n d ic a tio n s  te r r ito r ia le s  d e  la  R é p u b liq u e  T ch éco- 
S lo va q u e), especially as regards the Slav corridor. “If the Hungarians are set 
apart from the Germans, and the latter cannot use them as instruments to 
establish their rule in Central Europe, this means that the basis for a new 
political system in the region has been created: the reconciliation and co­
operation of the Czechoslovakians, the Yugoslavs and the democratic Hun­
garians is the basic condition of these three nations becoming the basis of a 
lasting and peaceful new organization there.” Benes, who had only recently 
demanded the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on the basis of 
the national principle, referred now to a higher interest than the principle of 
nationality, saying that “the application of the principle of nationality can 
never be complete and there always will remain national minorities in the 
individual states”. 8
The need to set up natural frontiers was another argument for the Czecho­
slovak claims, as were also considerations of trade and transport. These were 
the main arguments for the need to set the frontier along the stretch of the 
Danube between Pozsony/Bratislava and Párkány/Sturovo. “Slovakia has natural 
frontiers all around; it is obviously essential that the Danube be her southern 
frontier,” Benes himself wrote.9 Where this argument was out of place, as in 
the case of the territories east of Párkány (the zone between Vác and Tokaj that 
was eventually left to Hungary), the proposed annexation of which to Slovakia 
was called “a most obvious violation of the principle of nationality” even by 
the Paris committee, Benes called for punishment and reparations for “centu­
ries of Hungarian oppression”. “Our claim for this territory is a claim for a kind 
of reparation that has long been due to us”, the detailed Czechoslovak docu­
ment states.10 The Hungarian nation has been “the butcher of Slovaks, the 
Serbs, the Croats, and the Rumanians... and there has never been a worse and 
crueller oppressor in history”, states Benes in D etru ise z  /’A u trich e-H o n g rie ."
The counterbalance to the “Hungarian oppressors” was, however, not the 
Slovak but the Czech nation, endowed with the best of qualities. This nation 
“has achieved the greatest possible development in the Modem Age and in 
recent times, from intellectual, social and economic aspects alike”, and have
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achieved “the first place among all Slavonic peoples”.12 The purpose of ideal­
izing the Czech nation was to make the other nations believe that the new state 
would guarantee all nationals their rights which they had not obtained from the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire or from Hungary. The Slovaks would acquire the 
status of a partner nation, the Ruthenes full territorial autonomy, and the 
Germans and the Hungarians would be given extensive minority rights. Thus, 
besides ethnic and strategic aspects, as well as geographic, economic and 
transport considerations, reparation for past wrongs and the political maturity 
of the Czech nation enabling it to manage a state, the promise of an exemplary 
treatment of the minority question was what Benes and his colleagues mostly 
referred to.13
During the early years of the war, it was Russia alone that supported the 
attempts of the Czechoslovak National Council to found a state. France and, 
especially, England still wished to maintain the Habsburg Empire while trans­
forming its inner structure. This was why the memorandum of the Allies of 
January 10,1917, in which they stated their war aims at the request of President 
Wilson, declared only the liberation of the Italians, the Slavs and the Czecho­
slovaks from foreign rule and did not mention the destruction of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire, or support for the attempts by its nations to form independent 
states. The Fourteen Points of President Wilson of January 8, 1918 contained 
basically the same ideas, though in a rather ambiguous form. The standpoint of 
the Allies changed only in the spring of 1918, after the Peace of Brest-Litovsk 
between Germany and Soviet-Russia and the failure of Austro-Hungarian 
attempts to obtain a separate peace. From then on, not only France but also 
England and the United States supported the formation of small states in 
Eastern Europe, including a separate state for the Czechs and Slovaks.14 
There was, however, no full agreement between the Allies and the Czech 
politicians in exile even after that. It was only Paris that approved the proposed 
frontiers of the not yet existing Czechoslovak state going beyond ethnic and 
linguistic boundaries. Rome, London and, especially, Washington protested 
against the excessive and unjustifiable claims. At the end of 1918, the Peace 
Preparation Committee (Inquiry) of the United States proposed a frontier 
between Czechoslovakia and Hungary that was to be 10 to 20 kilometres 
further north than the one actually to be sanctioned in Trianon later on, and 
much further north than the frontier proposed by Benes. The American pro­
posal left to Hungary the Grosse Schütt Island (Csallóköz), the district of Fülek 
(Filakovo) in Central Slovakia, and the northern part of the area called 
Bodrogköz (Királyhelmes/Královsky Chlumec and its neighbourhood) in 
Eastern Slovakia. The American committee were prepared to accept the an­
nexation of Sub-Carpathia to Czechoslovakia with extensive autonomy rights.15 
They did not, however, in any way support the idea of a Slav corridor. This, 
they said, “would obviously be in direct contravention of nationalistic ide­
als”.16 The British proposal, prepared by Seton-Watson and his colleagues, 
stood closer to the American view than that of Benes. The British maps still 
treated ethnically Magyar zones north of the Trianon border such as the island
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of Csallóköz/Grosse Schütt as areas with a mixed or uncertain population 
whose status was to be decided by the peace conference after thorough prelimi­
nary investigation on the spot. 17
Preliminary suggestions made by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as 
to the Hungarian frontier are not known. The Italian views at the peace 
conference were, however, certainly closer to the American ones and indeed, at 
times, favoured Hungary even more.
Reconciliation of the Czechoslovak demands and the views of the Great 
Powers was the task of the peace conference or, rather, its expert committees. 
Benes presented his ideas on the frontier that he expressed earlier in his 
writings during the war, and in the materials submitted by the Czechoslovak 
National Council to the Council of Ten on February 5, 1919. His arguments in 
the latter displayed the same features as his earlier writings: eclectic and 
incoherent reasoning, arbitrary treatment of statistical data and, if necessary, 
even deliberate deception. Let me mention one example in support of this 
harsh description. When Lloyd George and Sidney Sonnino interrupted his 
address and asked about the ethnic composition of the Danube-riparian zone, 
especially that of Pozsony/Bratislava/Pressburg, Benes replied without hesita­
tion that “Presbourg est une vilié entiérement slovaque” , that Pozsony was 
completely Slovak.18 (In fact, even the Czechoslovak census of 1921 estab­
lished that Slovaks made up 39 per cent of the population; according to the 
Hungarian census of 1910 they accounted for fewer than one third of the 
inhabitants).
The plenary hearing of Benes was followed by hard work in the committees. 
The status of Sub-Carpathia was decided first. On February 27, 1919, the 
Czechoslovak Committee of the conference accepted the American proposal 
as to the annexation of the territory to Czechoslovakia with extensive autonomy. 
Only the Italian delegate mentioned the possibility of leaving Sub-Carpathia 
with Hungary, which would create a chance for co-operation between Poland, 
Hungary and Rumania. The parties were also quick to arrive at a consensus to 
reject the Slav corridor, not even the French delegate supporting the idea. The 
definition of the actual frontier between Slovakia and Hungary proved much 
more difficult. The Czechoslovak claims were supported mainly by the French 
and, to a lesser extent, by the English. The Italians and the Americans stood 
apart. The so-called Trianon border between Slovakia and Hungary was declared 
on March 8, 1919, after severe debates in committee. This frontier remained in 
place until the autumn of 1938, and was restored with minor modifications 
after the Second World War. It did not accede to the Czechoslovak demand for 
the Börzsöny Hills between the River Ipoly and the Danube Bend, for Salgótarján 
and the surrounding coal fields (i.e. the northern spur of the Mátra), for 
Miskolc and its neighbourhood, Sátoraljaújhely and the Bodrogköz region. 
However, it did leave to Czechoslovakia zones along the border (the Csallóköz/ 
Grosse Schütt) that were marked on the British maps as ethnically mixed or 
uncertain territories.19
The decision made by the expert committee of the peace conference left
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Benes dissatisfied and prompted him to make use of connections, primarily 
with the French general staff, to fight for a more favourable solution. Develop­
ments in Hungary, that is the proclamation of a Soviet Republic in Hungary 
offered him a good opportunity, and he was quick to refer to it in his memoran­
dum of March 26 addressed to Clemenceau and his foreign minister Pichon. 
Czechoslovakia was a lonely island facing the Bolshevik tide coming from the 
east, he wrote, against which she can defend herself only if granted proper 
frontiers. In spite of these energetic attempts and the support of French gov­
ernment circles, Benes’s intervention did not achieve anything. The Council of 
Foreign Ministers accepted the proposal of the Czecho-Slovak Committee 
without any modification on March 8, and the Council of Four did so on March 
12. After that the Slovak-Hungarian frontier underwent only a single insig­
nificant adjustment, on June 11, when the Council of Foreign Ministers awarded 
Ipolyság/Sahy with its railway junction to Czechoslovakia. Thus this interven­
tion by Benes cannot be called completely futile after all.20
The Slovak-Hungarian border thus established in the Spring of 1919 was 
made known by Clemenceau’s memorandum of June, 1919, and the politically- 
minded in Hungary reacted to it with deep bitterness. They saw in it the failure 
of the much mentioned ethnic or national principle. There were, however, 
differences of opinion as regards the substance of the opposition to the frontier. 
Many demanded full restoration of the status quo, but there were others—es­
pecially members of the democratic opposition to the Horthy regime—who 
could have been conciliated by the recovery of the border zone inhibited 
mainly by ethnic Hungarians. Certain Hungarian historians and sections of 
public opinion mention from time to time that the new democratic Czechoslo­
vak state was at that time prepared to establish friendly relations with Hungary 
and to modify the frontier along ethnic lines. This, they think, was frustrated 
only because the reactionary leaders of Hungary, who cherished the ideal of 
the kingdom of the lands of the crown of St Stephen and were thus unable to 
arrive at a reasonable compromise.
The idea of a compromise based on mutual concessions was, however, not quite alien to the conservative Hungarian leading elite. To my mind, the 
man who did everything to prevent even the slightest modification of the 
frontier was not Count Teleki nor Count Bethlen but Edvard Benes.
The possibility of agreeing on a more acceptable frontier occurred as early 
as late 1918. The initiative was taken by Milan Hodza, formerly a Slovak 
member of the Hungarian Parliament and, at that time, the Budapest envoy of 
the new Czechoslovak state. On December 6, 1918, he agreed with Albert 
Bartha, the Hungarian Minister of War, on a demarcation line that would have 
left all the Magyar population along what was to be the Trianon border in 
Hungary. It was therefore natural that the agreement caused great uneasiness in 
Prague, though obviously no definitive border was determined. Prime Minister 
Kramar disavowed his envoy at once and ordered Benes to take immediate 
counter-measures. The foreign minister did his best to persuade the Allies to
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define a demarcation line more advantageous to the Czechoslovak state; these 
efforts were crowned with success. The new demarcation line, declared on 
December 23, 1918, followed the Danube in the west, and only the central and 
eastern section of the frontier ran a few kilometres north of the actual frontier 
established in the Spring of 1919.21
In April, 1919, that is after the decision of the committee of experts of the 
peace conference, it was President Masaryk who thought it desirable to estab­
lish a frontier that was more just from the ethnic point of view. To the proposal 
of General Smuts, who stopped over in Prague on his way from Budapest to 
Paris, he replied that “he would prefer to waive all claims to this Magyar 
territory” north of the Danube “and withdraw the Czech frontier to the north, so 
as to leave all this ethnologically Magyar territory to Hungary”. As a compen­
sation he would ask for the establishment of a small bridge-head opposite 
Pozsony/Bratislava south of the Danube. Masaryk’s own notes, found in the 
presidential archives in Prague and published a few years ago by Václav Král, 
also confirm Smuts’ report. Masaryk wrote that “should the Entente grant us 
the Danube line as far as the Ipoly, we would start negotiations with the 
Hungarians on returning the other excessive Magyar territories”. 22
The peace conference—specifically the Council of Foreign Ministers and 
the Czechoslovak Committee—would have been ready to discuss the Slovak- 
Hungarian frontier line anew and to make certain modifications in the first 
days of May, 1919, i.e. before the final decision was taken. It was again due to 
Benes that this did not happen; he fought not for ethnically sound frontiers but 
for those borders he held to be the most advantageous for Czechoslovakia. 
Jules Laroche, a French delegate, interpreted the opinion of the Czechoslovak 
foreign minister at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 3 as 
follows: “General Smuts had seriously misunderstood what he (i.e. Masaryk) 
had said”. Masaryk only wanted to say that “certain parties in Bohemia held 
the view that the Island of Grosse Schütt might be exchanged for a small 
enclave opposite Pressburg. President Masaryk himself, however, did not 
support that proposal.” Benes added that Czechoslovakia needed the Grosse 
Schütt in order to secure navigation on the Danube and that a delegation of the 
inhabitants of the island had also been to Prague to demand the annexation of 
the territory by Czechoslovakia for economic reasons. After these interventions, 
the Czechoslovak committee decided to make the March proposal definitive on 
May; the Council of Foreign Ministers did so on May 8, and the Council of 
Four on May 11.23
In the spring and summer of 1921, when the peace treaty was already signed 
but not yet ratified, the possibility of reconsidering the Czechoslovak-Hungarian 
frontier emerged anew in bilateral talks between the two countries. According 
to the memoirs of Miklós Bánffy, the Hungarian foreign minister, the Hungar­
ian delegation asked for a frontier somewhat to the south of the line that was 
established in the autumn of 1938, that is for an ethnic border justified even by 
the Czechoslovak census of 1921.24 Benes, the leader of the Czechoslovak 
delegation was, however, ready to discuss the possible return only of a much
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smaller area, the district of Komárom/Komamo and Losonc/Lucenec. The 
Hungarian prime minister, Count Bethlen and his foreign minister thought that 
rewarding such a minimal concession by voluntarily signing away other former 
Hungarian territories in a bilateral treaty would have been a grave mistake. The 
documents of the Franco-Hungarian talks of 1920 reveal that some of the 
Hungarian leaders, that is Counts Bethlen, Teleki and Bánffy, would have been 
prepared to renounce Pozsony/ Bratislava/Pressburg and its neighbourhood as 
well as the district of Nyitra/Nitra and the border district of Eastern Slovakia at 
the most. They, however, absolutely insisted on Hungary retaining the Grosse 
Schütt, the Little Hungarian Plain, the counties of Hont and Nógrád. (That is, 
the Ipoly region and the district of Losonc/Lucenec.) Benes announced in 
Marienbad that he was not willing to accept this demand. The laconic memoirs 
of the Hungarian foreign minister are a primary source for the supposition that 
the Czechoslovak-Hungarian compromise failed because of the rigidity and 
inflexibility of the Hungarian party. The truth is the opposite, that no agreement 
could have been arrived at, even if the Hungarian delegation had accepted 
Benes’s proposal as a basis for discussion. Essentially Benes had made his 
counterproposal knowing in advance that the Hungarians would refuse it. 
Should they accept it, he said to the British minister to Prague about his actual 
standpoint, “I will be forced to meet it with a direct refusal”. 25 In other words, 
Edvard Benes did not regard conceding a single square meter to Hungary as 
either possible or admissible.
One might think that frontier revision remained unmentioned after this at least until the thirties. But this was not the case. It remained continually in 
the forefront of attention and it was President Masaryk who played a crucial 
role here. As far as we know now, he expressed an opinion in public four times 
between 1922 and 1929 on the possibility of redrawing the Slovak-Hungarian 
frontier. In 1922 his views appeared in Nouvelle Europe, in 1923 in Budapesti 
Hírlap, in 1928 in the Sunday Times, and in 1929 in the Neue Freie Presse. 26 
There was good reason why it cannot be coincidental that Masaryk spoke of 
this so frequently nor can it be journalistic exaggeration that he did that so 
explicitly. Nor did he air his thoughts only in the press; he also used political 
channels. The British minister to Prague reported on one of his similar state­
ments in the spring of 1929; he “would have been prepared... to restore to 
Hungary a triangle of territory on the frontier near Bratislava, which is inhab­
ited almost exclusively by Hungarians, and Hungary would have returned to 
Czechoslovakia a number of Slovaks not resident in Hungary”.27 It is therefore 
highly probable that Masaryk really wished to achieve a reconciliation with 
Hungary and considered minor corrections of the frontier conceivable.
Nevertheless, the declarations and statements of the President had no prac­
tical consequence at all. Every single one of them was followed by a disclaimer 
by Benes, just as we have already seen in the case of the mission of General 
Smuts in 1919. Benes either stated that the President had not spoken of the 
frontiers at all or that his words had been misread or intentionally minister-
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preted. This peculiar “division of labour” between the President and the 
foreign minister had become everyday practice by the late twenties, and there 
was not a diplomat who would have attributed any significance to it. C. 
Howard-Smith, who was in charge of Central European affairs at the Foreign 
Office in London dismissed one of the recent statements of Masaryk and the 
subsequent disclaimer of Benes in 1929: “This is the kind of thing which is 
continually happening and which irritates the Hungarians, perhaps not un­
naturally. President Masaryk and Dr Benes are for ever saying that they would 
welcome an arrangement with the Hungarians, but the latter always draws back 
or qualifies his statement before any conversations begin. The Hungarians 
therefore consider him a hypocrite.” 28 A few months later the British minister 
to Prague added: “Every time that Benes speaks of Hungary he always shows 
that, in spite of his officially expressed desire to conciliate them, he really at 
the back of his mind would like to humiliate them on every possible occasion 
(...) He has ... always said that a permanent peace with Hungary is impossible, 
that Hungary will never be conciliated, and when he says this he appears to say 
it with some relish as though it were in the ordinary nature of things.” 29 
Edvard Benes stuck to his anti-revisionist standpoint right up to 1938-39, that is 
to the end of the Republic of Czechoslovakia. However, he seems to have reconsidered 
and revised his views during his second exile. In June 1940 he declared that 
“nothing that has been imposed upon us since Munich do we consider to be valid in 
law ... This does not mean that we desire as our war aim a mere return to the status 
quo of September, 1938 (...) We wish to agree on our frontiers with our neighbours 
in a friendly fashion. (...) Changes in detail are possible.” 30 In a policy-making ar­
ticle, written in 1942, he discussed his ideas of post-war Europe and there, too, 
found minor correction of the frontiers possible: “Perhaps in certain cases it will be 
possible, by local alterations in the frontiers, to diminish somewhat the minority 
population in the individual states.”31 Other members of the Czechoslovak gov­
ernment in exile, for example Jan Masaryk, son of the founder of the state, or 
Ladislav Feierabend, minister of finance, made similar statements.32 Having taken 
these statements seriously, the American diplomats working on the peace terms 
thought it possible right up to the spring or summer of 1945 to alter the Slovak- 
Hungarian frontier after the war by a peaceful agreement between the two parties. 
They considered the return to Hungary of the Grosse Schütt and part of the Little 
Plains justified and desirable as a minimum, and that of a few districts in Eastern and 
Central Slovakia as a maximum. They thought of the same regions they had been 
willing to leave with Hungary in 1919.33 It, however, became obvious very soon 
that the former statements of Benes and his colleagues had not been made out of the 
open-mindedness of a statesman, but could be more correctly called insincere and 
empty promises that they thought advisable to repeat as long as their exile lasted. 
Once back in Prague, they promptly abandoned their former views on the revision 
of the frontier and on autonomy for the national minorities, and could only think of 
expelling the Hungarian population from their country. They did so despite the fact 
that, after 1945, the Hungarian leadership no longer consisted of reactionary 
noblemen but, for a short period, of declared democrats.
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László András Magyar
Rough Justice
The Moral Dilemma o f a 16th Century Hostage-Taking
I n the year 1567 an apothecary, Caspar Pfreund, from Wittenberg, was visiting Leipzig on the occasion of the oriental fair. On a Wednesday he was 
loitering in front of a pharmacist’s stall when a certain student, named Georg 
Goldstein, son of an innkeeper from Leipzig, stepped up to him and told him 
that his godfather, Master Schönberg of Wittenberg, having broken his thigh, 
sends his compliments and begs Master Pfreund to hurry to him without delay 
as he would seek his advice. The apothecary, commiserating over the plight of 
Master Schönberg, at once set off with the student. Georg Goldstein led him to 
Nicol Street, to a house which his long deceased father had bought. Upon 
entering the house the apothecary imagined he heard groans and cries of pain 
from above and hurried upstairs forthwith. There, however, he found no 
godfather, but three other students; Alesius, a doctor’s son from Leipzig, 
Zacharias Strademan, the son of a furrier, and Mathusalem Töpfer, the son of a 
Naumburg jeweller. All three were masked, so the apothecary did not recognize 
any one of them. The students set upon him directly, gagged and held him fast. 
He took a piece of chalk from his pocket and wrote on the floor that, ask of him 
what they will, only take the gag out of his mouth so that he can talk to them.
When he was safely trussed and bound, they laid the accusation against him 
that he, as mayor of Wittenberg, had permitted certain illegalities in return for 
a consideration. They said that the hour of retribution had come, demanded 
3,600 guldens of him, and warned him he would be a dead man if he did not 
pay.
The apothecary pleaded for mercy in vain, the students were not moved to 
pity, but continued to demand the money. They went through the unfortunate 
man’s pockets and found forty gold rings on him, which they pocketed at once, 
and relieved him of his half-gulden as well. They locked him up in a deep 
cellar, pushing a table against its door. They then laid the table with boiled and 
roast meats, beer and wine brought from a nearby stall and there made merry. 
They had victuals taken down to their prisoner in the cellar, and sent Georg 
Goldstein to keep him company so he should not have to drink alone. They 
instructed the student to use gentle persuasion to give them the money they
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demanded. But the apothecary showed a perverse obstinacy and incessantly 
complained of the indignities and injuries he had been made to suffer.
Before daybreak the creaking of a four-wheeler could be heard. Upon 
hearing this Goldstein said:
“Do you know what this creaking signifies, Master Pfreund? This is the 
carriage in which you, after being slain, will be taken in a barrel to a place 
where you will never be found. Therefore I entreat you to promise them the 
sum they demand, unless you are resolved to die.”
Upon hearing this the poor wretch lost his head and his courage. As there 
seemed to be no other way out of the situation, he decided he would promise to 
pay the vast sum they demanded. He gave his oath and put it down in writing 
that, as soon as they let him go back to his lodgings, he would pay them six 
hundred guldens, and would pay the remaining three thousand in instalments 
on his next three visits to the Leipzig fair, and would never tell a soul of what 
had happened to the end of his days. When he had taken the oath, and the deed 
was signed, they gave him back his rings so that their absence should not 
arouse suspicion and finally, putting a hood over his head, Goldstein led him 
out of the house to a forsaken back alley and left him at the comer before the 
sun had risen.
As soon as the apothecary was alone again and had rid himself of the hood, he 
hurried to his lodgings in the cobblers’ alley, to Doctor Brembach’s house, who 
at that time was the mayor of Leipzig. Upon seeing him, his host asked him 
where he had spent the previous night, for it was not his custom to stay out all 
night, he had left no word that he would be late, and no servant had brought 
tidings of him. The apothecary remined as silent as the tomb, the only words he 
uttered were a plea to the mayor to be so kind as to lend him six hundred guldens 
from his own purse or from the town council’s funds, as he would be in great 
need of the sum at noon. This request greatly astounded Doctor Brembach. What 
on earth could Master Pfreund want with such a large sum and at so short a 
notice, when his credit was good with every merchant of the city, and any piece 
of merchandise in Leipzig his for the asking at the mere mention of his name? As 
he did not keep such a large sum at home, he accompanied his friend to the 
council-house to secure him a loan. When the council had assembled, he again 
asked the apothecary where he had been the previous night and what he wanted 
the six hundred guldens for at such short notice, for, though they would of 
course willingly give him the money, caution must prevail and, as the whole 
affair seemed rather suspicious, they must ask him to tell, of his own accord, 
what happened to him the previous night. Still the apothecary remained silent, 
and in the end disclosed only that he had sworn to tell no one where he had been.
The Prince-Elector of Saxony, August, who was then leading the captive 
Prince of Gotha through Leipizig, learned of his subject’s case. The Prince 
Elector sent his own pastor—an office performed at the time by Doctor 
Pfeffinger, the superintendent of Leipzig—to Master Pfreund and entrusted 
him with the task of prevailing upon the apothecary to reveal where he had 
been and what he needed the money for. However, not even these distin­
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guished persons could get the apothecary to speak. The elector then warned 
him that he would have him taken to Dresden for interrogation. The apothecary 
understood that he would in all certainty be put to torture in Dresden and so 
consented to have Doctor Pfeffinger release him from his oath, take his sin 
upon himself and account for it on the Day of Judgement. With that, the 
mystery was solved.
At noon, when Georg Goldstein went to pick up the six hundred guldens, two 
town constables were waiting for him in the doorway opposite Doctor Brembach’s 
house, caught him in the act of taking the money, arrested him, and committed 
him to the custody of the council. In the meantime, his accomplices roamed the 
streets looking for their friend, for they had no idea what could have become of 
him. When they saw him taken prisoner they all three jumped into a carriage 
they had had waiting as a precaution, and drove out of the city.
On the following Friday, Goldstein was beheaded in the market-place 
following the judgement of the Prince-Elector. Not long after, Alesius was also 
arrested; but being the son of a respected doctor, he was sentenced to ninety 
years’ imprisonment. Strademan became the abbot of a Catholic monastery, 
and a gentleman from the Szepesség had Mathusalem hanged for alchemy in 
Hungary.
As for the apothecary, he lived for only two years following the incident. He 
kept telling his son in Merseburg how much the breaking of his oath troubled 
his soul, and that he had better have paid that terrible sum to those wicked 
students and kept the secret to the end of his days than to have broken the oath 
he made verbally and in writing, upon the urging of Doctor Pfeffinger and the 
threats of the Saxon Elector.
It must be said that though the apothecary remained a rich and honourable 
man, he did not have much pleasure in life from that moment on, and could not 
keep down anything he ate.
Based on P. P. Nitzschka: Historische Blütenlust. Frankfurt—Leipzig, 1685, pp. 
15-22.
2
Though this story of a crime may not be bloody enough for the contempo­rary reader, nor contain enough in the way of surprises, it does have its 
points of interest. It deals with violence disguised as the dispensing of justice, 
in other words with terrorism. Even in its details it reminds us of acts of 
terrorism today. What is the story? Four students abduct a representative of the 
ruling class in the name of social justice, blackmail him with threats of murder, 
then, trusting that the victim, as a man of high principles, will not violate the 
moral law, attempt to fleece him.
The delinquents are also typical. They are students, of “good” families, who 
probably have no need to resort to such methods to make money.
The order of events is also characteristic. The robbers singled out their
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victim long before the actual kidnapping took place (as the precision of the 
preparations indicates); they abduct him under circumstances unlikely to raise 
suspicion, lure him to a deserted house without difficulty, owing to his honest 
and upright character. The perpetrators wear masks and use physical and 
psychological threats. The gang profess to be motivated by the highest moral 
considerations, but are obviously simply greedy for money. They disport 
themselves most ostentatiously in order to plunge their victim into despair, to 
prepare him psychologically. They begin by threatening him, then change 
tactics: they split up, one of them pretends to be the “good guy”, who does not 
side with the others so as to insinuate himself into the apothecary’s confidence. 
The scheme pays off: the prisoner gives in, extortion has proved effective.
The method used is rather odd; cinema-goers would probably boo if it 
featured in a contemporary film. All that the abductors demand of their victim 
is an oath, given verbally and in writing; once it is given, they feel safe. But he 
could report them to the police! One would like to cry out. He does not. Why 
doesn’t he?
There are two possible solutions.
One is that the accusation made against Pfreund may not have been un­
founded, that the apothecary may in fact have abused his authority. For this 
reason, he remains silent; if he informs against his assailants, his own sins will 
be brought to light. However, this solution can be dismissed on the grounds 
that, a) at the end, when the gang’s designs are thwarted and one of its 
members apprehended, nothing pointing to Pfreund’s culpability comes to 
light; b) if the gang had really wanted to blackmail him, there was no need to 
abduct him, a simple blackmailing note would have sufficed; c) there would 
have been no point in going to such lenghts to secure the oath of a man known 
to be guilty of a breach of trust, for such a man would never abide by his oath; 
d) the apothecary’s qualms of conscience over breaking his oath do not offer 
grounds for such a supposition.
The second solution is that the apothecary did not inform against his 
assailants because he had given his word. This may seem somewhat incredible 
in this day and age, but this was a time when people died for their beliefs by the 
thousands. There were many who could have saved themselves from death by 
torture with a single word, yet chose to die rather than sully their honour. This 
was the age of Saint Thomas More and Servetus. On the other hand, we must 
keep in mind that the apothecary’s social function depended on his good 
reputation; if he perjured himself he would have had to suffer not just the 
eternal fire but the scorn of his fellow-citizens. Society in those days was more 
closed than today, it had a better hold over its members, exerting pressure on 
them that was also internalized. Incidentally, the whole course of the kidnapping 
indicates that the gang had selected Pfreund because they were sure that he, as 
a typical respector of law and order, would show due regard for the moral 
constraints of the said order and would not inform against them.
The kidnappers assumed, then, that their victim would abide by those rules 
of society by whose violation they made their living. This is characteristic of
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terrorism. In a terrorist state (founded on illegal violence) terrorism cannot 
exist, for it cannot rely on it being the sole violator of laws. Terrorism does 
however flourish in places where society can only oppose its illegalities and 
immorality with its own ineffectual legality. Terrorists who take hostages are 
quite certain that the blackmailed community cannot abandon the hostages to 
their fate, in consequence of the community’s own laws and moral order. If this 
were not true, if a state were to allow hostages to be blown up alongside those 
who took them hostage, there would be no point in taking hostages.
The apothecary is set free and tries to keep his word. His abnormal behaviour, 
however, draws attention to himself and arouses suspicion. The kidnappers 
committed a blunder there. The reason why they picked on the apothecary was 
that he was proper and correct in his behaviour. They should have taken care 
not to force him into any situation where his conduct would deviate from the 
normal (staying out all night, finding himself suddenly in need of money). 
Failing to consider all this was what, in the end, caused their downfall.
The apothecary’s dilemma is as follows. Which should he choose, loss of 
honour or loss of money? He does not hesitate in choosing the latter (as he did 
not hesitate in choosing to live when his money or his life were at stake). In 
other words, honour (the respect of society) is more important to him than 
money (individul interest).
The council’s dilemma is as follows: it cannot demand one of its members to 
violate his oath, for that would mean breaking its own rules. At the same time, 
the council is disquietened by seeing normal, “orderly” people behaving in an 
abnormal, “disorderly” way; because of the unknown, hidden sin, “disorder” 
threatens. The council represents, indeed is, society. And what does society do 
in such a situation? It turns to state power for help.
What should the state do? For what is at stake here is no trivial matter. The 
state must make a choice between instigating the violation of an oath (a crime 
against morality) and tolerating disorder (a crime against order). The grave 
question is whether the state can resort to illegal (or at least immoral) means to 
oppose violation of the law?
The apothecary finds himself in a quandary again: his honour is now 
threatened from both sides. On the one hand, by the violation of his oath, on the 
other by creating and concealing disorder. He cannot make a choice. Luckily 
Doctor Pfeffinger, the man of compromise arrives.
Pfeffinger realizes that what the apothecary really fears is not eternal hell- 
fire, nor the loss of his honour either way. The apothecary is afraid of respon­
sibility, for finally it is he who must decide whether one can violate one’s own 
principles if one’s interests demand that one do so. It is he who must assume 
the responsibility for the choice between order and morality.
So, Doctor Pfeffinger finally assumes responsibility, not for the violation of 
an oath but for the decision; it is he who will be accountable on the Day of 
Judgement. (Fortunately, Protestant theology affords an opportunity for so 
doing.) As the apothecary still shows reluctance, the threat of torture tips the 
scales in a more effective, if not the better, way.
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The rest follows the pattern of a simple crime story. The punishments are 
cruel, but after all, the good-for-nothing perpetrators put the state in such a 
quandary! One loses his head, the other is hanged—serves him right for 
coming to Hungary—and the biggest scoundrel of them all becomes a Catholic 
priest—a quite understandable ranking, if we consider that Nitzschka, the 
chronicler, was a Protestant minister. And there is one who, owing to some 
string-pulling, gets off with a paltry ninety years.
The miserable apothecary’s conscience is not appeased by the practical and 
the theologically admissible compromise. As a consequence of his doubt pace 
the theologically admissible compromise, he suffers from a chronic gastric 
ulcer, as the final silly sentence of the chronicle attests.
The solution is somewhat peculiar. The final decision of the state was that 
order is more important than the enjoinment of morality. This morality may be 
sacrificed for the sake of order, especially if the solution is a delicate compro­
mise, albeit slightly tarred by a threat. The latter, nevertheless, apparently 
leaves morality untouched and in its proper place (apparently only, as the ulcer 
attests).
There’s a place for everything, when everything’s in its place.
The kidnappers calculated badly. Society did not respect the rules of the 
game according to which they played. To be sure, if the state proves no better 
than they, terrorists will be disappointed. Or will the state be risking an ulcer 
too if it enters into such games?
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ECONOMY
Györgyi Kocsis
The Uncertain State of Privatization
£ £T~^ rzsébet Fehér, chief executive officer of Pannonplast, and Keun Sun
JC / Choi, President of Lucky Ltd, whose activities range from chemicals to 
gene technology, have signed an agreement on the establishment of a Hungar- 
ian-Korean joint venture to be called Pannon-Lucky Plastic Processing PLC, 
which will be capitalized at $14m.” “The Hungarian holding in Budalakk- 
Hearing Paint Manufacturing Ltd has been bought by a French company. 
Total, the world’s eighth largest oil group, has obtained 60 per cent of the 
company, and the German Hearing paint factory holds the remaining 40 per 
cent.” “If the talks between Reorg Rt and Oxford Trading of the US are 
successfully completed within a month, and the Atlanta-based US company 
presents the necessary financial documents, the Eger-Mátravidéki Wine Com­
plex will pass into the hands of American buyers within 30 days.” “ETL 
Consulting Company, based in Miskolc, has bought the briquet works of 
Várpalota for 185m forints. The company, staffed by 170, is in process of 
liquidation.” “Mercury Holding, owned by a private entrepreneur, Tibor Kerezsi 
(33), has bought 85,44 per cent of Monimpex, a wine trading company capital­
ized at l,5bn forints.” “The 1,570 employees of the Herend Porcelain Factory, 
which has an annual turnover of l,8bn forints and is considered part of the 
national heritage, have bought 65 per cent of the company’s shares at above 
face value. The employees did not have to compete for the company’s shares 
and will be given a preferential loan by the Central European Investment 
Bank.”
These are just a few random examples of recent privatizations. The casual 
observer, who comes upon items of this kind in the press almost daily, will 
probably be surprised at the criticism voiced by economists and politicians, 
who blame the government for slow progress and hitches in the privatization 
process. It is difficult to object to the argument frequently put forward by 
government circles, that “the world’s fastest privatization is taking place in 
Hungary”, since there is precious little to compare it to. The degree of nation­
alization and centralization of the economy, and the absence of the institutions 
of a market economy, which were characteristic of Eastern Europe until the 
change of regime, were unprecedented elsewhere. Consequently, it is not fair
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to compare the Hungarian privatization process either with that in South 
America or the privatization of large nationalized industries in Western Europe.
In principle, comparison with the achievements of the former socialist 
countries in the same boat seems feasible. Yet deeper analysis will reveal the 
shortcomings of this approach. All of these countries started from a radically 
differing background. For example, the former GDR was handed a “turnkey” 
capitalist pattern, with all its drawbacks and advantages. Poland has been 
struggling with a financial crisis much deeper than Hungary’s for over ten 
years. The successor states of Yugoslavia are preoccupied with their own 
identity, and even Czecho-Slovakia, which seems to be the obvious one to 
compare Hungary with, has chosen an entirely different path of privatization, 
whose outcome it is far too early to judge. (And, of course, political events in 
Czecho-Slovakia have led to the splitting up of the country.)
But history does not care much for “fair comparisons”, and posterity will 
probably judge the Hungarian privatiztion process by the degree to which it has 
helped the county to become competitive internationally. Unfortunately, there 
is not much to boast about in this respect, since the de-nationalization of the 
economy is taking place more slowly than the deterioration of the performance 
of businesses that are still owned by the state.
A panel of experts headed by Tamás Szabó, Minister without Portfolio 
responsible for privatization, which is drafting a government programme for 
the renewal of the privatization process, is also unhappy with the level of de­
nationalization of the economy. “Since the establishment of the State Property 
Agency two and a half years ago, 8.3 per cent of former state property has 
passed into the hands of private investors (giving the SPA an income of 85bn 
forints). If privatization continues at this rate, it seems unlikely that the 
economic policy objective of reducing state ownership to under 50 per cent by 
1994, can be achieved.” The privatizations of the past two years have contributed 
little to the emergence of a Hungarian property owning middle-class, govern­
ment experts claim. There is only a loose connection between the sale of state 
property and the processes of economic restructuring. The official conclusion 
is that far-reaching changes are required in the methods of effecting privatization, 
to make it equal to its historic importance and the requirements of economic 
transition.
But this apparently obvious conclusion conceals a host of uncertainties. For 
one thing, it is by no means clear what is understood by the term “the 
requirements of economic transition”. Daily political disputes show how in­
terpretations can differ according to place and time and to the political affilia­
tion of the persons making them. Almost all the “big questions” of privatization 
are being discussed all the time. These are whether privatization should take 
place strictly on a market basis, through sales, based on asset valuation, or 
whether state property should also be passed on to new owners free of charge, 
or at a nominal price; whether preference should be given to financially strong, 
but foreign, multinationals, which are also in possession of new technologies, 
over domestic investors of slender capital and little know-how; to what extent
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privatization and the stimulation of competition can and should be connected; 
how large the share of the employees can be in a privatized company; whether 
greater revenues for the state from privatization or the survival of the privatized 
company should enjoy priority; whether ailing companies should be “improved” 
before being privatized so that they will fetch a better price; how can the 
tightrope be walked between a centrally-steered and consequently slow priva­
tization and decentralized techniques which inevitably permit carpet-baggery. 
The question of questions is of course what if any kind of property the state 
should hold onto in the long run.
Experience shows that the majority of questions daily debated by econo­
mists and politicians almost “solve themselves”. In other instances, life itself 
tests the practical feasibility of theoretical options. FIDESZ’s (the Young 
Democrats’ Party) economic adviser László Urbán, who has recently quit the 
Board of Directors of the SPA, has pinpointed the inconsistency between the 
government’s proclaimed preference for market-type privatization, and the 
practice in the past two years of free distribution of state property. “Of state 
property of 2,000bn forints book value, local governments received 300bn 
forints worth, the social security administration another 300bn forints worth, 
the holders of compensation coupons lOObn forints, and the beneficiaries of 
employee participation discount schemes are also given about 100 bn forints 
worth of state property. Supposing that 300bn forints worth of state property 
will have to be liquidated before privatization, allowing lOObn forints for the 
costs of privatization, including the state’s obligation to make good previous 
environmental damage, and considering that 500bn forints worth of property is 
meant to stay in state ownership in the long run, one can realistically reckon on
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL
Foreign capital involved in privatization transactions (bn forints)
1991 1992 1992
Dec.31 June 30 July 31
buy-out, capital contribution in kind, 
conversion and property protection, 
together 56.68 72.64 81.43
Foreign ownership in new 
businesses a=JVs, b=all companies,
as percentage of capital
in restructured firms per cent percent per cent
a) 40.76 40.78 40.7
b) 8.26 2.83 2.83
in new subsidiaries of companies 
a) 42.14 43.89 43.89
b) 32.42 34.82 34.46
Source: Privinfo (1992/10)
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privatization revenues of 200bn forints at most”, the opposition economist 
said. “Even that income is subject to the sale of the remaining state property at 
book value, of which there is little chance, in view of the condition Hungarian 
firms are in.” The market principle will probably and inevitably disappear into 
the realm of theory anyway. Now that profitable companies have been sold, 
what is left are mainly firms which are, for some reason, or another, unsellable.
The vehicle-maker Ikarus, for example, is a mammoth deprived of its 
markets and heavily indebted, others are small and medium-size concerns on 
the brink of bankruptcy, unable to offer any attractive features to potential 
investors either in the way of markets, advanced technologies or size. The most 
obvious answer would be the sale of these firms to the management and staff, it 
being their particular interest to keep the enterprise going and thus their jobs, 
and possibly also to domestic entrepreneurs. However, these potential investors 
are plagued by a chronic lack of capital. Gábor Slosár, the deputy executive 
director of the SPA, admitted that a decentralized privatization of small and 
medium-sized concerns has made little progress over the past year or more, 
with only 22 of the 414 firms on offer actually sold.
The State Property Agency is clearly trying to shift the emphasis towards 
methods of privatization which involve preferential treatment, like the ESOP 
(Employees’ Shared Ownership Programme), which has taken the form of 
legislation, or the Leasing and ESOP scheme, which is currently under prepa­
ration, or else privatization with the involvement of credit coupons. Although 
these methods have been rarely employed in practice, the double need for 
accelerated privatization and for the speedy creation of a property-owning 
middle-class—an aim more and more pointedly pursued by various politi­
cians—despite the scarcity of domestic capital will inevitably soon lead to the 
government’s extending preferential treatment to such an extent that privatiza­
tion will be tantamount to the free distribution of state property.
Obviously this type of privatization offers no guarantee for the survival of 
the companies concerned, since what the majority of them most need is an 
injection of capital which, in the given circumstances, it is difficult, if not 
downright impossible, to obtain. But it seems almost certain that “unclaimed” 
firms will quickly fail, and the end is once again an odd sort of privatization, 
called liquidation. In all likelihood, the most exciting “game” in the Hungarian 
privatization process will be the pursuit race of preferential privatizations and 
windings-up. The odds are rather high that carpet-baggers will make their best 
deals in connection with firms privatized by being wound up.
Many observers believe that 1992 will be the peak year for privatization in 
Hungary, at least in terms of revenue obtained. Indeed, the SPA fulfilled its 
target of 50bn forints for the year by the middle of the summer. Observers 
consider it rather likely that the plan of setting up the State Asset Handling 
Company (AVRT) also played a powerful role. The staff of the SPA is paid in 
keeping with the Agency’s income, and it was in their best interest to produce 
the highest possible revenue before a competing organization starts to operate.
The law establishing this new state ownership organization—the State Asset
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Handling Company—came into force on August 28th. A government order 
issued at the same time listed property to be kept in state ownership in the long 
term. With the advent of the new organization, two bodies are now in charge of 
managing state property to be operated as businesses. State property that can 
be privatized in full comes under the authority of the State Property Agency, 
and state property which will be privatized to a limited extent only will be 
managed by the State Asset Handling Company. (Separate legislation on 
exchequer property, which is currently being prepared, will address the ques­
tion of non-business state property.) In contrast to the SPA, which remains an 
exchequer-financed organization, the SAHC operates as a private one-person 
limited company, with ownership rights exercised by a minister. But in fact the 
SAHC exercises similar rights to the SPA over the firms that come under its 
authority. This means, that apart from the appointed percentage of the companies 
under its control, which will remain in state ownership, the SAHC may sell or 
lease its firms or restructure them for future privatization.
The relevant government order lists 157 firms which may be privatized in 
part only; between 25 and 50 per cent of their shares will remain permanently 
in state ownership. The ownership rights over the smaller, public service part 
of these state-held companies will be exercised by the competent ministries. 
Their majority was, however, handed over to the SPA. The non-privatizable 
assets of these companies will be incorporated as the equity of the SAHC, 
while the privatizable part of their assets will be considered its non-equity 
capital. Critics of this legislation argue that this will trigger an unprecedented
SALE OF STATE PROPERTY AND PRIVATIZATION REVENUES AND 
EXPENDITURES
Privatization revenues and expenditures (accumulated within the year)
1991*** 1992 1992
Dec.31 June 30 July31 
i jlä ie  30.44 37.10 45.30
b) dividend, yield 0.94 3.50 4.00
c) revenues, total (a+b)____________________ 30.38_____ 40.60_____49.30
***Because of delays in bank transfers, only this sum is shown on the
accounts of the SPA. A further 8.7bn forints was carried over to 1992.
Income from privatized state property (accumulated within the year)
Total___________________________________30.44 37.10 45.30
- of that
sold for forints (cash) 4.82 6.70 7.37
sold for forints (E+P credit) 1.01 4.00 4.42
sold for hard currency 24.61 26.40 33.51
sold for compensation coupons — — —
Source: Privinfo (1992/10)
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Stronger foreign investment in Eastern 
Europe and CIS
F oreign investment in Eastern Europe and the former USSR is in creasing despite instability in the region. The latest issue of the East 
European Investment Magazine, published on Monday August 31, 1992, 
surveyed acquisitions, joint ventures and greenfield investments in the 
first quarter of this year and the last quarter of 1991 in all of the now 27 
countries of Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR. (Foreign investments in 
Eastern Germany, since it was part of the former East Bloc, have been 
included.)
The number of deals has soared. The last quarter of 1991 saw a total of 
146 transactions in the region. “This result was no small feat for a region 
that still carries high investment risks and, arguably, an even higher 
perception of risk,” commented Mark Dixon, editor of the magazine.
This result has been achieved against a backdrop of social, political 
and economic turbulance in the region.
American investors have once again taken the top place. Their unri­
valled position as the leading investor nation was shown in both the 
number and value of their transactions.
Commenting on the investing countries, Mr Dixon said: “Without 
Americans, Germans, Italians, French and British, you could almost hear 
a pin drop in Eastern Europe, such would be the investment silence.” 
Even so, many other investing countries were identified—including 
even a few fellow East European countries whose companies somehow 
found the resources to invest in other countries of the region.
There was something good in the statistics for almost everyone. Russia 
got the largest number of deals, Hungary the largest number of greenfield 
investments, the CSFR the top deal value. Among the major target 
nations, only Poland found itself with little to celebrate, although its 13 
deals carried a respectable disclosed value of over $500 million.
It was already becoming apparent in the last quarter of 1991 that 
Hungary, with its population of 11 million, could not indefinitely hold 
out against Russia as an investment location with 140 million people.
This broadening of investor interest beyond Hungary has been under 
way since the collapse of communism throughout the region, but it took 
six months for the impact to be felt in actual investment flows. Through­
out this interval, many investors continued to view Hungary as the most 
appetizing investment target. In the old days before the Berlin Wall was 
breached—tiny Hungary took more than half of all investment in the 
region.
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T H E  I N V E S T O R S :  F I R S T  Q U A R T E R
I n v e s t m e n t  a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  2 7  c o u n t r i e s  o f  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e ,  E a s t e r n  C
1 9 9 2
j e r m a n y  a n d  t h e  e x - l
s c lo se d  V a lu e  ($  m illio n )  
G re e n fie ld  
Jo in t  in v es t-  
v e n tu re s  m en ts
J S S R
In v e s to r
n a tio n s  A c q u is i-  
r a n k e d  tio n s
G re e n fie ld  
J o in t  in v es t-  
v e n tu re s  m en ts T o ta l
A c q u is i­
t io n s T o ta l
U n i t e d  S t a te s 9 .5 3 8 .5 1 8 .5 6 6 .5 5 8 .3 7 8 4 .0 2 8 1 .4 1 1 2 3 .7
I ta ly 4 .5 1 2 .0 5 .0 2 1 .5 9 6 .7 7 1 .2 1 0 3 .3 2 7 1 .2
G e r m a n y 5 .5 6 .5 9 .0 2 1 .0 9 0 .4 6 8 5 .4 — 7 7 5 .8
F r a n c e 5 .0 9 .0 5 .0 1 9 .0 8 2 .3 2 4 4 .1 1 3 2 .4 4 5 8 .8
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m 7 .0 3 .5 — 1 0 .5 7 8 .2 2 8 .4 — 1 0 6 .6
S w e d e n 1 .0 6 .8 1 .0 8 .8 — 5 6 .1 — 5 6 .1
J a p a n 0 .5 3 .0 5 .0 8 .5 — 0 .3 — 0 .3
F in la n d — 7 .4 1 .0 8 .4 — 0.1 — 0 .1
A u s t r i a 4 .0 1 .0 2 .0 7 .0 1 6 3 .7 2 7 .7 — 1 9 1 .4
C a n a d a — 6 .0 — 6 .0 — 4 0 .7 — 4 0 .7
N e t h e r l a n d s 2 .5 2 .0 — 4 .5 5 5 .0 3 5 .6 — 9 0 .6
S w i t z e r l a n d 1 .0 1 .5 1 .0 3 .5 4 7 .8 — — 4 7 .8
D e n m a r k 2 .0 1 .0 — 3 .0 0 .6 — — 0 .6
H u n g a r y — 1.5 1 .0 2 .5 — — — —
S o u th  A f r ic a 1 .0 — 1.0 2 .0 1 0 9 .4 — — 1 0 9 .4
L u x e m b u r g 1 .0 — — 1 .0 1 7 8 .3 — — 1 7 8 .3
S p a in — — 1 .0 1 .0 — — 6 .3 6 .3
B e lg iu m 1 .0 — — 1 .0 — — — —
G r e e c e — 1.0 — 1 .0 — — — —
H o n g  K o n g — 1 .0 — 1.0 — — — —
I n d ia — — 1.0 1 .0 — — — —
L i b y a — — 1 .0 1 .0 — — — —
S o u th  K o r e a — 1.0 — 1.0 — — — —
U k r a in e — 1.0 — 1 .0 ---- ' — — —
R u s s i a 0 ,5 — — 0 .5 5 9 .8 — — 5 9 .8
I s r a e l — — 0 .5 0 .5 — — 5 0 .7 5 0 .7
N o r w a y — 0 .3 — 0 .3 — — — —
E u r o p e  ( m i s e . ) 3 .0 — — 3 .0 6 6 .0 — — 6 6 .0
T o ta l 4 9 .0 1 0 4 .0 5 3 .1 0 2 0 6 .0 1 0 8 6 .3 1 9 7 3 .5 5 7 4 .1 3 6 3 3 .9
S o u r c e :  E a s t  E u r o p e a n  I n v e s t m e n t  M a g a z i n e ,  N e w  Y o r k
RUSSIA IS MOST POPULAR TARGET:
First quarter 1992
Investment activity in the 27 countries of Eastern Europe, Eastern Germany and ex-USSSR
XT. n -  i i i f t  i r
T a rg e t G re e n fie ld G re e n fie ld
n a tio n s  A c q u is i- Jo in t in v es t- A c q u is i- Jo in t in v es t-
ra n k e d tio n s v e n tu re s m en ts T o ta l t io n s v e n tu re s m en ts T o ta l
R u s s i a 1 5 0 11 6 2 1 2 .8 6 6 8 .0 5 1 .1 7 3 1 .9
H u n g a r y 15 12 15 4 2 2 7 3 .4 4 1 .6 2 1 7 .3 5 3 2 .3
C S F R 17 13 9 3 9 3 4 6 .7 6 0 5 .7 — 9 5 2 .4
E a s te r n  G e r m a n y  13 1 5 19 4 0 6 .7 — 2 7 0 .5 6 7 7 .2
P o la n d 2 3 8 13 16 4 6 0 .5 3 5 .2 5 1 1 .7
U k r a in e — 6 2 8 — 1 6 0 .0 — 1 6 0 .0
E s t o n ia — 6 1 7 — 0 .1 — 0 .1
K a z a k h s ta n — 3 1 4 — — — —
S lo v e n ia 1 2 — 3 3 0 .7 — — 3 0 .7
L i th u a n i a — 2 — 2 — 0 .1 — 0 .1
L a tv ia — 2 — 2 — — — —
U z b e k i s t a n — 1 — 1 — 3 7 .5 — 3 7 .5
B e la r u s — — 1 1 — — — —
B u lg a r i a — 1 — 1 — — — —
R u m a n ia — 1 — 1 — — — —
S e r b ia
M o n te n e g r o — 1 — 1 — — — —
T o ta l 4 9 1 0 4 5 3 2 0 6 1 0 8 6  3 1 9 7 3 .5 5 7 4 .1 3 6 3 3 .9
S o u r c e :  E a s t  E u r o p e a n  I n v e s t m e n t  M a g a z i n e ,  N e w  Y o r k .
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degree of centralization of state property. The criticism seems to be well- 
founded, especially since the firms which come under the authority of the 
SAHC, although few in number, represent the country’s core industries. Ac­
cording to some estimates, the new organization will be in charge of half of the 
state assets to be operated as a business. It will control such mammoths as the 
Electricity Board, the Hungarian State Railways (MÁV) and the Hungarian Oil 
and Gas Company (MOL Rt).
Thirty-six organizations, mainly prisons and defence industries, the Na­
tional Textbook Publishing Company, the Games of Fortune Co., the Hungar­
ian Post Office and MÁV, (Hungarian Railways) will remain 100 per cent 
state-owned. The state intends to retain 50 per cent plus one share in Malév, the 
airline, the energy company MOL Rt, the regional water works, some three 
dozen state farms, 25 per cent in a number of large industrial companies 
including the Danube Iron Works, Hungalu, Rába, Ikarus, TVK, BVK, six 
pharmaceutical works, and in most of the banks.
Most probably several foreign firms will have to continue privatization talks 
with the SAHC which they began with the SPA, now that the new organization 
is in operation. The government order obviously intends to do away with 
uncertainties still surrounding the Hungarian privatization process, by clearly 
specifying saleable and non-saleable state property. But the age of uncertainty 
is not yet over. Legislation on the privatization of state property gives the 
government opportunity to modify the list which specifies the state’s stake in 
any firm.
In fact, the obligation on the part of the government to revise the list of firms 
slated for privatization every other year, is spelled out in the same legislation.
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Ronald Savitt
Privatization and the Consumer
The discussion of privatization and the market economy has been lively in 
the recent past in Hungary and continues 
with great spirit.1 The analyses have fo­
cused on traditional issues from econom­
ics, political science and sociology, but 
with rare exception have dealt with what 
can be termed “managerial concerns” in 
both the context of the firm and the con­
sumer.
Privatization is one part of a complex 
of activities usually discussed as trans­
formation. Of itself it will affect the de­
velopment of a market economy, though 
private ownership should not be regarded 
as synonymous with a market economy. 
It is fair to suggest that in Hungary great 
reliance has been put on privatization in 
terms of being both the means and the 
ends of the transformation process. This 
is understandable, since it is one of the 
more tangible elements of transition and 
one which is required as the cornerstone 
of a market economy. The creation of a 
market economy takes a great deal of 
time; it is an ongoing process in which 
variations in the amount and importance 
of private ownership take place in and 
among the economies which have a mar­
ket component. It will not happen quickly 
in Central and Eastern Europe, largely
Ronald Savitt is the John L. Beckley 
Professor of American Business at the 
University of Vermont, USA. During the 
1991-92 academic year, he was the Sen­
ior Fulhright Lecturer at the International 
Management Centre in Budapest.
because the process is evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary; even if it were the 
latter, we simply are not in the possession 
of the methodologies necessary to direct 
its progress.2
Although private ownership is an im­
portant part of the development of a 
market economy, it is only one part of a 
complex process. It may not be popular 
to say so but, I must state that private 
ownership in itself does not ensure the 
effective and efficient operation of a 
market economy, nor does it ensure eco­
nomic development.
Privatization and management
S uccesses in moving state organiza­tions from the public to the private 
sector in Hungary have been significant 
though it is reasonable to suggest that the 
various measures probably do more to 
cloud the issue than to clarify it. Whether 
we look at the number of organizations, 
their contribution to gross domestic 
product, the number of employees now in 
the private sector or any one of other 
indices, it is clear that substantial progress 
in this part of the process is visible. Mov­
ing from state ownership to private own­
ership, however, does not mean that a 
market economy has been created or that 
the economy is on a growth path.
Let me say in general that the change 
in ownership in no way guarantees that 
the new organization will be in any better 
condition to operate in the evolving mar­
ket than the ownership pattern that pro­
ceeded it. First, in some cases past man­
agement has now taken over as owner-
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manager without any sign of improve­
ment in the abilities to manage the new 
organization. In some ways the new en­
terprise may be worse off in the short run, 
in so far as it may lack access to both 
sources of finance and markets.3 How 
management skills become developed is 
a critical part of the privatization process. 
Some derive from the entrepreneurial 
nature of the population, though these, as 
well as those brought in by foreign firms, 
take time to reach the level necessary to 
operate in a market economy.
A market economy, regardless of the 
proportion of privately owned to state 
owned business firms, depends on rela­
tively intense competition among them. 
The structure of most of industry in Cen­
tral and Eastern Europe continues to be 
characterized by very large organizations, 
and while some progress has been made, 
much more must be done before the 
critical elements of a competitive envi­
ronment are present.4 It is reasonable to 
feel concern about those instances of pri­
vatization in which the old state monopoly 
has been reconceived but has not been 
restructured.
Transformation in this context has two 
distinct meanings. The first concerns the 
degree to which the bases for competition 
are present in an industry. There is no 
magical number of firms required to make 
industries competitive, in the sense of 
reacting to the wishes of consumers by 
providing choice and readjusting offerings 
as market conditions require. As far as I 
am concerned, too much attention in 
Hungary and elsewhere has been given to 
changes of ownership rather than the de­
velopment of a competitive environment. 
There are important exceptions, especially 
with regard to the entry of foreign firms, 
either through new investments or joint 
ventures with Hungarian firms. These 
provide the basis of competition, as long 
as the industry does not return to a single 
or substantially dominant firm situation.
I do not want to address what is the
correct balance of domestic versus for­
eign ownership and management except 
to the degree that, whatever takes place, a 
significant degree of competition must be 
developed and maintained. Clearly, 
managerial abilities and the ability to of­
fer better goods and services in an open 
market will determine this balance. No 
economy will ever see domestic firms 
alone dominating a large proportion of 
all of its industries.
The second meaning of transformation 
deals with the development of entrepre­
neurial and managerial attitudes which 
include market orientation. This concept 
recognizes the importance of the con­
sumer, it is the driving force in the market. 
Satisfying the consumer becomes the most 
important function of the organiztion. 
Making this happen even in western 
markets has not been easy, and many of 
the world’s most important firms have 
not developed such attitudes. Much of 
recent economic history is dominated by 
the need of the firm to serve the con­
sumer. While Hungary is moving in this 
direction at a faster rate than some of the 
economies in the region, it still has a long 
way to go. Once again this is an issue of 
process rather than performance.
It is difficult to estimate how long it 
will take managers to adopt this philoso­
phy. Some western firms, such as Burger 
King, Dairy Queen and MacDonalds, 
bring this with them and will affect others 
both in and out of catering. Foreign 
competition should discipline the newly 
privatized firms in the long run if they are 
able to stay in the market.
Some of this requires the adoption of 
new values throughout the organization. 
It begins with an understanding that a 
firm has only two inextricably intertwined 
assets—its work force and its customers. 
In the absence of either, there is nothing 
regardless of what technological materi­
als it may control. Too much of privatiza­
tion—to help assess values for establish­
ing selling prices— has focused on tradi­
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tional physical assets rather than those 
that I suggest. What we are unfortunately 
seeing in Hungary and elsewhere is the 
American performance approach, rather 
than one based on process.
Consumers and the market economy
T hose of us who have grown up in a market economy have developed our 
consumer behaviour to the point that it 
becomes second nature to us. What is at 
the centre of this is a socilization process 
in which consumers learn at a very young 
age “...how the marketplace works, how 
to earn and spend money, types of mar­
keting strategies, and altemtive brands 
that are available for sale.”5
The consumer has a key role to play in 
the development of a market economy 
and economic development. Privatization 
attempts to provide “sellers” with the 
means of creating a market. But a market 
requires both sellers and buyers. Little 
attention is directed at developing con­
sumers to take their responsibilities in the 
process. An implicit assumption is that if 
business is private, it will affect buyers 
by providing choice through competition. 
This is only partially true. As I have ar­
gued above, it is not certain how quickly 
competition will come to dominate mar­
kets. Even if there are two firms in com­
petition with one another, the conditions 
of the past do not guarantee that they will 
be competitive in such a way as to prompt 
consumers to demand market efficiency. 
“In a market society the consumer is the 
ultimate formulator of the pattern of eco­
nomic activity.”6
The early conditions of transformation 
do not place the consumer in the most 
advantageous position. Unemployment, 
inflation, and market disruptions do not 
encourage the development of positive 
market behaviour. Consumers simply do 
not have an opportunity to insist on the 
rules of the game; shortages demand ex­
tensive search, inflation requires cutting 
back on purchases, and unemployment 
affects the ability to consume.
Business firms and state organizations 
can and do take advantage of the lack of 
strength in consumers; they exploit needs 
with poor merchandise, they charge un­
reasonable prices, and they can in general 
exploit the generally shapeless mass of 
consumers. While such practices are not 
unknown in the United States, Great 
Britain or Germany, consumers have a 
tacit understanding of their roles in af­
fecting such behaviour, and those markets 
are governed by legislation permitting 
action to be taken against sellers who 
abuse their position.
Customers become managers of their 
assets; they not only make judgements 
about the various products and services 
that they are offered but also provide in­
formation about what they want. They 
learn the appropriate behaviour as a result 
of sellers’ policies who use “customer 
service” programmes as well as through 
the education system and public service 
programmes. “Consumers may take their 
complaints to manufacturers or retailers, 
pressuring them to recall or rebuild sub­
standard products, provide relevant and 
understandable information about product 
use, and issue guarantees or warranties 
that substantiate producer’s committments 
to their products”7
What the future may bring
I t is simplistic to expect firms, whose management does not fully understand 
the ideas that govern a market economy, 
to look at the development of consumers 
as an integral part of their behaviour, es­
pecially in the early periods of transfor­
mation. Their understanding of the market 
economy is making it in the short run 
rather than the process of satisfying con­
sumer needs. They are simply not market 
oriented. Building long term relationships
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in a market setting, in which shortages 
exist, in which competition has not begun, 
and in which consumer sovereignty is not 
known or understood, does not create 
profits. It is not that these firms are evil 
or anything of the sort; it is simply that 
they exploit short run economic condi­
tions.
This comes down to the following 
question: Who speaks for the Hungarian 
consumer in the period of transformation? 
Newly privatized firms and old state en­
terprises may, to the extent that they rec­
ognize their need to compete for the cus­
tom of consumers. Given the nature of 
privatization, especially the lack of 
emerging competitive conditions, this may 
not occur with the necessary speed, bear­
ing in mind that consumers as employees 
are unable to earn appropriate wages and 
develop spending power to allocate in 
markets, it may be doubly difficult for 
consumers to play their appropriate role.
The role of the government will prob­
ably be limited in this area, since there 
are so many conflicting pressures. Clearly, 
the development of a fair system in which 
contracts will be kept and grievances are 
attended to is required. Some government 
legislation and regulation is also neces­
sary, though Hungary, as other countries 
in the region, has good reason to limit the 
role of the government in the market. 
Education will take some time and effort.
We must look beyond the success rate 
to measure the impact of privatization on 
the creation of a market economy. Market 
economies function because there is a 
continual tension between sellers and 
buyers in the market as a result of both 
sides understanding their roles. While 
consumers never have equal power in
confronting sellers, they provide a sig­
nificant force which affects change. Pri­
vate ownership in itself does not guaran­
tee a market orientation, though it is much 
more likely to happen with private own­
ership in a competitive setting. What is 
missing in the current privatization pro­
grammes for state owned organizations is 
a similar set of activities focused on 
“privatizing” the consumer.
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PERSONAL
Péter Esterházy
Post-Modern Barbarism, 
or a Europe without Qualities
A ll that was Whole is shattered, wrote Endre Ady early this century. I have the feeling that all we have been doing since then is marking time, whiling 
time away with wars, with cold, with heat, with the erecting and collapse of 
that shed of lies called socialism, to stand now where early 20th century 
scepticism stood, disenchanted with liberalism, dependent on liberalism (what 
else could it have depended upon?) In the meanwhile, however, a century has 
come and gone and—to put a fine point to it—quite a few things have 
happened. We can raise the same questions under worse conditions, in a more 
difficult situation (the fact that we are able to raise these questions at all no 
longer affords us particular pleasure in itself). The world is less and less 
innocent. We have grasped that we are living a continuous scandal, in a new 
barbarism. Du musst dein Leben ändern, said someone near of Duino. Don’t 
you thou me, we are not on familiar terms, we answer, without insolence or 
annoyance, peacefully and quietly.
The intelligentsia of so-called Central Europe has discredited itself. That’s 
not what we expected of ourselves. If we glance into a looking glass of five or 
ten years ago, we see ourselves strutting about like peacocks, patting ourselves 
on the back, praising our moral integrity, our inner reserves, that great human 
warmth which we have preserved in spite of so many reverses, and it was quite 
clear that only the “system”, the Russians, the communists stood in the way of 
our far-reaching plans, our country-building longings... Little Snow-White’s 
step-mother had a better looking glass. You are fair, you are fairer than the sun, 
but... We did not hear the but.
And what is there now? Yugoslavia. It is at once a verb, a noun, an adjective. 
Yugoslav, Yugoslavs, Yugoslaving. Every kind of shame is justified. Where is 
that fantastic Central-European spirituality? There should be at least some­
thing to show, even half a line, in Slovene, or in Croatian, or Serbian, or 
Hungarian.
Péter Esterházy’s works to appear in English translation in 1993 are Down the 
Danube, Grove Weidenfeld, New York, and Helping Verbs of the Heart, 
Quartet Books, London.
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Who are you? runs the question; am I supposed to answer, Hungarian?
How pitiful that would sound, how pitiful, how inadequate, how miserable 
only to be Hungarian, or Slovene, or Serbian! Is not literature meant to speak of 
our being a thousand different kinds of things, at times creating even this 
diversity? If literature gives up this purpose, this duty, it renounces all claim to 
legitimacy. I am Hungarian. I am Slovene. I am Serbian. You do not need 
literature for sentences like that. A bureaucrat will do, and a rubber stamp. A 
border guard. An army.
There is nothing in our heads. Our heads are empty. This empty head is 
Europe today. We have caught up with the Civilized West, in that we now look 
around as perplexed as they. They are in a functioning world with a relatively 
assertive self-awareness, we in our accustomed non-functioning one (to which 
we are unable to accustom ourselves), perpetually bombarding the question­
able self with questions.
It is not unreasonable of us to be wary of great visions about society, we’ve 
had more than our share of them; we’ve burnt our fingers (this century was the 
bum, the burning). But we have no experience, no idea of what a Europe 
without dreams can be like—there has always been some kind of dream in 
Europe, from the beginning of time; in effect, this, the unbroken dream, is the 
sine qua non of Europe. This is the new situation.
We have picked up the thread where Musil let go: the man without qualities 
seeking his identity.
('Vilenica, September 1992)
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István Váncsa
The Swiss Army Knife
I bought myself a Swiss Army knife — a little expensive, but worth it, because a Swiss Army knife is good for all purposes: it has five different 
kinds of screwdriver, as well as a ruler (metric and English), tweezers, mag­
nifying glass, ballpoint pen, ivory toothpick, pliers, and even a couple of kinds 
of knives (though one wouldn’t be too surprised to see they eventually forgot 
to put them in). You can do anything with a Swiss Army knife, from cutting 
wire to cleaning fish to peeling oranges (it has the right tool for every job), but 
you can also use it to take apart a computer (and put it together again so that it 
works), cut a lock, saw a door in two (I need not mention that there are separate 
saws for metal and wood), fix the coffee machine, the frame of your eyeglasses, 
the television and the blender, drill a hole or carve a notch in a board. Of 
course, nobody really wants to do all these things with their Swiss Army knife; 
I for one have no desire to drill a hole or carve a notch, though I appreciate the 
possibility of executing any of these tasks should my gentlemanly desire so 
dictate.
Besides, the thing about the Swiss Army knife is not that it contains all these 
tools, but that they all actually work.
I tried out the wood saw, and determined that wood can be sawed with it, as 
well as metal with the metal saw. The little knife is like a scalpel, and can be 
used as one. Its scissors are sharp, cutting everything one normally cuts with 
scissors, and the ballpoint pen, though tiny, writes.
The Swiss Army knife can be described with one word: perfect. But since 
nothing is perfect, the Swiss Army knife’s existence is thoroughly improbable. 
Try to imagine a world built like a Swiss Army knife.
Everything would work in such a world: the car mechanic repairman would 
fix my car, the surgeon wouldn’t leave half-read pornographic novels in my 
belly, freedom would mean freedom, period, the word “politician” wouldn’t 
conjure up the image of a lunkhead or a raving lunatic, but of a person who 
practices not theoretical physics or dog-training or art dealing, but politics, and 
is obviously an expert in the field, because if he or she weren’t, they would 
give it up and become a pearl diver.
The object I refer to as the Swiss Army knife would be unknown in such a 
world.
István Váncsa is  a  cu ltu ra l jo u rn a lis t  a n d  d ep u ty  e d ito r  o f  Élet és Irodalom, a  
B u d a p est lite ra ry  w eek ly .
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For the Swiss Army knife is necessary because the world is imperfect, and 
anything that can break, does, while the only things that cannot break are 
busted to begin with—though such a thing usually has no problem getting 
more broken—because things are not what they claim to be, because soft drink 
bottles can’t be opened, and the nearly new revolving chair on which I am 
sitting at the moment has already collapsed under me three times (just as, by 
the way, the computer would already have fallen apart had I not repaired it in 
time with the Swiss Army knife, because it was only half-assembled at the 
factory), because all around me—around us—is accumulating the worthless 
trash of postindustrial societies, since what’s really good I can’t afford, and 
even what seems perfect is subject to Murphy’s Law (which is reminiscent of 
one of Buddha’s last utterances, that whatever has arisen will also pass).
Murphy’s Laws exude an unmistakeable Buddhist air.
For me at least, the Swiss Army knife is not a set of tools but an object for 
meditation, testifying that one must be ever-prepared, for this unravelling, 
unpredictable and absurd world may collapse on his head at any moment. For 
the time being I still have a job and a roof over my head, there is peace and I am 
suffering nothing, not even a toothache, but one tiny jolt and the whole thing 
will collapse: my place of work could go bust, a missile fired from who knows 
where could wipe my house away, leaving me under the open sky, and it may 
be that I myself will extract my upper left third incisor with the pliers in the 
Swiss Army knife, and put its chisel to use if I need to whittle myself a hut 
somewhere, since you have to go on living—I can’t just fall on my sword 
because I don’t have a sword, just a Swiss Army knife, which is a little too 
short for the job.
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János M. Rainer
Imre Nagy: Tragedy and Triumph
Peter Unwin: V o ic e  in  th e  W ild e r n e s s . I m r e  N a g y  a n d  th e  H u n g a r ia n  
R e v o lu tio n . London, MacDonald, 1991. 262 pp.
F ew figures in 20th century Hungar­ian history are better known than 
Imre Nagy, Prime Minister in the 1956 
Revolution, who was later executed. 
Nagy, of stocky build and schoolmasterly 
mien, wearing a pince-nez, made the front 
pages and television screens of the world 
on four different occasions. First in 1953, 
when he, as leader of what he himself 
called the “new era”, first attempted to 
reform the Stalinist regime; next in Oc­
tober 1956, when he became the head of 
government of the Revolution; then again 
in June 1958, when he was executed; and 
finally, in June 1989, when he was cer­
emoniously re-buried, an event that both 
ended an era and opened a new age of 
political change in East-Central Europe.
Imre Nagy was thus one of the few in 
Hungarian history to achieve international 
fame; furthermore, his life was mysteri­
ous, dramatic and tragic all at once. It 
therefore comes as a surprise that Peter 
Unwin’s biography of Imre Nagy is only 
the third published so far. None of the 
biographers live in Hungary. Soon after
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the suppression of the Revolution, two 
books were written on Imre Nagy by 
Hungarian exiles in the west. In 1959, a 
summary biography, written by Miklós 
Molnár and László Nagy, was published 
in French under the title Imre Nagy: Re­
former or Revolutionary? It was issued 
in Hungarian two years later by a Brussels- 
based institution, the “Imre Nagy Institute 
of Political Sciences”. Tibor Méray’s book 
on Imre Nagy was, again, initially pub­
lished in languages other than Hungarian; 
the most popular of these was the English- 
language version, Thirteen Days That 
Shook the Kremlin, which came out in 
1959. After several samizdat versions, it 
was finally published legally in Hungary 
in 1989, around the time of Imre Nagy’s 
re-burial.
Why was it that in 1989, the year when 
Imre Nagy, thirty years after his death, 
once again became a central figure in 
Hungarian politics, his biography was 
written by a foreigner? To put it in a 
different way, why did a British diplo­
matist write a book on Imre Nagy in 1988- 
1989?
The second is probably easier to an­
swer. Peter Unwin, the author of the book, 
found himself posted to Budapest in 1958, 
only one month after Nagy’s execution. 
His first stay in Hungary lasted three 
years. (His second child was baptized at 
the Budapest Embassy of the United States 
by Cardinal József Mindszenty who had 
found refuge there.) Between 1983 and
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1986 he was the British Ambassador in 
Budapest. His commitment to Hungary 
went beyond his professional duties. In 
the introduction he describes his interest 
in the Imre Nagy affair as an “obsession”. 
Obsession, in this sense, aptly describes 
his feelings for Hungary and the Hungar­
ian people.
It is not for the present reviewer to 
explain why the first biography of Imre 
Nagy after the great political transforma­
tion was not written in Hungary. Quite 
clearly Hungarian historians cannot ignore 
the challenge presented by the emergence 
of new sources; they will have to interpret 
the political and moral heritage of Imre 
Nagy from the specific Hungarian point 
of view, and to do this— paradoxically— 
presents fewer problems to a foreign ob­
server. What for Peter Unwin was a most 
fitting occasion to carry out a long-cher­
ished project means the dilemma of 
compulsory up-to-dateness or the lack of 
historical perspective to a Hungarian au­
thor.
Peter Unwin is not a professional his­
torian, nor is he Hungarian. For this rea­
son, he had no need to study new sources 
in great detail. His knowledge and hand­
ling of information available in 1989 is 
impressive; he even uses oral history 
sources. Thoroughly familiar with the 
language and the country, as well as 
having sound political understanding, 
Unwin presents with great authority the 
historical background to Nagy’s life and 
also the developments of the years that 
followed his death. Although he pays 
much attention to historical events in 
general—especially after 1945—I feel that 
it is always Imre Nagy who is at the 
centre of his interest. The account of the 
politician’s search for a place and role in 
society is mostly based on secondary 
sources. The author’s personal admiration 
and sympathy for Imre Nagy, together 
with his reliance on Nagy’s friends and 
family in gathering information, is evident 
from his portrayal of the man behind the
public figure. All this, however, is al­
ways kept under the close control of ob­
jectivity; in Unwin’s case it follows 
naturally from his temperament. This is a 
case where a British diplomatist, accus­
tomed to analysing events, indulges in 
discussing his favourite subject.
His familiarity with his subject, and 
his qualities as a writer, prevent Unwin 
from presenting an apology for a hero. 
His attitude towards Nagy is critical, es­
pecially in discussing his role in history 
and international politics and in describ­
ing the events of the 1956 Revolution. 
Interestingly enough, Unwin’s criticism 
concerns not only Nagy’s hesitation, and 
his drifting with the tide of events which 
eventually swept him away (a criticism 
which has repeatedly been made), but also 
his theoretical views and practical moves, 
that often challenged the realities of in­
ternational politics (thus Hungary’s leav­
ing the Warsaw Pact and trying to acquire 
the status of neutrality). The characteris­
tic realism of the British, and their aver­
sion to altering the existing balance of 
power, are perhaps responsible for 
Unwin’s restrained criticism.
English speaking readers will obtain 
an essentially correct picture of both Imre 
Nagy and Hungarian history between 
1945 and the 1956 Revolution. There are, 
however, a few crucial points which—in 
my opinion—are not really presented in a 
balanced way and which cannot be justi­
fied on the grounds of an author’s freedom 
of interpretation. This is all the more no­
ticeable since Unwin is otherwise re­
markably successful in cross-checking 
information from different sources and, 
despite his above mentioned “obsession”, 
he is able to preserve his objectivity.
A relevant point is Nagy’s exile in the 1930s, and his alleged employ­
ment by the Soviet secret police as an 
informer or agent. Similar rumours had 
circulated earlier, and were mentioned in 
the unpublished Imre Nagy biography
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written by the historian Miklós Szabó in 
the 1980s, but much the same was sug­
gested in György Konrad’s novel A cinkos 
(The Accomplice) which included a 
character modelled on Nagy. Such ru­
mours, not confined to Imre Nagy, had 
their origins largely in the obscure past of 
the communist exiles returning from 
Moscow, and also in the general suspicion 
which people in Hungary entertained re­
garding the Moscovites. In Imre Nagy’s 
case, weight was added to this suspicion 
by the fact that he had escaped all the 
purges, in spite of his many conflicts with 
the Communist Party, including less well 
known clashes in the 1920s and the late 
1940s, and his public confrontations with 
Rákosi in 1953 and after 1955.
It was in 1989, precisely around the 
time of Nagy’s re-burial, that the old al­
legations concerning his past record as 
an undercover agent of the GPU under 
the code-name “Sz-122 alias Volodia” 
were resurrected by Károly Grósz, then 
General Secretary of the Communist 
Party. Grósz even mentioned “original” 
Soviet sources purporting to support the 
accusation. (Somehow these “sources” 
were never published.) Unwin dutifully 
reports all the relevant information; he 
lists the versions, which ranged from 
credible or relatively credible stories to 
outright fabrications. He also refers to 
views and counter-views, and adds his 
own opinion. (I personally believe that, 
like any other exile, Nagy, too, must have 
had some dealings with the security 
forces, but was never actually recruited.)
In view of such methodological quali­
ties, it is difficult to understand how 
Unwin could practically ignore that op­
position within the Party which formed 
around Nagy in 1955. Without their sup­
port Nagy could never have become the 
historical figure he is remembered as to­
day: a statesman defending national in­
terests, who after an initial hesitation 
joined the Revolution and paid the su­
preme penalty for it. How is it possible
that the same Unwin, who is able to illus­
trate so vividly the complex character of 
Imre Nagy—a man full of hesitations, 
stubbornly following the party line and 
entertaining vain illusions, whose loyalty 
was rewarded by dastardly attacks—fails 
to see that it was precisely these Com­
munist Party dissidents who helped him 
get over all his hesitations and apprehen­
sions. Without grasping the role of this 
group with such prominent figures among 
them as Géza Losonczy, Sándor Haraszti, 
Miklós Vásárhelyi, Szilárd Újhelyi, 
Miklós Gimes and Ferenc Donáth, it is 
impossible to understand the most im­
portant decision in Nagy’s life: the trans­
formation that took place between the 
23rd and the 28th of October, 1956.
Initially, Nagy did not approve of the 
popular uprising, though his disapproval 
was neither unqualified nor enormously 
Stalinist. As was always the case, a true 
Bolshevik politician was terrified by the 
real people, to whom so many rhetorical 
references were made. It was these friends 
who literally mediated between the revo­
lutionary people and their standard-bearer 
and Prime Minister to be. These men are 
in fact hardly mentioned in Unwin’s bi­
ography. Their emergence and composi­
tion certainly deserves more attention, 
precisely because their fate was so closely 
bound up with his. Some of them are first 
mentioned only in connection with the 
events of the morning of the 23rd of Oc­
tober, when they had a meeting with the 
Prime Minister.
In my view, the reasons for this one­
sidedness must be sought on several lev­
els. To start with, Unwin’s sympathy is 
engaged by the lonely figure of the 
brooding hero and this side-tracks him. 
On the other hand, Unwin might have 
over-identified, primarily through his 
conversations with family members, with 
Imre Nagy’s contemporary opinion on 
the group, which paradoxically enough 
(or perhaps naturally?)was not one of un­
equivocal approval. True he thought
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highly of them, and appreciated their 
standing by him in the difficult times af­
ter he was ousted from power in 1955. 
On the other hand, too, he was often an­
noyed by their radical approach (radical 
by the standards of the time); their call 
for firmer action, the pressure they exerted 
on him to take more decisive steps, to 
make up his mind, irritated him, despite 
the soundness of their political judgement, 
which he was prepared to admit even at 
the time, and which he most certainly 
admitted in retrospect.
Mention must also be made of the one­
sided approach to János Kádár: a man 
whose role in Imre Nagy’s life has to be 
confronted.
Even given the sources that have re­
cently been made available in Hungary, it 
cannot be said that Kádár’s role in the 
reprisals and in the political management 
of the Imre Nagy trial can be satisfacto­
rily determined. Nevertheless, there is no 
doubt that his responsibility is greater than 
suggested by Unwin. On the evidence of 
the surviving minutes of Politbureau 
meetings, it appears certain that in Feb­
ruary 1958, during the early days of the 
Nagy trial, Kádár received a Soviet re­
quest not to hold the trial just then, 
pointing out that it would adversely effect 
the current foreign policy goals of the 
Soviet Union. In his speech at the 
Politbureau meeting, Kádár mentioned the 
possible postponement of the trial (and of 
the death sentences that directly and in­
evitably followed from the charges) and 
the “influencing” (otherwise the directing) 
of the courts of justice to pass milder 
sentences, as possible alternatives. 
Knowing full well that the Politbureau 
had never before voted against his pro­
posals, Kádár firmly warned against the 
second alternative. One day we might 
even know whether the Soviet “request” 
also contained a suggested solution. It is 
certain that nobody in Moscow raised a 
voice to save Nagy’s life. What is equally 
certain, however, is that Kádár was never
the puppet he is made out to be in Unwin’s 
book—though admittedly Unwin does not 
put it quite as directly as this. Kádár’s 
dependence on the Soviets was recipro­
cal, in matters especially important to 
him—for example, in preventing Rákosi’s 
return to Hungary—Kádár took a firm 
stand in dealing with the Moscow lead­
ership from the start. He could act firmly, 
and get results. In Imre Nagy’s case he 
chose to do nothing.
Unwin cites a 1898 discussion he had 
in Budapest with the late György Aczél— 
by then retired but from 1956 on Kádár’s 
closest associate and powerful supreme 
authority in the ideological and cultural 
fields, a Politbureau member until his re­
tirement. According to Aczél, Kádár spent 
his last days weeping from remorse. This 
is new information. Others claim, on 16 
June, the day Nagy and his associates 
were re-buried, Kádár wanted to leave 
his hospital bed to attend the ceremony. 
Incidentally, Kádár died the very day the 
Supreme Court annulled Nagy’s sentence 
for high treason and declared him inno­
cent.
It is not familiarity with the latest 
sources that I miss, but a weighing up of 
the evidence, of which I spoke in general, 
and the lack of which I also mentioned in 
connection with particular points. In its 
later stages the Kádár regime—liberal in 
comparison with the other eastern-block 
countries—impressed a number of frank 
and honest western observers. It must be 
pointed out, as Unwin does in his book, 
that a considerable proportion of Kádár’s 
reform policies first appeared in an em­
bryonic state in Imre Nagy’s “new era” 
policy. But the road to the Kádár reforms 
led through times of unrestrained repris­
als and terror.
Peter Unwin does not end his book 
with 1958, the year of the execution. He 
follows up Nagy’s “heritage” up to his 
rehabilitation as the Prime Minister of 
the Revolution, his re-burial, and the 
country’s return to democracy: events
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which themselves amount to a revolu­
tion. Unwin’s conclusions in this respect 
cannot be disputed: although Imre Nagy 
was unable to carry out his reforms, and 
his faith in a socialism with a human face 
did not prove viable, the love of man and 
nation manifest in this faith, together with 
his courage when it mattered, have sur­
vived him. In a democratic and free
Hungary this ensures that he will be well- 
remembered by the nation, more than most 
people could have hoped for in the age 
and the environment in which he lived. 
Her Majesty’s Ambassador has served 
this country well in helping us to preserve 
this memory, for which—pace any criti­
cism here made—he deserves our grati­
tude.
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Catching the Fleeting Moment
The Transition in Eastern Europe through Western Eyes
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Pinter Publishers, 1991,129 pp; Roger East: Revolution in Eastern Eu­
rope. London, Pinter Publishers, 1992,193 pp; Timothy Garton Ash: The 
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H as enough time passed to allow us to understand the nature of the post­
communist changes in Eastern Central 
Europe? Can a history of the extraordi­
nary events of 1989 be written, and if so, 
is what we experienced ourselves recog­
nizable in it?
In a sense, the most important change 
in the twentieth century was the rapid 
disintegration of the communist regimes 
that had seemed as firm as a rock. The 
great experiment began in 1917 with the 
Revolution in Russia, and ended in De­
cember 1991 with the disintegration of
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the Soviet Union. Teleological systems 
have disappeared from the stage of his­
tory—let us hope for good. All that has 
followed since—the euphoria and the 
disillusionment, the passivity, attempts to 
overturn past wrongs, liberalism and 
populism, democracy and nationalism— 
is, to some extent, déja vu.
The Ice Age is over; the agents on the 
political stage have emerged from a hi­
bernation that had lasted for many dec­
ades. Yet it is not possible for things to 
continue where they left off in pre-com­
munist times. Decades of communist rule 
thoroughly changed the political atmos­
phere of East-Central European societies 
and the relationship to politics of their 
citizens. The property-owning class dis­
appeared—as indeed did private property. 
The seeds of a market economy appeared 
in Hungary in the 1970s only as a spin­
off of economic reforms. Thus the politi­
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cal developments of 1989 showed both 
elements of renewal, and of restoration: 
the introduction of democracy in a region 
where such ways had never enjoyed a 
long run being an example of the first, 
and the restoration of capitalist property 
relations an example of the latter.
Since 1989 the number of works deal­
ing with the transition to democracy has 
swollen to enormous proportions. It has 
almost become a separate discipline lo­
cated where sociology, history and po­
litical science march on each other. It is 
sometimes ironically called TDology (TD 
standing for Transition to Democracy). 
After studying transition to democracy in 
Southern Europe, East Asia and Latin 
America, attention is now concentrated 
on the same processes in post-communist 
East Central Europe. The bulging period­
ical literature shows just how fashionable 
the subject is.
Books have now followed articles. 
What they have in common is their anxi­
ety not to be left behind by events. Writ­
ing contemporary history is always diffi­
cult: a certain distance has to be main­
tained between the author and the events 
taking place before the witness’s eyes. 
Authors can never be sure that their hasty 
conclusions will stand the test of time, 
even whether they will still be valid by 
the following year.
Instead of analysing processes, some 
books simply attempt to capture the 
fleeting moment. The Magic Lantern, by 
Timothy Garton Ash, is one of the best of 
this kind. Earlier he had closely studied 
developments in Poland—see his Soli­
darity: the Polish Revolution—and East 
Germany. In the 1980s he devoted much 
attention to the dissidents in Eastern 
Central Europe.This made it possible for 
him to write about the 1989 changes as a 
recognized authority on an area he knew 
well.
The Magic Lantern is impressive and 
entertaining reading. Writing of this 
quality is only possible for someone who
is so well-informed that he can in fact 
afford not to analyse when it is still im­
possible to do so.
The book shows, however, that Garton 
Ash is not as sure in his judgement re­
garding Hungary as he is regarding the 
other countries. This is especially evident 
in his discussion of the tripartite negotia­
tions of the summer of 1989, of which he 
notes: “These talks lasted just over three 
months, a month longer than Poland’s. 
However, that included a month’s time 
out in August, partly because the talks 
had reached a stalemate, but perhaps 
also because it was, well, holiday time.” 
(p. 57) In fact, the negotiations lasted all 
through the summer without interruption, 
with the single exception of Sub-commit- 
tee 2; here negotiations over the Political 
Parties Act were indeed suspended for a 
month because of an impossible ultima­
tum by György Fejti, who headed the 
MSZMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ 
Party) negotiators.
On the tripartite negotiations concern­
ing the election of the President of the 
Republic, Garton Ash comments: “There 
was an understanding that the job would 
probably go to Imre Pozsgay. But [...] the 
Free Democrats, the Young Democrats, 
and the Independent Trade Unions broke 
that consensus before the ink was dry.” 
(pp. 57-58) What, in fact, happened was 
that the organizations of the Opposition 
Round Table had originally reached a 
consensus that the election of the President 
of the Republic should not precede the 
Parliamentary elections, since the out­
come of the former might influence the 
results of the latter. It was the Christian- 
Conservatives, rather than the Liberal- 
Radical organizations, which broke the 
consensus in July, after holding informal 
talks with Imre Pozsgay, the leader of the 
Reform Communists. The SZDSZ (Free 
Democrats), the FIDESZ (Young Demo­
crats), and the Democratic League of In­
dependent Trade Unions refused to sign 
the agreement of September 18th precisely
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because 1) they did not wish to go back 
on their earlier agreement and, 2) they 
did not accept that the documents con­
cluding the negotiations should be signed 
without first coming to an agreement on a 
number of important issues (such as 
Communist Party property and the 
Workers’ Militia). But these opposition 
groups did not wish to jeopardize the 
agreements already reached, so the strange 
decision not to sign the pact, yet effec­
tively to allow other organizations to do 
so by not exercising a veto, was taken.
Nevertheless, these small errors of 
fact—their evaluation is controversial 
even among Hungarian political scien­
tists—do not deduct from the qualities of 
The Magic Lantern. The chapter discuss­
ing Hungarian changes concentrates on 
the symbolic act of breaking with the 
past: the burial of Imre Nagy in June 
1989. Garton Ash beautifully captures the 
mood of this particular moment. Indeeed 
this has a place among the very best books 
on the post-communist changes.
The late Misha Glenny’s The Rebirth of History is somewhat more contro­
versial. The author challenges Francis 
Fukuyama’s theory, argued in The End of 
History, that with the fall of the teleologi­
cal regimes history has come—in a cer­
tain sense—to an end. Glenny is right to 
maintain that, for the people in the re­
gion, history is suddenly springing to life, 
rather than coming to an end. After the 
collapse of communism, a multitude of 
unsettled and dormant conflicts have 
surfaced. For example, people grew up in 
the Kádár era without being aware of 
anti-Semitism, or the conflict between the 
“urban” and the “folk” school of writers, 
or of aggressive nationalism. These young 
people are now amazed to see that, with 
the arrival of free speech, these problems 
do emerge: problems that they knew of 
only from history books.
The Rebirth of History is an amalgam 
of a personal account of events and mid­
dle-brow political science. In view of the 
latter aspect, the addition of notes would 
have been helpful. As it is, some of what 
he has to say remains unsubstantiated. At 
one point he writes “Hungary’s new 
constitution insists that the government 
should rule in the name of all Hungarians, 
including those living outside its borders. 
Thus, according to Hungarian law, the 
government now has the right to intervene 
in the affairs of neighbouring countries in 
defence of the Hungarian minority.” (pp. 
10-11) The fact is that the Hungarian 
government has no authority to consider 
itself the government of the subjects of 
other sovereign states, and thus its “in­
tervention” cannot, according to Hungar­
ian law, go beyond the defence of human 
rights, which is the duty of all govern­
ments ever since the Helsinki Conven­
tion was signed. The Hungarian govern­
ment has no more rights in respect of 
Rumania or Slovakia, than the German 
government in respect of Bohemia, or the 
British government in respect of the Re­
public of Ireland.
Much else that Glenny says is debat­
able. To give just one more example: 
“Already in some areas in Poland it is 
possible to observe an extraordinary mi­
gration from cities to the countryside, a 
reversal of what happened in the 1950s, 
as recently unemployed Poles search 
desperately for ways of making a living. 
This bizarre phenomenon is also likely to 
emerge in Hungary, Rumania and Bul­
garia.” (pp.16-17) I do not know on what 
grounds Glenny bases this. It is certainly 
not true of Hungary. At the time Glenny’s 
book was published, the unemployment 
rate in Hungary was far below five per 
cent, and although the Smallholders Party 
predicted a massive migration from the 
towns to the rural areas as a result of its 
own reprivatization plan, neither the plan 
nor the migration came into being. To­
day, when the unemployment rate in 
Hungary exceeds ten per cent, it is still 
much easier to find work in large cities
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than in villages. The growth of unem­
ployment is forcing the jobless to move 
from villages to towns, rather than the 
other way round.
Misha Glenny appears prejudiced in a 
number of ways, but, unlike Timothy 
Garton Ash, who sympathizes with the 
democratic forces against the old order, 
Glenny presents some countries in a better 
light than others. To illustrate the back­
ward conditions that exist in Hungary, he 
points to “urban” v. “folk” antagonism as 
an underlying feature, which might be true 
for the intelligentsia, but in no way applies 
to the man in the street. The decisive ma­
jority of Hungarians are left cold or indeed 
annoyed by ideological thinking. The rift 
between the MDF (Democratic Forum) 
and SZDSZ was one between the elite of 
these parties, the ideological implications 
of which filtered through Hungarian soci­
ety from the top downwards, and failed to 
seriously effect the man in the street. 
Glenny quite rightly points out that, during 
the transition, this division was given 
greater emphasis than it actually deserved 
(without also mentioning how much this 
over-emphasis contributed to the emer­
gence of a competitive multi-party system); 
nevertheless, it is true that overall support 
for the ideological parties has significantly 
declined since then. It seems that Hungar­
ians are on the side of pragmatic politics 
that might solve their everyday problems.
Glenny’s book, which contains out­
standing chapters on Yugoslavia, Bulgaria 
and Albania, presents a biased and one­
sided view of the Hungarian situation. 
Although I have no intention of defending 
Hungarian nationalism, Glenny does not 
stand on firm ground when he objects to 
Hungarians using the Hungarian name, 
Kassa, for Kosice in Slovakia. On the 
same grounds the French, too, are guilty 
of nationalism for referring to London as 
Londres, or the English for referring to 
Firenze as Florence. What is Bratislava 
in Slovak is Pressburg in German, and 
Pozsony in Hungarian.
I n its structure, David Selbourne’s Death of a Dark Hero resembles Garton 
Ash’s book. Rather than claiming to write 
a comprehensive account, Selboume picks 
on certain moments of the post-commu­
nist changes in the East Central European 
countries, which he regards as historic. 
Instead of 1989, he begins the story in 
1987. This allows him to contrast 1987 
with 1989, the revolutionary year. 
Selboume realizes that the winds of change 
first reached the region in 1987, after 
Gorbachev declared his commitment to 
glasnost and perestroika in January 1987.
An interesting aspect of Selboume’s 
account is that he concentrates not on the 
moments which were judged to be cru­
cially important in retrospect, but on the 
events that led up to them. The agony of 
the Zhivkov regime unfolds in the snap­
shots of the Bulgarian situation in April 
1989. From the long list of dates important 
in the Hungarian transition, the author 
picks on January 10, 1989, the date when 
the Association Act was passed in Par­
liament, rather than June 1989, the date 
when Imre Nagy was reburied. His choice 
is not entirely unjustified. By January 
1989 the first stage in the formation of 
political parties had ended. By then the 
MDF, FIDESZ, SZDSZ, the Smallholders 
Party, and the Social Democratic Party 
had all appeared on the political scene. 
This was the month when reformers within 
the Communist Party mounted a decisive 
attack on the conservatives led by Károly 
Grósz, the General Secretary. The first 
step was the passing of a liberal Associa­
tion Act, followed by the political re- 
evaluation of 1956, and then by the rec­
ognition of the multi-party system in 
February.
Selboume and Garton Ash thus differ 
in their approach to understanding and 
describing the Hungarian transition. The 
erosion within the political elite and the 
political breakthrough of the reformists 
are emphasized by Selboume, while 
Garton Ash stresses the acceptance of the
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opposition by society at large, the moment 
of the moral victory of the opposition. 
For Garton Ash the symbolic figures in 
the transition are Árpád Göncz and Viktor 
Orbán, in Selbourne’s view they are 
Kálmán Kulcsár, Minister of Justice in 
the reform-communist Németh govern­
ment, and Imre Pozsgay. Whatever we 
might think of them now, one thing must 
certainly be acknowledged: they all played 
their part in making the Hungarian tran­
sition a success.
H ungarian-born authors living in the west are another category. They are 
able to combine the advantages of speak­
ing the language and of Hungarian con­
nections with a familiarity with western 
(and especially American) political sci­
ences.
Charles Gati’s book on the history and 
collapse of the Soviet bloc bears the title 
The Bloc that Failed, Rudolf Tőkés con­
centrates on the Hungarian transition in 
his brief From Post-Communism to De­
mocracy. Gati has written for univer­
sity students and provides a first class 
summary of the history of the Soviet bloc 
from Stalin to Gorbachev. The distinct 
virtue of the book is due, however, to the 
simple fact that it was written in 1989-90. 
When the author began he had no way of 
knowing that by the time he finished, the 
subject of his study would no longer exist. 
It is a tribute to Gati’s competence that, 
instead of flinching from the unusual 
challenge, he decided to race with the 
events. He could have stopped in 1988, in 
which case we would have been given a 
sound historical summary. But Gati chose 
to go on and write the third part, the one 
on the “age of the revolutionary changes”, 
and by doing so he took on the job of 
writing contemporary history without the 
necessary historical perspective. Three 
years after the events, the unevenness of 
the third part is beginning to show; certain 
events which seemed important at the 
time, such as the establishment of the
Pentagonale, are today of only marginal 
interest in the shadow of spreading na­
tionalism and the current civil war in 
former Yugoslavia.
Another aspect of the political transi­
tion was chosen by Rudolf Tőkés, who 
conducted a micro-analysis with respect 
to a single event in one country. Taking 
the Hungarian elections of 1990 as his 
starting point, he examines the dynamics 
of the political changes. The author was 
even quicker than the Hungarian changes: 
the second round of the elections took 
place on April 8, 1990, and three weeks 
later, on May 8, the book was completed.
Tőkés marks the Party Conference of 
May 1988 as the beginning of the Hun­
garian political changes; that was when 
János Kádár and his close associates were 
ousted from office by the young techno­
crats of the party elite. I am inclined to 
place the beginning at a still earlier date: 
September 1987, when the first opposi­
tion meeting at Lakitelek was held and 
the MDF was founded. This was the first 
occasion that oppositional groups, previ­
ously limiting their activity to drafting 
underground programmes, decided to 
come out into the open and face a wider 
audience. The meetings in the Budapest 
Jurta Theatre took place in early 1988 
with several thousand participants, and 
oppositional groups, FIDESZ and the 
Network of Free Initiatives, were organ­
ized before the Communist Party’s con­
ference. Therefore, the demand for a 
change was first made by the public, rather 
than by the political leadership. Save for 
this difference of judgement and a few 
smaller factual errors—for example, the 
Christian Democratic People’s Party was 
founded in March 1989, and not in late 
1988—Tőkés provides an accurate and 
sound analysis. Anyone who wishes to 
learn about the emergence of political 
parties, the recruitment of the new political 
elite, and the history of the first free 
elections in Hungary, will find From Post- 
Communism to Democracy useful.
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“The general scenario for negotiating a 
pact is fairly clear: it is a situation in 
which conflicting or competing groups 
are interdependent, in that they neither do 
without each other if they are to satisfy 
their respective, divergent interests”— 
Judy Batt quotes Tőkés’s definition in 
her East Central Europe from Reform to 
Transformation (p.28), the first compara­
tive analysis of the post-communist tran­
sition in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and 
Hungary. Her decision to compare these 
three countries is justified, since the 
northern countries of the former Soviet 
bloc (along with Slovenia and perhaps 
Croatia) are in a different position to the 
post-communist states of South East Eu­
rope. The former have had democratic 
traditions, as well as a bourgeoisie, and 
there were also oppositional groups chal­
lenging Soviet-type rule. The main po­
litical forces in these countries countered 
communism with democracy, not with 
anti-communism. In these countries 
highly-qualified professional people op­
posed the communist leadership, and re­
formers within the Communist Party were 
also present—although this is truer of 
Hungary and Poland than of Czecho­
slovakia. Perhaps this explains why the 
political transition in these countries was 
peaceful; the agents of political change 
negotiated the schedule of the transition 
at conference tables, rather than by 
shooting it out.
The greatest question is, however, 
whether these positive traditions will 
prove strong enough to survive the pain­
ful test of economic change. Or, to put it 
another way, whether the commitment to 
democracy in these countries will be 
strong enough to resist the temptations of 
populism and nationalism in a period of 
general pauperization. With reference to 
Dahrendorf, Judy Batt herself mentions 
the limited manoeuvring space available 
for simultaneous political and economic 
changes. Commendably, she concentrates 
on economic problems. However, lack­
ing the necessary data, she is unable to 
perform a thorough analysis of the subject: 
she approaches the economic problems 
primarily from the angle of politics, rather 
than from that of society. As a result, and 
perhaps contrary to her intentions, she 
ends up with a book, which provides a 
political history of the region. In this cat­
egory, however, hers is the best 
“TDological” analysis published so far 
on the development of these three post­
communist countries. At the end of her 
book Judy Batt, who apparently shares 
the post-1989 optimism of western ob­
servers, predicts the economic prosperity 
of these three countries: “Certainly the 
possibility of failure cannot be discounted, 
but it is surely too early for conclusive 
judgements on this account. As yet, the 
evidence does not seem to me sufficient 
to persuade me to abandon my own con­
viction that Poland, Hungary, and Czecho­
slovakia will continue to develop politi­
cally along democratic paths, and eco­
nomically towards open market systems.” 
We all hope she is right.
B y 1992 the first accounts of the East- Central European changes were 
published; eminently usable as textbooks, 
these books first of all impress a reader 
with the wealth of data and practical in­
formation presented. Michael G. Roskin’s 
The Rebirth of East Europe is a brief 
documentary history, giving a summary 
view of the past one hundred years of the 
countries of the region. This introductory 
text will be indispensable to students of 
history or political science, interested in 
the region. Likewise, Roger East’s Revo­
lutions in Eastern Europe also has the 
potentials of a textbook; it differs from 
Roskin’s work in that it concentrates on 
the historical changes of 1989-90, and 
that in addition to listing the parties, elec­
toral systems and leading political fig­
ures in a reference-book manner, it also 
presents a detailed chronology of events. 
(Unfortunately, a number of factual er­
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rors have slipped in, thus Social Con­
tract, a brief programme drafted by the 
Hungarian democratic opposition was 
actually published in the summer of 1987, 
and not in 1986.) Nevertheless, Roger 
East’s text has already been included in 
the reading lists of universities in Hun­
gary. It offers sound guidance to those so 
young that even the 1989 political transi­
tion is history to them.
What was it then that really happened 
in East Central Europe in 1989-90? Ac­
cording to Garton Ash it was a refolution,
a curious mixture of reforms and revolu­
tion. Glenny and Roskin described it as a 
rebirth, East regards it as a revolution, 
Tőkés thinks of it as a negotiated revolu­
tion, Gati refers to it as revolutionary 
change, Judy Batt prefers the term trans­
formation and Selboume uses reformation. 
The terminology is varied and—with the 
exception of Garton Ash and Judy Batt— 
remains largely undefined. A deeper un­
derstanding of the process requires more 
time. The books presented here make a 
significant contribution to this process.
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Bálint Sárosi
Bartók’s Classification for 
Hungarian Folk Songs
Magyar Népdalok. Egyetemes Gyűjtemény 
(Hungarian Folk Songs— The Complete Collection). Edited (between 
1934 and 1940) by Béla Bartók as commissioned by the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences. Volume I. (Division I Nos. 1416.) Prepared for 
publication by Sándor Kovács and Ferenc Sebő. Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest, 1991, 1142 pp, 24 illustrations.
E thnomusicology accounted for the major part of Bartók’s work. In 1904 
he started to collect Hungarian folk songs; 
he extended the scope of his field work to 
Slovak folk music in 1906, and after 1909 
to Rumanian folk songs. He went on to 
collect Arab music in North Africa (1913) 
and folk music in Turkey (1936); in addi­
tion, he transcribed on paper and pre­
pared for publication a large collection of 
South Slav folk music. Bartók did all in 
his power to ensure scholarly publication 
for the fruits of his field work, but For­
tune was not on his side, and most of 
what he collected was only published af­
ter his death. His collection of Serbo- 
Croat folk songs was published in 1951; 
two volumes of a planned three-volume 
Slovak collection came out in 1959 and 
1970; the great majority of his Rumanian 
collection appeared first in 1967; and the 
Turkish collection (in two versions) in 
1976. The third volume of the Slovak 
collection still awaits publication.
Bálint Sárosi is the author of Folk Mu­
sic: Hungarian Musical Idiom, Corvina, 
1986. His monograph on instrumental 
Hungarian folk music will appear in 1993.
Bartók never planned the separate 
publication of his own Hungarian field 
work. All he regarded as important for 
the presentation of Hungarian folk music 
was incorporated in his studies, most no­
tably in his Hungarian Folk Music. All the 
music he collected, together with all the 
other collections of Hungarian folk songs, 
became part of the central archive con­
ceived and set up by Kodály and Bartók 
at the beginning of the century. This was 
to be published as an integral whole. Up 
until the beginning of the Second World 
War, the central archive existed in dupli­
cate; the aim being to allow Bartók and 
Kodály to work independently on the 
classification of the tunes. That is how 
the Kodály taxonomy came to exist in 
parallel with Bartók’s; the latter was 
completed by the time Bartók left for the 
United States, in 1940 and it has not been 
altered since. It was only recently that 
this body of music of which Bartók had 
completed the musical editing, finally 
started to be published. A detailed account 
of the preliminaries and preparations im­
mediately preceding the publication is 
given in the first volume of a series of 
publications produced by the Bartók Ar­
chives of the Institute of Musicology of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
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Why is it necessary to publish the 
Hungarian folk songs in Bartók’s tax­
onomy when the same songs will all be 
included in A magyar népzene tára— 
Corpus musicae populáris hungaricae, 
based on the material of the Kodály clas­
sification? A brief answer is given by 
László Somfai in his introduction to the 
Bartók volume: Bartók’s taxonomy is in 
itself a chapter in ethnomusicology; be­
sides, “posterity has the right to study the 
‘classic’ repertory of Hungarian folk 
music in its original and authentic form— 
the form that it was known in to Bartók 
and the other great composers of the first 
generation of new Hungarian music.” In 
his introductory essay on the problems 
and principles of the work done in 
preparation for the publication of the se­
ries, Sándor Kovács writes: “There is no 
other work by Bartók (his own composi­
tions included), the completion and final 
formulation of which took up so much of 
his time, as this did; there is no other 
work by him, the modifications and im­
provements of which could be studied in 
so many different phases, or occasionally 
even step by step, as in this case.”
Bartók and Kodály first sketched a draft 
plan of a complete collection of Hungar­
ian folk songs in 1913. In this text, drafted 
by Kodály, the principles of editing were 
discussed in considerable detail. The 
collection was to be encyclopaedic, but 
in the sense that “with the related songs 
placed next to one another, the main types 
should show up clearly.” For this purpose, 
the system of a Finnish ethnomusicologist, 
Ilmari Krohn was adopted “with certain 
modifications”. These were summed up 
by Kodály: “We have transposed every 
song to make the closing note of each 
tune g . Since the tunes, with insignifi­
cant exceptions, all had four lines, we 
had to take into account the closing notes 
of the first three lines. The second line 
was the most important of the three—it 
here marked the half way—the end of the 
period. All those songs which had their
second line ending on the same note were 
put in the same group. Next, further sub­
groups were formed in each group, first 
according to the closing note of the first 
line, and then, according to the closing 
note of the third line.” Still more sub­
groups were formed according to the 
length—otherwise the rhythm—of the 
melodic lines, rather than on the basis of 
the melody. “Each group began with the 
song with the shortest lines, followed by 
the songs with successively longer lines.” 
The final classification within the small 
sub-groups formed in such a way was 
based on the ambitus of each song. Within 
the system, the sequence always proceeds 
from bottom up, from the low to the high 
numbers. As an illustration, Röpülj páva, 
the famous folk song that provided the 
theme for two Kodály compositions—the 
Peacock Variations and a piece for male 
choir—was accounted for in the system 
as follows—cadenza: 7 b3 b3; the number 
of syllables within one line: 6 (being the 
same for all four lines, it is written out 
only once); extent: VII-8 (that is to say, 
spanning from the note below the closing 
note right up to the octave of the closing 
note). (For the score of the song, see No. 
75 in the volume).
As opposed to Kodály’s system which 
primarily concentrated on the melody, 
Bartók’s arrangement was primarily based 
on the rhythm. In Hungarian Folk Music, 
published in Hungary in 1924, with an 
English edition (London, 1931), Bartók 
separates from the start the rather dis­
tinctive “old-style” and “new-style” songs 
from the stylistically heterogeneous 
“mixed category” (in his notation, divi­
sion A, B, and C), leaving the division of 
the songs on the basis of the line ending 
note one stage later, after their division 
according to the number of syllables— 
that is the rhythm.
In the final version of Bartók’s system 
(completed in 1939-40), some of the 
“mixed category”, Division C, was 
merged into Division A. (As a result, Di­
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vision A was split into A I and A II; this 
split is, in fact, indicated by the title of 
the book.) The non-architectonic songs 
with four lines of the same number of 
syllables to a stanza were thus transferred 
to the enlarged Division A—mostly, but 
not exclusively, old-style melodies. Di­
vision B, consisting of the new-style 
melodies with their four lines forming an 
architectonic structure, remained unal­
tered. The remaining part of division C 
was made up by songs which either had 
heterometric lines (of an unequal number 
of syllables), or non-architectonic struc­
ture, or any number of lines to a stanza 
other than four. Within this global divi­
sion, the songs continued to be classified 
according to the number of syllables in a 
particular line and some other more 
elaborate rhythmical characteristics. The 
closing notes and the compass of the songs 
were taken into account only at the next 
level. Bartók gave the same identification 
code to a family of tunes or a group of 
variations, with the variations listed in 
alphabetical order. But, as the introductory 
essay points out, Bartók, in evaluating 
the variations, regarded the match between 
the melodies as more important than the 
match between their respective number 
of syllables...”
T hrough the structure of his system, Bartók wanted to illustrate the for­
mation of the types and styles of Hungar­
ian folk songs. He believed that the best 
way to document the various stages of 
development was by grouping the songs 
according to the number of syllables they 
had in one line, as well as by considering 
other rhythmical characteristics. Bartók’s 
original table of rhythms which formed 
the basis of his system is reproduced in 
the first volume in facsimile. The table, 
consisting of approximately eighty auto­
graph pages, itself amounts to a unique 
and impressive scholarly achievement. 
However, it also illustrates the complex­
ity of the system. In his essay, Sándor
Kovács points out that Kodály learnt about 
the final form and the relative complexity 
of Bartók’s system only after the comple­
tion of the system and Bartók’s depar­
ture to the United States. In 1941, in a 
letter written to Béla Bartók in English 
(since it was taken in an unsealed enve­
lope by his son Péter Bartók), Kodály 
stated his reservations and critical com­
ments; however, the two had no further 
opportunity to discuss these points or to 
reach a solution acceptable to both. 
Kodály’s letter reads: “You did a great 
work in ritmics [sic]. But your system A 
B C in the new form, although more logi­
cal, is hardly more able as a frame of 
edition. The division is made from het­
erogeneous points of views: style, metri­
cal, formal. It is too complicated and dif­
ficult.” Elsewhere in the letter we learn 
that Kodály was not satisfied with his 
own system either: “So we did not fulfill 
we engaged us: instead of one, but good 
Collection we made two, both incomplete 
and unready.”
In the same letter Kodály also admitted 
that in years past he had not worked hard 
enough on editing the collection (“I was 
not very busy”). This is easily explained, 
especially when we compare his workload 
to Bartók’s. Between 1934 and 1940 
Bartók was relieved of his teaching duties 
at the Academy of Music. Instead, for three 
afternoons a week—his normal working 
hours—he transcribed folk songs, revised 
his earlier transcriptions, but above all, 
classified the collected material. By com­
parison, Kodály spent most of his time— 
time that remained after teaching and 
seeing to his other obligations—on public 
collections, supervising the copying of old 
folk song manuscripts and comparing them 
to the originals. Of the two, it was Kodály 
who was more willing to let the other 
choose what he liked doing most, all in 
the interest of “the great and fathomless 
work” (Bartók enjoyed the work of tax­
onomy; beside folk songs, in his younger 
days, he had classified beetles.)
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Bartók left behind his system in a 
completely finished form, with the final 
code allocated to each entry. After the 
war, the collection of folk songs for the 
yet unpublished central archive could re­
commence. Considering that the study of 
folk music was conducted under Kodály’s 
direction, it was only natural that the 
Bartók system was left untouched, and 
all further acquisitions were added to 
Kodály’s open system, arranged in a 
catalogue format.
Bartók’s collection contains 13,500 
melodies. By the mid-sixties, the rapidly 
growing Kodály collection amounted to 
roughly 100,000 entries. (Of course, this 
huge quantity does not imply an increase 
of this order in new finds—although they 
were in fact quite large in number—rather, 
the purpose of the new additions was the 
confirmation and the geographical exten­
sion of the existing entries.) The first five 
volumes of Magyar népzene tára—Cor­
pus musicae populáris hungaricae—the 
only volumes published before Kodály’s 
death in 1967—contains such mostly non- 
stanzaic items whose order was deter­
mined by the folk customs to which they 
were linked. Their publication in the 
present arrangement was therefore called 
for irrespective of the work done by 
Bartók. Up till now, only two volumes of 
the envisaged great series containing the 
stanzaic melodies have appeared. In the 
first half of the sixties, when these vol­
umes were prepared for publication, the 
demand for a system emerged which, in 
addition to being able to guide the readers 
through the folk songs, could also provide 
clues to the interconnection between types 
and styles—something Bartók had in mind 
when he created his own system. That 
was when Kodály accepted Pál Járdányi’s 
proposal concerning the line of melody 
as a principle of arrangement. In volumes 
VI and VII of A magyar népzene tára, the 
type of changes in the melody line came 
to form the first step in the classification 
process, as it were as complimentary to
the order based on the closing notes. It 
appears, however, that by the consistent 
(rigid) application of a single principle— 
whether it be rhythm or melody—one 
would never be able to produce a tax­
onomy that could adequately reflect the 
multiplicity of types and styles, them­
selves the results of many factors. (A re­
cent acclaimed publication A magyar 
népdaltípusok katalógusa—The Cata­
logue of the Types of Hungarian Folk 
Songs I, 1988—by László Dobszay and 
Janka Szendrei shows that the—not 
strictly evolutionary but in some sense 
historical—classification of types and 
styles is only possible as a result of an 
item by item examination, with due at­
tention paid to the specific conditions 
prevailing at the time of their origin.)
However, the method used in the last 
volumes of A magyar népzene tára still 
did not appear to satisfy expectations— 
nor did it prove better than Bartók’s sys­
tem, for that matter. The appearance of 
the successive volumes has also slowed 
down considerably. (Volume VI was 
published in 1973, Volume VII in 1983.) 
Apart from more serious considerations, 
this last factor alone could have been 
sufficient to make the editors contem­
plate recourse to the Bartók order which 
was ready for publication. Finally, the 
decision to publish the Bartók version 
was made in 1979 by József Ujfalussy, 
the Director of the Institute of Musicology, 
and himself a leading Bartók scholar.
The fine introductory study and the 
facsimile of Bartók’s rhythm tables (to­
gether with a few autograph transcrip­
tions) take up hardly more than one-tenth 
of the nearly 1150-page volume. Of the 
remainder, there are, first of all, the songs. 
As the title discloses, Division A I. Nos 1- 
416 includes those few songs which have 
five-syllable lines, together with those 
consisting of six- and seven-syllable lines. 
The great majority of numbers refer to 
groups of variations of various sizes, 
rather than to a single song. Since it is a
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critical edition—the guiding principles of 
which are described in the introductory 
essay in quite some detail—the editors 
preparing the manuscript for publication 
made no changes in the text. Whenever it 
was necessary and possible, they added 
their own notes. Those who are acquainted 
with the earlier editions of Hungarian folk 
song collections will relatively frequently 
come upon familiar tunes. This is because 
previous editions of Hungarian folk songs 
also took their material from the classic 
collections. The purpose of this publica­
tion was however, not the individual songs 
it contains, but a scholarly presentation 
of a major item of Bartók’s posthumous 
papers. Another consideration justifying 
publication was to provide readers with 
the same view of Hungarian folk music 
that was available to Bartók, Kodály and 
their contemporaries during the years of 
revolutionary renewal in twentieth-cen­
tury music. This was the musical material 
which influenced them as composers, and 
which, through its quality and composi­
tion, made its first—and ever since the 
deepest—impression on the audience.
The book makes it quite clear that what 
Bartók in Division A considered archaic, 
or even "primaeval” tunes, were indeed 
such tunes although he did permit a 
number of songs having nothing to do 
with the old style to slip through his filter. 
It is a sympathetic attitude—one in line 
with accepted scholarly practices—that 
Bartók resisted the temptation to ma­
nipulate the data. He treated all entries as 
equal, never relegating “less valuable” 
pieces to footnotes. As a result, some of 
the songs which had been published ear­
lier are put in a new light. In Bartók’s 
taxonomy there is a strict scientific order, 
without a hierarchy of more representa­
tive and less representative items. All en­
tries—old or new, perfect or flawed,— 
are put in their place within the system in 
compliance with its rules. The very first 
tune is an insignificant and solitary item. 
It is also an exception in the sense that,
judging by her name (Dr Landerné, the 
wife of Dr Lander), the woman contrib­
uting the song must have come from the 
educated classes, although we know that 
both Bartók and Kodály (the latter had 
collected this particular piece) laid down 
the strict rule that non-peasant sources 
must be avoided. At the beginning of the 
book we find a couplet version among 
the tunes recalling mediaeval Europe with 
their small compass and mostly volta 
rhythm. (In the notes Bartók even pub­
lished its original under No 12.) The whole 
of the large group of variants under No 
27 (from a to v) can also be found in the 
corresponding volume of A magyar nép­
zene tára, mostly as wedding songs. 
However the huge number of stanzas— 
186 of them altogether!—is only given 
here, under 27i by Kodály, who tran­
scribed them in County Nyitra (today in 
Slovakia) in connection with a single 
melody version. In general, the more 
deeply rooted songs had version-group­
ings, even in Bartók’s relatively small 
collection. By contrast, songs which for 
some reason are unrelated to these usually 
stand alone. The source of songs Nos 36, 
112, and 113 is not Hungarian but a Gypsy 
in Hungary—in the case of the first two, 
the collector László Lajtha even recorded 
that the source is a “Hungarian Gypsy of 
the Calvinist faith”. The collection in­
cludes several beggars’ songs (32a, 100a), 
and a parody of a lament (65a)—it nec­
essarily follows from the function of these 
latter songs that they belong to the archaic 
layer of folk music; the placement of the 
last of these in Division A I  was due 
merely to its unique stanzaic form. There 
are also “school songs” (43a and b), oc­
casionally even some folksy songs of older 
or more recent origin (256,390,391,399), 
as well as other songs completely alien to 
the old peasant tradition, e.g., Kutya, ku­
tya, tarka (165ab) and Szeretnék szántani 
(188ab).
The small compass of the songs that 
were included in Volume I followed al­
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most naturally from a particular feature 
of the Bartók system, namely that it begins 
with songs whose lines contain the 
smallest number of syllables. Songs with 
a small number of syllables and of a small 
compass—and not necessarily a penta­
tonic scale—did, indeed, turn up in re­
gions of a more archaic culture: in the 
county of Somogy, in south-western 
Hungary, in Hungarian-speaking islands 
in the Nyitra region, in the north-west of 
pre-Trianon Hungary, in certain areas of 
the Székelyföld in Transylvania, and es­
pecially in Moldavia, which was never 
part of Hungary. Some of the songs were 
recorded in a particularly oramented form. 
By far the greatest number of such 
minutely detailed items were transcribed 
by Bartók. He collected 2834 Hungarian 
songs. (By comparison, Kodály collected 
3546.) However, as the book also indi­
cates, most of the songs collected by 
others (Béla Vikár,Vilmos Seemayer, Pál 
Péter Domokos, etc.) were transcribed by 
Bartók. Once again, readers may admire 
the fine detail of Bartók’s transcriptions, 
right down to barely audible sounds, with 
special regard to their rhythmic accuracy. 
(See, for example, No. 297a, where the 
impressively detailed transcription of a 
Moldavian ballad is accompanied by a 
sketch of an easier version; see also 30h, 
198st, etc.) The transcription of the fa­
mous Fly, Peacock (No 75) also deserves 
a separate mention. The same song, from 
the same source, and in Bartók’s tran­
scription, has already been included in 
two important publications: it was listed 
in the Examples compiled by Lajos 
Vargyas, of Kodály’s book Hungarian 
Folk Music under No 1.; it was also the 
first melody representing “Type IX” songs 
in volume VI of Corpus. The Vargyas 
compilation published the second stanza 
of 75a of this volume with seven minor 
modifications. (In fairness to Vargyas, it 
should be mentioned that Examples was 
not meant to be a critical edition.) By 
contrast, volume VI of the Corpus was—
as the Introduction emphatically pointed 
out—a critical edition. In view of this 
claim, it is somewhat surprising to find 
on page 367 a sketchy score of Fly, Pea­
cock, with Bartók’s name given as the 
transcriber. At the end of the book, hid­
den among the notes, is version 75b, the 
less ornamented version of Bartók’s tran­
scriptions and not 75a, Bartók’s tran­
scription of the original gramophone re­
cording—a small consolation. It should 
be mentioned in passing that Bartók, who 
carefully annotated the variations (melo­
dies he considered as belonging to the 
same type) with the same number, clas­
sified one of the Type IX songs (No 421) 
of the former system as No 24, which is a 
long way from No 75. Admittedly he, 
too, could make mistakes (thus he failed 
to recognize that Nos 396 and 401 are 
essentially the same tune). Nevertheless, 
anyone who sets about replacing Bartók’s 
system with a better one with regard to 
classification and, especially, transcrip­
tion, might find the challenge a tall order. 
That is a further reason for welcoming 
the publication of the first volume of the 
Bartók edition of folk songs.
A volume such as this is hardly the 
appropriate place to describe the culture— 
or in some cases, the cultures—of a region, 
of which the songs form a part. Never­
theless, the inclusion of roughly two dozen 
photographs showing people in the fields 
was a sensible idea. Regardless of the 
ceremonious poses for the camera, these 
are true snapshots of the tough life led by 
these “folk-singing” peasants.
Hungarian publications on folk music 
seldom boast ample and sound indices. 
One of the strongest features of this book 
is the apparatus. Mostly we consult a 
reference book such as this in a hurry. 
Ferenc Sebő, who relied on computers 
when preparing these indices, made sure 
that all the information could be accessed 
quickly and with ease. He starts with the 
most important. The code numbers of the 
types are listed, in the order of this publi­
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cation, to which these songs belong (in 
the Archives of the Institute of Musicol­
ogy.) A reverse index follows, the number 
of the types, in ascending order, in which 
the manuscripts of the songs can be found. 
Although the index of the rhythmical or­
der is identical with the corresponding 
section of the rhythmical table published 
in facsimile at the beginning of the book, 
it still proves to be useful, as the facsimile 
strains the eye, indeed occasionally the 
figures are completely blurred. In addition 
to the usual indices—line ending notes, 
first lines, place-names—there are sepa­
rate indices for the medium of the source- 
material (phonograph cylinders, records, 
nineteenth-century printed material), the 
collectors, and the informants.
The only thing the Hungarian readers 
will be likely to miss is a glossary of 
obsolete or ununderstandable words and 
expressions found in the songs. Although
in some cases the collectors’ notes (most 
notably Sándor Veress’s) contain helpful 
comments, in the majority of the cases the 
readers are left to their own devices. The 
editors should perhaps consider getting 
expert help from a linguist for the prepa­
ration of such notes for future volumes. 
Apparently, even the singers themselves 
were occasionally unable to explain the 
meaning of certain expressions. For read­
ers, on the other hand, it would be reas­
suring to be told that the meaning of some 
of these terms were not clear even to the 
collectors. What potential non-Hungarian 
buyers of the book will be most likely to 
ask is why a brief English or German de­
scription of the contents is not added. 
Bartók’s name in itself guarantees that the 
book will appeal to an international public. 
Furthermore, it is a well-produced publi­
cation—if people outside Hungary also 
realize that, so much the better.
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I f his characters were not so run-down and weather-beaten, and if the man 
himself were not such a humble, awk­
ward figure, we might compare Mándy’s 
inexhaustible, ever-growing oeuvre to 
some wonder of nature. He stands among 
us like some huge and venerable tree 
without which our lives would be unim­
aginable. He continues to grow even in 
old age, imperceptibly spreading still. 
Alternatively, we might imagine him as 
the enduring tree in the courtyard of an 
old tenement, leaves covered in dust, 
whose roots, cramped into such a tight 
space, draw into themselves enough of 
the juices of life in some unimaginable 
fashion. Or the tree could again stand on 
the square which is a constant setting for 
his stories, appearing in his latest volume, 
Huzatban (In a Draught), in “Day of 
Praise”, in which the Master takes a Ger­
man film director on a tour of his typical 
Budapest milieu:
“Down in the square, leaning against a 
thick-trunked tree. Around me broken 
branches, a carpet of fallen leaves. The 
tree is full of stabs and wounds, the eter­
nal target for jackknife games... I gazed 
at the wounded tree in the silence of the 
square.”
Miklós Györffy is NHQ’s regular re­
viewer of new fiction.
We could best compare Mándy, with 
his indefatigable production, to one of his 
crumbly, draughty old tenements, one of 
those which sheltered many generations, 
which had never been luxurious and are 
now pretty shabby, though they still stand 
to haunt us as witnesses to vanished lives. 
Such a house is also the main character in 
the long title story of In a Draught, actu­
ally not so much a story as a stream of 
dream images or visions. The setting is 
the draughty strairwell, the decrepit el­
evator, the entrance way full of rubbish 
bins. In this space, which has virtually 
through Mándy, achieved mythical status, 
drift about no less mythological beings: 
“an infant woman”, who comes down the 
stairs from Lajos Bauer’s; “the rubbish 
fairies,” two stoop-backed old women in 
grey overcoats, who pick through the bins, 
cans and buckets looking for tidbits; Un­
cle Arnold, setting out with his 
wastebucket, making his way in loops be­
fore ultimately disappearing; a girl, lover 
of the theatre, who rushes about every­
where; or the “story writer” himself, who 
nightly takes his bucket out to the trash 
bin dressed for an evening on the town: 
“Light blue pullover with thin white 
stripes. Sporty elegance. Makes a differ­
ent impression, though. Problem is that 
this is what I was wearing yesterday when 
I took out the bucket. Yesterday, and the 
day before. Dark grey suit. So cosmopoli­
tan, it’s almost arrogant. No reason to
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overdress. Might offend someone. 
Fishbone jacket. That’s got more style. 
Fishbone jacket with a dark green necktie.
“He dressed carefully, even tying the 
necktie twice. He picked up the bucket 
and struck out on his nightly route.”
The short pieces collected in Egy dél­
utáni alvó (An Afternoon Sleeper) draw 
their scenarios from the same trip to Eng­
land which had furnished a theme for the 
earlier volume, Autobiography, where it 
figures as a grotesquely unsettling experi­
ence, disturbing the writer from his 
memories and dreams. There is not a novel 
here about what happened to Mándy in 
England, but rather how in the midst of 
English situations—in a restaurant, or 
shopping for clothes—certain long-faded 
times swim into his consciousness, like 
the horrific memories from the days of his 
early life, or the persecution of the Jews. 
There are three separate stories, “Day of 
Praise”, “An Evening”, and “A Night”, 
but they are tightly linked since Mándy 
sets them into the course of one disturbing 
and hectic day. “Day of Praise” shows the 
writer as an expert on Budapest’s golden 
age, guiding a German film director and 
his repugnant interpreter through the 
squares, houses, and courtyards in the 
shabby parts of town, in the vague hope 
that he will get a commission to write the 
screenplay for a television film on the 
subject. One of the greatest Hungarian 
writers of our time, in his fragile vanity, 
reluctantly admits to himself that he views 
this as an honour.
He is no easier on himself in the story 
about the evening which follows, in which 
he describes how he feared to sign a pro­
test petition brought to him by a girl on a 
bicycle, in which Hungarian intellectuals 
appeal to János Kádár on behalf of Czech 
civil rights activists vilified and impris­
oned. Finally comes the night, passed in 
turbulent nightmares drawn from the anx­
ious memories of the day’s upsetting trials.
Whoever is fond of Mándy’s world 
and style cannot get enough of these new
volumes of stories, whose charm lies, 
among other things, in the very thing that 
his critics once reproached him for: that 
he does not change, does not “develop”. 
Yet this very unchangeableness of 
Mándy’s, the stability of his original vi­
sion and superb literary technique, offer 
us a consistency, reliability, and sinewy 
endurance which are rare today. Mándy’s 
style has a taste and a bouquet of which 
one cannot tire. It becomes more refined 
from volume to volume, offering the re­
ceptive reader ever new nuances. In 1993, 
Iván Mándy will be seventy-five. Long 
may he flourish.
Valéria Korek, bom in Budapest in 1906, has lived in the United States 
since 1938. In 1960 her novel A Visit to 
Buda was published by a Hungarian house 
in Brussels; this provides the basis for her 
Post-Hungarians, which has now come 
out in Budapest. “Post-Hungarians”, as 
we discover from one of the book’s main 
characters, are those exiles who gradu­
ally shed not only their Hungarianness 
but even history itself. The term is based 
on “Proto-Hungarians”, a people whose 
existence is postulated, bom in the test 
tube of modern Medieval studies. They 
would have been a Uralic tribe which had 
still not mingled with our other ancestors, 
the Altaic Ugors. The Post-Hungarians 
have not sufficiently blended with the 
Americans to feel themselves as Ameri­
cans but they cannot be made into Hun­
garians again either.
The book, complicated in structure, 
consists of three sections. If all one knows 
of the author is that she is an elderly 
exile, the first section might well be read 
as a memoir. The diarist, who appears to 
be one with the author, narrates in the 
first person her life in America in the 
fifties, the present in which the diary is 
written, and certain memories of her life 
in Budapest in the thirties. That this lady 
is the librarian of an imaginary American 
university, and that both she and the other
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characters have imaginary names, does 
not absolutely undercut the apparent 
character of a memoir. But the reader 
becomes suspicious after the long-winded 
personal introduction, and later, the dis­
cussion of various details, which seem 
superfluous, works to create a motif: it 
seems as if the very man in a red sweater, 
who twenty years previously had crossed 
paths with the narrator, might have turned 
up in the library of the American univer­
sity, and even tried to purloin her research 
topic, as was hinted at in the early days. 
The effect is to create the tension of de­
tective fiction, though the fact remains 
that the scholarly work in question is too 
insignificant. For the moment nothing 
becomes of all this; the diary ends without 
us knowing anything about the man in 
the red sweater or his intentions, or what 
his connections to the earlier man really 
is. Indeed, we cannot say with certainty 
that the whole sequence is not entirely 
imagined.
In any case, the second section, “The 
Research”, begins with the author of the 
diary, while concealing her identity, 
sending it to a psychiatric institute, where 
an entire team begins to examine it as the 
production of a specially disturbed indi­
vidual. One of the doctors is a Russian 
exile who had lived in Budapest in the 
thirties and forties, and feels half Hungar­
ian himself. The writer obviously intended 
the diary, written in Hungarian, for him. 
The research fails, though, to shed light 
on the diary’s author, or at least no more 
than that she could not have existed in 
the condition the diary portrays.
The research contains many digressions 
which, like many details of the old wom­
an’s life, seem irrelevant to the subject, 
burdening the novel with extraneous filler. 
But the reader maintains the faith that this 
will all eventually come into focus. In any 
case, save for the one mysterious woman, 
Post-Hungarians are hardly to be found.
The third section, “The Story”, full of 
them, is set in New York. Its two protago­
nists are known to us from the diaries as 
figures from Budapest: the ageing phi­
losopher Géza, and the cousin of his di­
vorced wife, the comely Livia, in her early 
thirties, visiting New York from Uruguay. 
The story is of the love between these two 
Post-Hungarians searching for their niche, 
a love which flames up unexpectedly, then 
fades towards a bittersweet end. In the 
background pop up figures presented in 
the digressions of the second section, 
mostly English and Americans, all con­
sistently unengaging. One may dimly 
suspect that Livia wrote the diary of the 
first section, an expression of the fear 
which is part of the exile’s lot. But it never 
becomes clear why precisely she identifies 
with the elderly librarian, and what her 
relationship to the imaginary characters of 
the diary is. The “diary” and the “story” 
go poorly together; it is difficult to recog­
nize in them the consistent elements of the 
preoccupations of one and the same fear- 
driven person. Apart from the issue of 
literary coherence, each of the sections 
unfortunately shows little of the Post- 
Hungarians, much as one would like to 
see them. Most regrettable is the scarcity 
of memories of her youth in Buda, which, 
after some faint attempts, soon disappear 
entirely. Hence the somewhat melodra­
matic affair between the ageing man and 
young woman is regrettably lacking the 
most important part: their faded common 
past.
I mre Kertész is the author of the impor­tant novels Fatelessness, Failure, and 
Kaddishfor an Unborn Child. His Galley 
Diary was written between 1961 and 1991. 
It is a highly unorthodox diary in that it 
strives to give a day-to-day account of the 
author’s life without being an account of 
the progress of his literary work. The title 
well expresses the work’s special, unusual 
quality: Imre Kertész’s notes and thoughts 
deal with the issues in the life of a 
thoughtful man who has ended up in the 
galley of our age. Kertész’s fundamental
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problem is that he is compelled to live in 
the absurd twentieth century as a moralist, 
intellectual, writer, Jew, and human be­
ing. “This century”, he writes, “is like an 
execution squad inflicting uninterrupted 
servitude.” In this age “failure is the only 
experience which can be achieved”. Hence 
the title of his novel, Failure. “Every­
one’s life is a half-completed and actually 
unsuccessful attempt at living. What makes 
us believe that this life is our life, that this 
world is our world?”
The moral person has no choice but to 
accept his term on this galley. “For me, it 
seems, the most fitting suicide is life.” A 
person’s primary task is to survive his 
existence as it falls to him. “To live life as 
it falls out, no matter where we live, and 
to live it fully, is the task of our lives.”
“I must be almost insane to think about 
art. But to think about anything else is not 
worth it.” Hence Galley Diary, for the most 
part, is a means to understanding artists, 
writers, and philosophers, and a set of 
reflections on them, their works, and their 
thinking. Imre Kertész’s lode-stars are 
above all those philosophers who dwell in 
the border zones of word and thought, and 
whose remarks reflect his own personal 
struggle with existence. He reads and 
comments on Pascal’s Pensées, Kafka’s 
diaries and aphorisms, Nietzsche’s essays, 
Camus’ Notebooks. An endless list could 
be compiled of other writers, authors, and 
composers whom he quotes, mentions, and 
explains, from Flaubert to Wagner and 
Beckett. It is fascinating to observe how, 
during those three decades in which the 
cream of the Hungarian intelligentsia were 
shaped by ideology and censorship, or by 
ephemeral fashions, Imre Kertész managed 
to remain independent in his voluntary 
isolation, searching instead for the intel­
lectual nourishment which would sustain 
and fortify him through his galley slavery. 
Thus he maintained that degree of sover­
eignty which kept—and keeps—him pro­
tected from the hysterical spasms of East 
European political life. For Imre Kertész,
life’s purpose is to “shorten the routes of 
escape—for the moment, an escape back 
to your desk.”
His compulsion to write is itself a form 
of slavery for him. The diary’s tripartite 
structure is shaped most strongly by his 
bursts of activity as a writer, not by the 
impression his oeuvre will make on pos­
terity. It shows how the diary author stood 
with his efforts as a writer of other works. 
In the first section he “sails out onto open 
waters.” This section, which embraces 
nearly twenty years, reflects his setting 
himself to his task, and the writing of the 
first novel, Fatelessness. The next, a mir­
ror of the eighties, “drifts between cliffs 
and reefs,” reflecting the period in which 
the second novel was born after very 
painful struggles, his literary career con­
tinuing under the sobriquet of “failure”. 
Finally, in the last two years, “he releases 
the tiller, he pulls in the oars, content”. 
Hungary has been freed from Bolshevism, 
though “not from itself’. Imre Kertész 
became known as a writer, who freely and 
“contentedly” allows himself not to “row”, 
or write, any more. In any case, the issue 
remains an open question: “What should 
be done anyway? I believe less and less in 
“literature”, in fiction. Humankind does 
not just consume, but is itself consumed; 
what it had preserved for art (its most 
succulent tit-bit), seems gradually to be 
disappearing. What is left? Perhaps the 
example (existence): both more and less 
than art. The need to bear witness is ever 
growing within me, as if I were the last 
survivor who could speak, as if I direct 
my words to those who will survive the 
deluge, the brimstone, or the Ice Age-— 
biblical times, great and grave cataclysms, 
the age of dumbfoundedness. In place of 
the person, the race steps in; the collective, 
like a stampeding herd of elephants, 
sweeps away the process of creation.” With 
his Galley Diary and novels, Imre Kertész 
may have succeeded in saving his life and 
individuality, but the task for the galley 
slaves of the future will be no less difficult.
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ear of Relations by Zsuzsa Takács is 
a portable vortex rather than a col­
lection of poems, incessantly concerned 
with the crudest and bloodiest sensations 
of body and spirit. It is the most telling 
volume of the year, which will be put 
down with hands trembling from an 
amalgam of ecstasy and shock. Its inten­
tional lack of shape and occasional ob­
scurity make it fairly incompatible with 
classic taste, and it was met with some 
grudges by the present writer but, at the 
same time, I am sure it would have pleased 
A1 Alvarez. Zsuzsa Takács started to write 
verse in the mid-1960s and began trans­
lating from the English (as well as Span­
ish and Italian), so it is small wonder that 
she shows a close similarity with English 
verse of those years. Curiously, the poets 
who for a short time had a noticable in­
fluence on her have no similarity with 
her, nor do they have any with each other 
(Rilke, Lorca, and more recently, Cavafy). 
Takács’s personality is too strong to be 
shaped by outside influences. She has 
succeeded in creating a consistent world 
out of obsessively recurring themes. Her 
poems are surrounded by this visionary 
ambiance.
Gergely Hajdú is a literary critic and 
NHQ’s regular poetry reviewer.
The title, Tear of Relations, puns on the 
phonetic likeness of the Hungarian words 
for “book” and “tear” (könyv and könny, 
which until a couple of hundred years 
ago were still homonyms). The volume 
deals with relations, but with relations 
that are incipient or about to break up. 
Nothing is said of what they are about, as 
one is told nothing of the second person 
involved in the poems. Concrete details 
of the outside world are also absent, which 
makes this strange poetry hard to under­
stand.
Some people meet somewhere. The 
scene is perpetually, shockingly narrow. 
A room or a street, always in a city of 
ruins, suffocating in smog. Now Buda­
pest, now Rome, or again London, stuck 
by some imaginary Blitz, the Jerusalem 
of Josephus, or Wajda’s Warsaw, under 
the process of destruction. There is an 
invasion constantly going on, without at­
tracting any attention. The moon always 
shines through a fog, shrieking trams run 
over fallen leaves, and nature only ap­
pears in the form of an alley: “the pol­
larded trees of a death camp.” These tragic 
landscapes are the location of permanent 
apocalypse: “the sun has not turned black 
like a bag of body-hair, / the moon as a 
whole has not turned into blood, / the 
slime from the window only spilled on 
my dress. / ... I did not see the vermilion 
animal, / it was only the silence which
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dragged out / warningly to the breaking 
point”. (“The Fall of Babylon”). Yet, all 
in all, this is far removed from a philoso­
phy of history.
Sometimes she says in so many words 
that these are interpretations of dreams, 
and this can be felt in other poems as 
well: she portrays everything and any­
thing so that it re-emerges unexpectedly 
and half-forgotten, as in a nightmare. A 
confined and dark environment, a suppu­
rating wound, in which one awakens 
bathed in sweat, choking, buried alive, 
painfully struggling towards the light, and 
not outside reasons, but gushing blood 
alone can give rise to jubilation. “Warmth! 
Blood everywhere! And is there anything 
finer / than the velvet brook? Did I ever 
long for anything else?” As a dream 
image, this unambiguously refers to the 
womb and to parturition.
Life is no more than a protracted birth. 
A truly human being is born again, as an 
adult, in such a way that the birth pangs, 
like Michelangelo’s chisel, chip away the 
superfluous from the nucleus of the per­
sonality—“torment macht frei”, as she 
puts it half ironically in “The Visitor”. 
She has her doubts about the success of 
the process; her recurring subjects include 
induced abortion (“Diary”) and still birth. 
“...How should I tell those full of hope 
that they must not wait as in the corridors 
of hospitals, /.../ So it has turned out that 
the one you have seen / so often, is now 
(still) born.”(“ Forbidden Pieces of Mu­
sic”). This is also the subject of “Four 
Poems,” the outstanding cycle in the vol­
ume. The personality, beyond all the fu­
tile acts of daily life, becomes estranged 
from itself, and by the time it receives a 
final shape, it no longer feels itself as its 
own. This takes us to the most alarming 
feature of the volume: all along it tight 
rope walks on the edge of schizophrenia.
This is also evident in the depiction of 
the relations referred to in the title, in 
“Dumb Game,” as the title of one of her 
earlier poems, so often referred to, puts
it. The scenes suggest a kind of 
Scandinavian ambience, like a Bergman 
film, or even more a painting by Munch. 
Two or more people meet and, after a 
glance or a gesture, they part. Turning 
against the wall, a woman is crying, and 
another one watches the scene from the 
outside. She is the same person, at the 
same moment in time. “Instead of mood 
lighting, it is practically a street / light 
that fills the room, no wonder, as it is 
inhibited by strangers, / including a 
woman, who will be me, if all goes well.” 
The first person often blends with the 
third person, as is the case with the vari­
ous second persons. “You” may mean a 
person, as for instance a lover in the first 
line, and another lover in the next line. /”I 
am thinking of my lovers, that is of just 
one”/, but it can also mean a nation, 
mankind, or indeed—as the entreaties 
make clear—even God, without any 
transition. Zsuzsa Takács’s patriotism is 
one of the most extraordinary variants on 
this sentiment. Once it appears in the form 
of shame felt for being amongst a 
“drunken Hungarian rabble” on a train, 
“in compartments heated to thirty de­
grees”—again the quasi-womb. Then 
again she states that she is attracted by 
decay, by destruction. “How much I love 
the Hungarians!, I said. / ...) and the 
mysterious confession intended for you, 
made things go dark.” Everything is con­
nected with everything in this world—in 
a regression, towards the position of the 
small child locked between two parents, 
and at the same time towards a more 
archaic human state, nearer to perfection, 
which may provide a singular, perverted 
happiness.
Though the primary merits of this po­
etry lie in its visions, her versification, 
too, displays shrewd calculation, for in­
stance in the choriambs inserted in the 
loosely iambic lines, echoing, as it were, 
one of her frequent images, that of a halt­
ing heart beat. However primeval the ex­
periences expressed, it would be a mis­
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take to underestimate Takács’s deliber­
ateness. The rarity of noteworthy imagery 
and metaphors can also be calculated, for 
in fact the whole oeuvre is a single de­
pressing metaphor—that of existence 
which has no defences.
It would be an error to imagine that the 
methods of psychoanalysis allow one to 
see through the poet. On the contrary, it 
is she who surprises supercilious 
Freudianism in flagranti, and she adds its 
concepts with easy irony to her own in­
terpretations of dreams. However sur­
prising it will sound after what I have 
said, she does not lack humour—although 
her humour is cruel. On several occasions 
she starts telling a grotesque story which 
at first can be taken as a humorous anec­
dote, until it takes a tragic turn and the 
reader feels guilty complicity for re­
sponding with laughter earlier. As I have 
said, this is a vortex—mysterious, dan­
gerous, unforgettable.
T he collection by Zsuzsa Beney in­cludes in a pure form all that which 
might be distilled from Zsuzsa Takács’s 
chaotic (and much more exciting) se­
quence of images. These are “love sonnets 
meant for God,” as she puts it, “the words 
of which I have been taught by the 
sufferings of my early loves.” This is not 
a question of mysticizing the coup de 
foudre of profane love, after all, in the 
allegorical labyrinth of the title—in which 
the soul is led towards God by Ariadne’s 
thread of suffering—the walls are made 
up of sensual impressions, of “mirages”. 
The earthly body, including brain and 
consciousness, only leads one astray: 
“why can the soul become existent only 
in the body / when it would always like to 
overflow the brim / of death, because the 
crystalline glass / is a hard crust for its 
water, clear as glass.” This poet of amor 
sanctus joins the Petrarchean sonnet with 
a stock of metaphors from the Old Testa­
ment, mostly from the Song of Solomon. 
The sonnet form, whose recent popu­
larity has made it over-used, is given a 
most elegant treatment by Zsuzsa Beney, 
for whom it has been her favourite form 
ever since she first started writing twenty 
years ago, despite the occasional verbos­
ity of her formulations. Her stylized 
landscapes, the bower, the cliff, the desert, 
are more problematic. This abstract world 
provides a strange background to some 
modem matters, as for instance the “vio­
let-blue crystals of the gas”, referring 
concretely to the technology used in the 
Holocaust. Aware of this, she avoids 
recollections. Zsuzsa Beney, a doctor and 
specialist in pulmonary diseases, could 
obviously give harrowing descriptions of 
suffering, but no trace of that is to be 
found. This, however, clashes with the 
plan of the volume as a whole, which 
implies that she is to try to examine her 
own life from the vantage point of her 
proximity to God—as an individual fate 
is precisely that subject of which it is 
most difficult to speak relying on the 
psalms as a paradigm. What is more, even 
the assumption that life is fate, a coher­
ent series of acts which can be set in 
some order and thus interpreted, is in 
need of proof in our own day and age.
That God sends word precisely through 
His absence, is not a theological novelty, 
neither is interpreting “the scandal of the 
century” as attempt at a second redemp­
tion by sacrificing, after the Son of God, 
his Chosen People. But Zsuzsa Beney 
(who in much of what she says follows 
Simone Weil) does not claim to be a 
theologian. The mystery of failures 
proving to be successes and of victory in 
defeat has provided the opportunity for 
memorable pieces—striking oxymorons 
concealed in melodious lines.
In one of her deceptively simple poems 
she argues that our notions about God in 
fact distance us from Him: “Along the 
tracks of intertwined paths, / God and the 
soul perambulate interlaced / the earthy, 
moss-grown green rounds / of the mass 
of space and time. / ... / You cannot be
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farther away than in the word / which 
calls You in words. Everlastingly—you 
are present only in the secret of Your 
non-existence, / in creation, which You 
have imbued / with Yourself, so that You 
should be fragrant in the form of forests, / 
so that you should be bom again and 
again, just to die ceaselessly.”
I t seems strange how strongly the motif of the Second Coming, the apocalyptic 
grand rétit is present in authors who can 
be considered as post-modem from more 
than one point of view. One of them is 
Géza Szőcs, the poet-politician from the 
Hungarian minority in Rumania. It is dif­
ficult to quote even a single line by him, 
not merely because this present collec­
tion includes only a few new poems, and 
those do not represent him at his best. (As 
an outstanding talent, Szőcs is always 
expected to come up with something 
movingly powerful and novel.) The diffi­
culty lies in Szőcs blending four or five 
different styles and the viewpoints which 
accompany them—and which exclude 
each other. He often divides his work into 
short movements, something most strik­
ingly exemplified by one of his matter- 
of-fact titles: “Miniatures, One-Moment 
Pieces, Haikus, Fragments, Aphorisms, 
Variations, Bagatelles: Wedding Sto­
ries”—and etymological and typographi­
cal jokes, one may add. Szőcs teases a 
more profound meaning out of plays on 
words. Texts, which at first sight seem to 
be homogeneous are, no less daring for 
their virtually dadaistic turns, as for ex­
ample, “water bathes in its past / like 
Sancta Claus in blood sugar.” (“Gritti on 
the Plane”). This is a crystal clear image, 
except that it combines three notions. A 
simple thought concerning the arriving 
sweetheart, as a gift of fate, is suddenly 
suppressed by the nervous reactions of 
excitement, and finally the myth of 
Atlantis surfaces from somewhere to 
shape some indefinite overflowing fright 
(sea water as a metaphor of blood).
Two layers stand out among the styles 
Szőcs offers hospitality to: one archaico- 
magic, and the other of late Romanticism, 
which has such a fondness for the first. 
The character of Szőcs, once an active 
member of the opposition and a prisoner 
of Ceausescu’s gaols, includes some ro­
mantically heroic features, but precisely 
this provides ground for a touch of sus­
picion. Someone so sensitive to his intel­
lectual autonomy would scarcely opt for 
the most easily attainable segment of tra­
dition; it is more probable that he is be­
guiling his readers. Here one should pose 
just the opposite of the usual question: 
who is not speaking? It is not the 
Herderian speaking, who is seeking for 
the expression of the absoluticized ethnic 
character in archaic texts. The “disrespect” 
with which Szőcs uses folk tradition and 
Hungarian national classics, joining them 
to more vulgar linguistic material amounts 
to sacrilege in the eyes of true Herderians. 
He has put into verse on several occasions 
the romantic motif of the nation’s death, 
but he has been able to do so with sur­
prisingly little pathos, since he has con­
centrated on the realistic threats to an 
ethnic group existing here and now, in­
stead of the myth, the possible assimilation 
of the Hungarians in Rumania to the ma­
jority there.
But to return to the question of who is 
not speaking, it is not somebody who 
places his poetic gift at the service of 
politics. As long as he felt that politics 
determined the whole life of his environ­
ment right down to the tiniest gestures, 
he accepted this as his subject. But since 
he has been able to discuss politics legally, 
he prefers to deal with other sensations. 
He envisions ecological catastrophes—in 
the style of nursery rhymes.
His most important subject is not what 
the poem is about, but the way in which it 
is worded: that with all the things which 
whirl through the mind, man interprets 
the world. But these meanings are not 
cemented into an integral whole. This is
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why he so often uses the motif of the 
futility of adulthood, the absence of ma­
turity which one tries to make up for 
in haste. This is a personality catastrophe 
on a world-war scale. As a 1988 poem 
puts it: “When you will be President of 
America / and with golden water-pistols 
in your pocket /... / you suddenly take yet 
another unobserved step / and do not even 
feel that you are already past / the other 
half of your life /... / and you will bury in 
the cellar of the White House the black 
box / which will be filled with your last 
words, / you will dig there in the cellar of 
the White House, / with a cross wires on 
your forehead, in galoshes, / with the hot 
line around your neck, / when you will be 
the American or Soviet President.” 
Refreezing Plates is the first, success­
ful volume of twenty five year old Mónika 
Mesterházi. It keeps to a variegated, basi­
cally Classical style, using poetic solu­
tions, or at least avoiding neo-avant-garde 
means, which appear in Szőcs in such 
profusion and, what is most striking, 
without turning to any grand metaphysi­
cal subjects. “Even if grumbling, I ac­
quiesce in what / chafes my throat / when 
it utters / that it is superfluous / as it is, 
the whole lump, Budapest, / the houses, 
the air, and even / the trees, the books— 
that there is no defensible / surface...” 
Contrary to most of her contemporaries 
who are just appearing on the literary 
scene, Monika Mesterházi does not even 
consider either overtly chiselled elabora­
tion or a mass of mythological references. 
On the contrary, she takes subjects that 
seem to be the province of youth with 
unconcealed irony. Two poems are, for 
instance, about the ears of her dog. It is as 
if she rejects the notions about adulthood 
as expressed by the poets mentioned ear­
lier. At the same time, she shows no trace 
of the typical newcomers’ intoxication 
with the fact that she has feelings. She is 
a poet who tries to hide, but in a different 
way from Zsuzsa Beney. Nor does she 
imitate the attitude of Győző Ferencz (who
taught her at university), a noted poet 
whose influence can nevertheless be 
strongly felt in the precisely elaborated 
idiom of Refreezing Plates. Mónika 
Mesterházi has an individual attitude to 
things, or rather, to the absence of things.
Events take place, they turn into 
memories and become incorporated in the 
personality, constantly changing, like the 
flow of Heraclitus’ river. The poems carve 
out and sensually rebuild moments from 
time and this, in itself, is a traditional 
endeavour of poetry. But she never de­
scribes decisive moments, only prepara­
tions for something unidentified, and 
memories of emotions whose reality is 
questioned by the poet herself. Even if 
this “vacuum” connected with the absence 
encountered in the outside world /’’no 
wonder if your face has a ghost image, / 
the compared-with it is haunting behind 
you”, it is primarily an inner emptiness 
which she repeatedly sets forth, but which 
she does not propose to analyse. The water 
of the river is beautiful if it is not stirred 
up, indeed—as the title suggests—if it is 
refrozen, which means that there has been 
a thaw but that should not be spoken 
about. She knows, many false meanings 
would invade the vacuum if she were to 
try to speak about it: imagination masked 
as remembrance and emotion, social and 
private roles. “The inner noise makes it 
difficult for me to hear / when I speak, 
which voice is speaking from me. / 1 can 
read this on the faces of others. /... / And 
for you I keep silent—suitably.”
To give up speech (even if it is inad­
equate) might also be just a role, and not 
even an original one. Mónika Mesterházi 
devotes a whole cycle to explain her being 
a poet, blending resignation with pride 
(“I have done what is not worth doing”). 
Her pride is certainly justified. There are 
some six or seven poems in the volume 
which lead the reader to believe that she 
will succeed in her exceptional experi­
ment—to base a significant oeuvre not on 
the gift of sharp vision, but on its denial.
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MUSIC
László Somfai
Bartók and Szigeti
Béla Bartók’s friendship and his crea­tive connections with Joseph (József) 
Szigeti is considered to be an extremely 
well-documented subject. Szigeti’s remi­
niscences and reflections in his well 
known With Strings Attached, along with 
other recollections, six characteristic and 
informative letters written by Bartók to 
Szigeti and five by the violinist to the 
composer, and documentation of their 
some twenty duo recitals in Europe and 
America, have all been published. The 
Bartók literature discusses Szigeti’s 
splendid transcription of the Hungarian 
Folk Tunes for violin and piano (1926), 
Szigeti’s role in commissioning a trio (the 
Contrasts, 1938) for the “King of Swing”, 
Benny Goodman and himself, and how 
Szigeti, along with Jelly d’Arányi, Zoltán 
Székely, and Yehudi Menuhin, were 
among the privileged violinists who re­
ceived printed dedications of major Bartók 
works. In addition to the Contrasts, 
Rhapsody No.l 1928 was also dedicated 
to Szigeti. Since the issuing of the Cen­
tenary Edition o f Bartók’s Records 
(Hungaroton 1981) the most exciting as­
pect of the Szigeti—Bartók connection 
for the musician of our time has been,
László Somfai heads the Bartók Archives 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
He is currently at work on the first volume 
of Béla Bartók: Complete Critical Edi­
tion. His Béla Bartók: Composition, 
Concepts and Autograph Sources will be 
published by the University of California 
Press.
however, the more than 100 minute long 
gramophone recording of them as a duo 
playing Bartók, Beethoven, and Debussy. 
The younger generation of Bartók per­
formers use these recordings as a guide 
of primary importance to the re-creation 
of an authentic Bartók style.
Should the case be reopened? Still un­
published documents (thirteen Szigeti 
letters to Bartók in the Budapest Bartók 
Archives; annotated Bartók music in the 
Szigeti collection of the Liszt Ferenc 
Academy of Music in Budapest, etc.) 
alone would not necessarily justify a 
thorough reconsideration of their friend­
ship. It is the preparations for the complete 
critical edition of Bartók’s music, cur­
rently the central scholarly project in the 
Budapest Bartók Archives, that necessi­
tates our re-examining the surviving 
documents in a broader context.
In fact, the close study of the Szigeti 
file can be a pilot project in answering 
urgent methodological questions in Bartók 
research. For instance, how can the com­
plex study of such a rich documentation 
be used in the detection of lesser-known 
but similarly important Bartók links? How 
much can one rely on a single source of 
information? How do we know that the 
recollections of a witness can be trusted 
where there are contradictory statements? 
To what extent is a gramophone record a 
document, an authorized version, the 
textual deviations and significant features 
of which must then be incorporated into 
the printed musical text of the future 
Bartók critical edition? How much of a 
Szigeti—Bartók performance was pri­
marily determined by Szigeti’s ideas and
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style, and not by the composer’s instruc­
tions? Shall we say that duo performances 
in general are less “authentic” than solo 
piano recordings played by the composer? 
And last but not least, how are we to 
explain the fact that Bartók made so many 
records with Szigeti but none with Jelly 
d’Arányi, Stefi Geyer, Imre Waldbauer, 
or Zoltán Székely?
This last may be called a superfluous 
question. Of the Hungarian violinists listed 
above, Szigeti alone was in a position to 
persuade leading gramophone companies 
such as Columbia, to make records with 
Bartók. Incidentally, the London studio 
recording in 1931 (Bartók—Szigeti: 
Hungarian Folk Tunes; Bartók—Székely: 
Rumanian Folk Dances), and the New 
York studio productions in 1940 (Rhap­
sody No.l, and the Contrasts with Benny 
Goodman) were of perfect assistance to 
Szigeti’s career too: he was keen to play 
with famous composers, preferably pre­
senting works written for him. In a way it 
was pure chance that, of the many 
memorable sonata evenings involving 
Bartók playing with several violinist 
friends, only the April 13,1940, Szigeti— 
Bartók concert in the Washington Library 
of Congress was recorded. Fortunately, 
after twenty-five years, this some 70 
minutes of live performance (Beethoven’s 
“Kreutzer”, the Debussy Sonata, Bartók’s 
2nd Sonata and the 1st Rhapsody) was 
issued on LP and can now be studied as 
probably the liveliest and most significant 
sound document of Bartók’s personality 
as an interpreter, with no other sources of 
its kind comparable to it.
Though the amount and therefore the 
significance of the Bartók—Szigeti 
records may be misleading in some re­
spect, nobody can doubt the importance 
of this connection, and the sincerity and 
mutual high respect felt by the two great 
musicians. Their friendship was formed 
relatively late, which explains the psy­
chological background of a few seem­
ingly controversial facts. For instance
Szigeti, who helped Bartók in a most no­
ble way while often remaining in the 
background, was not willing to play cer­
tain violin works by Bartók in America, 
despite the fact that the composer very 
much hoped he would. This delicate 
question will be discussed below.
Szigeti’s restrained approach to foster­
ing a fruitful connection had to appeal to 
Bartók. It has been established that they 
knew of each other as early as Szigeti’s 
study years under Hubay in Budapest. In 
1910 they even played at the same recital. 
But it was not until the mid-1920s that 
Szigeti, who at that time lived abroad, 
realized that, in the meantime, Bartók had 
become a major figure in the post-war 
modem music scene. We do not know 
precisely what prompted his recognition. 
I personally suspect that the response to 
the famous Paris performance of the 1st 
Sonata (April 4, 1922) by Jelly d’Arányi, 
who by then was living in England, and 
Bartók, in the presence of Ravel, 
Stravinsky, Honegger, Milhaud, Poulenc, 
and others was what primarily impressed 
him. The dedication of the two Bartók 
violin sonatas (1921, 1922) to Jelly, soon 
followed by the dedication of Tzigane by 
Ravel, was indeed an unusual acknowl­
edgement, perhaps a challenge to Szigeti.
He -chose the indirect way to approach 
Bartók. In 1926 Szigeti made a violin and 
piano transcription of pieces from For 
Children with the title Ungarische 
Volksweisen, which he sent to Universal 
Edition (Vienna). The publisher forwarded 
it to Bartók who, after suggesting a few 
minor changes, but impressed by the 
quality of the work, approved it.1 This was 
a clever self-introduction. So too was the 
next step. Instead of asking Bartók to give 
the first performance of the brand-new 
transcription with him, Szigeti suggested 
a duo recital in Budapest with Bach,
1 The manuscript is in the Stadt- und 
Landesbibliothek in Vienna, MHc 14300.
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Szigeti’s notes for Bartók: special pizzicato, flageolet etc. tricks on the violin 
(Budapest Bartók Archives)
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Mozart, Schubert, Beethoven sonatas on 
the programme. (April 10, 1927). The re­
cital created a sensation. According to a 
newspaper account,2 they had a happy 
time together. At the end of the rehearsal, 
Bartók took Szigeti’s violin and showed 
him unusual col legno effects. Szigeti tried 
them out and in return played new sounds 
from Stravinsky. (This naturally sounds a 
somewhat typical piece of journalism, but 
it is supported by a recently identified 
document in the Budapest Bartók Ar­
chives. Soon after the concert, Szigeti gave 
a page of examples to Bartók of special 
tricks on the violin: pizzicato chords 
combining the thumb and the forefinger, 
flageolet effects, and others.)
There can be no question that both 
men got more inspiration from this meet­
ing than expected. Bartók liked Szigeti’s 
style and virtuosity as well as his person­
ality. By that time Bartók had various 
contacts with talented members of the 
Hungarian violin school. As a young man 
he had played with Hubay, the head of 
the school, he had enjoyed Adila Arányi’s 
company (she was 15 at that time) and 
when he met Stefi Geyer (19), he fell 
immediately in love with her. He had 
accompanied the teenage Ferenc Vecsey 
on a concert tour. Imre Waldbauer was 
just 18 when, in 1910, he committed him­
self to fighting for Bartók’s music; Zoltán 
Székely was 17 in 1920 when he began 
playing contemporary music with the 
composer (and Bartók immediately rec­
ognized his talent); Ede Zathureczky was 
20 when he first played the 2nd Sonata 
with Bartók. They were much younger 
than the composer, honoured by this 
partnership, and quite naturally used the 
connection to advance their careers and 
define themselves as musicians. (Jelly 
d’Arányi, 28 in 1921 when she enchanted
2 Jenő Feiks’ in Pesti Napló (April 12,1927),
who also made a drawing of Szigeti and Bartók 
in rehearsal.
Bartók with her playing and her personal­
ity and inspired him to write two sonatas, 
was to some extent another story, partly a 
love story, which never really bothered 
Szigeti.)
In contrast to the younger generation, 
Szigeti at thirty-five, a celebrity in inter­
national concert life, was his equal. He 
could arrange things for Bartók; he dis­
covered misprints in the printed edition 
of the 2nd Sonata, which he discussed 
with the composer. In two years the form 
of address in their correspondence quickly 
developed from the formal Igen tisztelt 
Szigeti Ur! through Kedves Kolléga Ur! 
to the much less formal Kedves Barátom!
Bartók recognized the favourable ef­
fect made by the first two violin tran­
scriptions from his piano music (Bartók— 
Székely, Rumanian Folk Dances, Uni­
versal Ed. 1916; Bartók—Szigeti, Hun­
garian Folk Tunes, Universal Ed. 1927)3 
in the popularization of his music. In ap­
preciation of the services of Szigeti and 
Székely, he wrote two rhapsodies in 1928, 
based on folk dances. He had great ex­
pectations that the rhapsodies would be a 
success abroad with the two outstanding 
Hungarian violinists. He offered a number 
of variant forms to make them a real suc­
cess: with piano or with orchestra; the 
two-movement full form or the Lassú and 
the Friss dances independently. The two 
rhapsodies differed considerably in style, 
because of the very nature of the folk- 
dance material and the idea which under­
lay them, but also because Bartók tai-
3 The two other popular violin transcriptions 
needed more help and were published only in 
Hungary. The Bartók—Gertler Sonatina (ca. 
1930) was considerably revised by the com­
poser. The Bartók—Országh Hungarian 
Folksongs had a longer history: the 11-piece 
set of Országh’s transcription, (1931) was 
fully rewritten in 1934 by Bartók in a new 9- 
piece arrangement which in this form is indeed 
the most original of all of the versions of For 
Children.
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lored them to some extent to the person­
ality and technique of the two violinists. 
According to Székely’s verbal recollec­
tions—and he is a dependable witness— 
the composer let him read the music of 
the two rhapsodies while still in manu­
script and asked him which he would like 
better. Székely was particularly fascinated 
by the 2nd Rhapsody, although it was 
more difficult in every respect. As it 
turned out, Bartók had already intended it 
for him, while the 1st Rhapsody had been 
meant for Szigeti. Székely soon played 
both rhapsodies with Bartók; Szigeti, 
however, played only “his” rhapsody.
One wonders whether Szigeti liked to 
be paired in 1928/29 with a much younger, 
ambitious but not yet recognized Hun­
garian fellow violinist in this way. Al­
though he never wrote about it, he must 
have been affected. An indirect sign of 
this involves the Violin Concerto 1937/ 
38, commissioned and first performed by 
Székely in Europe. According to Bartók’s 
letter to Szigeti (January 30, 1944), the 
composer had sent the piano score of the 
still unpublished concerto to Szigeti and 
hoped that he would perform it in 
America. This Szigeti did not do, although 
he knew that the composer was ill, cruelly 
disappointed in America, and badly in 
need of a success. In fact, he never played 
the concerto dedicated to Székely, nor 
the solo Violin Sonata, which was 
Menuhin’s piece. This was typical of 
Szigeti. In his later years in Switzerland, 
he did, however, study and teach them, 
and even quoted them in A Violinist’s 
Notebook.
Returning to the 1st Rhapsody, a few 
interesting facts came to light during the 
preparations for the critical edition. In his 
recollections Szigeti gave an account of 
thirty-nine unpublished measures of the 
Friss movement in the manuscript which 
he received from Bartók. These were later 
left out, he comments. In fact all manu­
scripts and versions contain the passage, 
an Allegretto scherzando based on an­
other dance tune from Transylvania. It 
was lovely music, but it was typical of 
Bartók’s self-criticism that, on second 
thoughts, he discarded longer sections if 
they acted as a brake on the development 
of the form.4
Another interesting detail is the gesture 
of the original slow ending of the rhap­
sody, which Szigeti did not mention. In­
stead of the last ten measures of the printed 
score, (Rubato, quasi cadenza) originally 
there were only two with a suggestion: 
Cadenza breve (ad lib.), i.e. a short ca­
denza to be improvised. In one manuscript 
amongst the Bartók papers in America 
there is a short and not very successful 
violin passage in Szigeti’s handwriting. 
This they eventually rejected, and later 
Bartók sketched cadenzas, which became 
longer and longer, until finally he wrote 
the present form—which is still not perfect 
from the performer’s point of view.5
Szigeti favoured the new (fast and 
brilliant) ending of the 1st Rhapsody, 
written months after Bartók had finished 
the composition. This new ending clearly 
belongs to the independent performance 
of the fast second movement (Friss) 
alone.6 Yet Szigeti liked it, played it with
4I discuss this and several similar cuts in 
Bartók’s manuscripts in my forthcoming Béla 
Bartók: Composition, Concepts, and Auto­
graph Sources (University of California Press, 
Berkeley).
5Isaac Stern told me that in a discussion with 
Bartók in the 1940s he suggested a technically 
and musically more satisfying last measure for 
the violin, which the composer accepted.
6Movement I is in the key G; Movement II 
starts in E but, with the return of the opening 
theme of Movement I, ends in G—which is the 
key of the unabridged form of the 2-movement 
Rhapsody. The new (fast) ending recalls a 
theme from Movement II and, logically, ar­
rives in E—intended as the end of the one- 
movement form, when the Friss alone is per­
formed.
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Bartók in the two movement full per­
formance too (Bartók, whatever he 
thought, accepted it), and by recording 
the 1st Rhapsody with the composer in 
this form, created a tradition. This is a 
misleading tradition, I think. As a matter 
of fact, except for Székely, few violinists 
play the probably less attractive but mu­
sically only logical original form.7
All in all, the Bartók repertoire of 
Szigeti was selective: Rhapsody No.l 
(with piano and with orchestra), Sonata 
No.2, Contrasts, Székely’s and his own 
popular transcriptions, and the Portrait 
(No. 1 of Deux Portraits) with orchestra. 
Except for the orchestral version of the 
rhapsody, all were recorded, the 1st 
Rhapsody with Bartók even twice, once 
live in concert and once in the studio.8 All 
are extremely important documents, not 
only for the younger generation of Bartók 
interpreters but also for the future editors 
of these works in the Béla Bartók Com­
plete Critical Edition. For Szigeti was an 
exceptionally careful reader of the music, 
who discovered mistakes and inconsist­
encies in the notation, discussed them 
with the composer, and played Bartók’s 
music as the composer approved it. In 
addition, we have reason to believe that 
whenever he made some slight changes, 
playing chords, flageolet and pizzicato 
notes, glissandi etc. in a way similar to, 
but technically not identical with, the 
printed version, he had the composer’s 
agreement. After all, Bartók was open to 
the advice of a master string player in
7 Székely (together with Isobel Moore) re­
corded the violin and piano version of the two 
rhapsodies for the Béla Bartók Complete Edi­
tion in 1974 (Hungaroton SLPX 11357).
8Szigeti’s recordings with Bartók were re­
leased in an amply annotated form in the 
Centenary Edition of Bartók’s Records (Com­
plete) (Hungaroton 1981, V oll, LPX 12326- 
33), on sides 6-7,11-13, and were re-issued on 
CD in Bartók at the Piano (Hungaroton 1991, 
HCD 12326-31), CD 3 and 5.
questions of the proper notation and ren­
dition, if he was satisfied with the 
“acoustic” (played) form of the sugges­
tion.
Probably more caution is advisable in 
accepting that the general style, the tempo, 
the rubato in Szigeti’s recorded perform­
ance with Bartók automatically represent 
the composer’s ideal. Comparative stud­
ies of selected samples from the complete 
recorded material point towards potential 
problem areas of the indisputable “au­
thenticity” of Szigeti’s Bartók interpreta­
tion.
A comparison of two live performances 
of the 1st Rhapsody (Zathureczky with 
Bartók: April 11, 1939, Budapest; Szigeti 
with Bartók: April 13,1940, Washington, 
D.C.) confirms that Bartók accepted a 
considerably slower tempo of the Lassú 
too; he actually enjoyed it, together with 
the gentler tone, more liberal use of rubato, 
and the more pointed accents and 
directionality in the performance of Ede 
Zathureczky. Szigeti developed a robust, 
noble Hungarian tone for the opening 
theme, safe in performance, but certainly 
a bit stiff.
Similarly, speaking of rhythmic free­
dom, one can rightly compare the first 
dance of the Rumanian Folk Dances in 
Bartók’s solo performance (taken from 
the 1920 Welte-Mignon roll, or from the 
1915 home-made phonograph cylinder) 
with the Szigeti—Bartók record (1920). 
The difference is astonishing. Szigeti takes 
a slower tempo, with heavier beats and 
with a much more rigid rhythm. Why did 
Bartók adjust himself to this tempo and 
style, if he had a clearly different piece in 
mind? He did play the piano accompani­
ment to a basically correct and certainly 
powerful interpretation. This is exactly 
the point: although the performance may 
be perfect and highly informative, a duo, 
even involving the participation of the 
composer, in general does not have the 
hundred-percent authority of a solo re­
cording.
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In spite of these and similar reflections 
based on a detailed analysis of the old 
recordings, Szigeti’s Bartók interpretation 
is a source of immense importance. Nor 
must we miss the main point. A musician 
who was able to achieve with Bartók such 
a catharsis as Szigeti did in the slow C 
major ending of the 2nd Sonata in the 
Washington recital, was a perfect Bartók 
player. Whether or not we have documents 
of the performance of other ideal Bartók 
players, this cannot be denied.
As Szigeti’s correspondence in 1940 
with the staff of the Library of Congress 
documents, he opposed the recording of 
the live performance of the 2nd Sonata. 
He knew that the sonata was difficult and 
they would probably not have enough 
time for rehearsal; he knew how difficult 
it was to play with Bartók, who impro­
vised a great deal on the concert plat­
form. Was it through vanity that Szigeti 
did not want to risk leaving less than
perfect recordings for posterity? Or was 
he overcautious out of respect for his 
friend Bartók? Fortunately for Szigeti and 
for us, the Library of Congress recorded 
the full programme.
Similarly, one would like to know why 
Szigeti did not play with Bartók in 
America after their concert in Denver, on 
February 18, 1941, when this could well 
have been the best way to support the 
disappointed composer. Was it because 
Bartók as a pianist had received a bad 
press for a piano duo recital with his wife 
Ditta in the Town Hall in New York and, 
for Szigeti, collaboration would have been 
disadvantageous? Perhaps he did have to 
consider this aspect too, but then it was 
also Szigeti—and Bartók never learned 
this—who persuaded Koussevitzky to 
commission the composer to write a new 
work (Concerto for Orchestra, 1943) 
which led to a last upswing in his creative 
activity.
Music 163
Paul Griffiths
Extraordinary Performances on CD
A simple salute is perhaps all that is necessary to mark the arrival of 
Kurtág’s Kafka-Fragments on record 
(Hungaroton HCD 31135), a simple “here 
it is”. That’s the way in which the re­
cording itself is presented, with no intro­
ductory text, not even a dating of the 
composition (which was created between 
1985 and 1987). But silence in a review 
could easily be evasion, so let me add a 
few points to what I said about the work 
in an earlier issue of NHQ.
The first thing to be mentioned, after an 
encounter with the piece in sound rather 
than on the page, is the colossal stature of 
the performance by Adrienne Csengery 
and András Keller. Csengery’s resilience 
and daring on every front—technical, ex­
pressive, musical, intellectual, moral—was 
evident in her work with and for Kurtág 
from before this piece was written; indeed, 
without that shared experience, Kurtág 
might well have lacked the creative confi­
dence to push the project through. He could 
do so because he knew he had the ideal 
performer, and this recording, quite apart 
from its value in disseminating the work, 
will be inestimably useful to future singers 
who will want and need to know the voice 
for which the Kafka-Fragments were 
composed, and on which they were honed 
in performance. It’s a voice that goes 
unafraid of the technical difficulties: often 
the singer has to emulate the violinist’s 
easy stalking through wide intervals, and 
Csengery is always sure in placement and 
attack, without the roughness that other 
singers disguise as expressive force (in
Paul Griffiths i.v NHQ’s regular record 
reviewer.
her performance everything is command- 
ingly accomplished; she blocks for herself 
the easy, lazy routes). She also has the 
range for the piece—not only the pitch 
range, but the range from fierce declama­
tion to things passed or rushed in a whis­
per. She can be magnificently authorita­
tive; she can also be vulnerable and alone 
(the authority and the vulnerability are 
both enhanced by the church acoustic of 
the recording).
However, the work is decidedly not a 
solo showpiece, and the triumph of this 
recording belongs also to Keller, whose 
spirit and virtuosity are unstinting. It 
would be easy to be overshadowed by 
Csengery; he isn’t (the skill is partly the 
composer’s in creating two parts of 
separate, interlocked prominence, but it 
needed a formidable player to take on the 
role). And so one comes to understand 
how the work’s double focus, on soprano 
and violin, is essential to its character. 
This isn’t a set of songs with accompani­
ment: the violin part is often pitched at 
the level of a cadenza rather than a sup­
port, and often the musical imagery de­
rives from the two lines together, as most 
obviously in the opening fragment, where 
“the good march in step” in the violin 
part while “the others dance around them 
the dances of time” in how the singer 
behaves. The singer isn’t privileged by 
the music: she’s not the expressive source, 
not the stand-in for Kafka. The music 
breathes through two musicians at once 
and equally.
Further experience, which this record­
ing will make possible, may enable us to 
understand the details more clearly, to 
see beyond the fearlessness and the wit of 
Kurtág’s identification with Kafka, and
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the remarkable inventiveness which ena­
bles him to create a new relationship be­
tween soprano and violin, in terms both 
of musical texture and textual connotation, 
in every piece. For instance, it wouldn’t 
be uncharacteristic of Kurtág if there were 
to be a great richness of cross-references 
among the forty numbers. To give one 
example, the long “hommage-message á 
Pierre-Boulez”—which concludes the first 
half, just as the second is concluded by 
the next longest piece, in which the image 
of a pair of snakes, crawling together 
through the inhospitable world, suggests 
the soprano and the violin of this per­
formance as much as the man and the 
woman of Kafka’s letters and diaries— 
this Boulez message has the violin mak­
ing slow attempts at scales against his 
own drone and quarter-tone inflections. 
As a sound event, this low-register doub­
le-stopping looks forward a few pieces to 
the fragment in which similar music— 
though lower still, on a second violin 
with scordatura—seems to stand in for 
the song of hell’s duplicitous angels, while 
its presentation of something simple (a 
scale) being done with great difficulty 
has wider resonances, notably in the 
fragment dedicated to Pilinszky’s 
memory: “I can’t ... actually tell a story, 
in fact I am almost unable even to speak.” 
Alongside this extraordinary work and 
this extraordinary performance, not much 
else matches up. For instance, “D’Adam 
á Abraham” (Quintana QUI903032), will 
be valued as a memento of Kurtág the 
performer, playing the organ in little in­
terludes to separate lessons and plainsongs 
taking us through the book of Genesis, 
but the sequence doesn’t work as an aes­
thetic whole. The matins responsories are 
sung by the Schola Hungarica, a clear- 
toned mixed choir; Kurtág’s interludes 
have some striking moments—like the 
astonishing low notes of “Organum et 
campanae” or the dissolving melody of 
“De diluvio”—but the combination of 
plainsong, modern harmony and picture­
making often suggests Messiaen. A more 
consecutive sacred narrative is offered by 
Pál Németh and his Capella Savaria, with 
the Cantamus chamber choir of Halle and 
soloists, in Carl Heinrich Graun’s Passion 
cantata Der Tod Jesu (1754-5). Extraor­
dinary to learn that this work survived in 
performance in Berlin for more than a 
century, against the competition of Bach’s 
Passions: the sentimentality, perhaps, was 
the appeal. This recording is as persuasive 
as possible; it’s also given character and 
distinction by Mária Zádori and Klaus 
Mertens among the soloists.
But the only other release to come near 
the Kurtág Kafka-Fragments in intensity 
and interest is a recording by Zoltán Kocsis 
and Adrienne Hauser of the fourhand ver­
sions of Bartók’s Miraculous Mandarin 
and Schoenberg’s Chamber Symphony, 
op.9, each of these arrangements being 
the composer’s own (Quintana, QUI 
903021). I’d expected the Bartók, like the 
four-hand reduction of The Rite of Spring, 
to be a tonic alternative, the Schoenberg 
to become an impenetrable scramble. But 
that wasn’t the way of it at all. Bartók’s 
richest orchestral score turned out to need 
its colour: the arrangement, even when 
played with such alacrity and finesse, 
sounded cheap and slightly ludicrous. The 
Schoenberg piece, by contrast, comes up 
brilliantly fresh and alive in this recording, 
partly because the counterpoint is so much 
more precisely managed by twenty fingers 
than it can be by fifteen musicians, with 
all the attendant difficulties of ensemble 
and of the different speed and volume with 
which instruments speak. Speeds which 
would be hazardous for a chamber or­
chestra are safely thrilling for Kocsis and 
Hauser, and one doesn’t miss the wind- 
heavy textures of the original. With four 
versions now on record (the 1906 score, 
Schoenberg’s later full-scale orchestration 
and Webern’s quintet cramming are the 
others), the chamber symphony must be 
counted the most satisfactorily mutable 
piece of music since Bach.
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THEATRE & FILM
Tamás Koltai
Misguiding Ideals
István Eörsi: A z  á ld o z a t  (The Victim); Moliére: T a rtu ffe ; Friedrich 
Dürrenmatt: R o m u lu s  th e  G re a t;  Milan Uhde: G la d  T id in g s
Theatres now are trying to be both artistically meaningful and commer­
cially successful. They see themselves as 
both having to provide answers to the 
questions of the day and trying to cling to 
their audiences. They should reflect real­
ity, but also make you forget it. For the 
most part it seems to be musicals that are 
best suited for this paradoxical purpose. 
The Vígszínház chose West Side Story. 
This evergreen is always assured of suc­
cess. The conflict between immigrants, 
aliens and ethnic minorities is now as 
timely in Hungary as it was in the America 
of the ‘fifties; refugees are flooding into 
the country, racist slogans and skinhead 
violence have forced themselves upon the 
public, and social problems are becoming 
more and more evident.
There is also a Hungarian “West Side 
Story”, which the Budapest Repertory 
Theatre has somewhat reworked from a 
musical that was first performed ten years 
ago. Like Bernstein’s, it is set among 
bleak tenements; in “the rough part of the 
city,” to quote a famous Hungarian poet. 
Cigánykerék (Catherine Wheel) is about 
the clash between Hungarians and Gyp­
sies, unfolding in the inner courtyard of a
Tamás Koltai, editor of Színház, a 
theatre monthly, is NHQ’s regular 
theatre reviewer.
house with a circular open gallery, a 
smoke-filled café, and a tattered cinema. 
The love between a gifted, self-taught 
Gypsy painter and a “white” school-mis­
tress is embedded in stormy romanticism 
and acute social, drama. The last moment 
of the play freezes on a giant photograph 
of a skinhead, glaring threateningly at the 
Gypsies. This is a direct reference to the 
manifestations of xenophobia and racial 
hatred in Hungary today.
To commemorate the “discovery” of 
America, the Budapest Operetta Theatre 
premiered a rock opera, Kolumbusz, az 
őrült spanyol hányattatásai szárazon és 
vizen / The Vicissitudes of Columbus, 
the Mad Spaniard on Land and Sea/. At 
the same time as paying tribute to the 
fantastic undertaking, the play also con­
tains two minor scenes showing that Spain 
in 1492 also saw the conquest over the 
Moors and the expulsion of the Jews. The 
second part of the play concerns the sub­
jugation of the Amerindians, though, it 
has to be said, not overly critically lest 
the festive mood of celebration of the 
enterprise be spoilt. (The subtitle, “The 
Odyssey of an Undertaking” is a reference 
both to Columbus and to the calvary in­
volved in acquiring backing for the pro­
duction.)
O ne issue which is preoccupying the thinking public is the process that 
led from various utopian ideas and 
messianic faiths to a total awakening.
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István Eörsi, playwright, poet, publicist, 
a pupil of György Lukács, and above all a 
nonconformist, has reached back for an 
answer to Christ’s day in Az áldozat (The 
Victim), which was staged by Péter Valló 
in the Arizona Small Theatre. The conflict 
interwoven in the basic fabric of the play 
is between Mark and Judas. The dramatic 
conceit is that Judas has been chosen by 
Christ himself as a tool, through whose 
“treachery” He could die, resurrect, and 
become the Redeemer. Forty years after 
the crucifixion Judas, the murderous as­
sailant, still persecutes Mark. He is impa­
tiently waiting for a delayed redemption, 
while Mark is about to turn the idea of 
redemption into a world-wide movement. 
Mark speaks about mankind; according 
to Judas, Christ had never so much as 
uttered the word. Mark performs the sac­
rifice of the scribes in the shade of the 
destruction of Jerusalem and of Roman 
hegemony; he adjusts the text of his gos­
pel to the times. Judas ends his life on the 
cross, unredeemed, a victim of his fidel­
ity to Christ, to the hero of the struggle 
for freedom of a small subjugated people. 
So that we can be told something about 
the nature of the empire which is massa­
cring the “Christian Jews”, Domitius, an 
agnostic sceptical Roman patrician, also 
has to perish if he is not willing to serve 
Rome. And one more important episode: 
just as the Evangelist did with the history 
of Christ, the story of the empire will be 
written on the basis of its utility—“to suit 
the times”, as described by a certain 
Tacitus, who, just out of his teens, is 
watching events on Eörsi’s stage.
The Victim is concerned with sacri­
fice, devotion and betrayal in a multiple 
way, dialectically, to use an outmoded 
word. The play immortalizes the fictive 
moment of the birth of Christianity as a 
world religion, in which one must take 
leave of “narrow-minded loyalities”, of 
the original idea of the liberation of a 
people (a modicum of which at most can 
be later smuggled into the final ideol­
ogy). To save it, it must be turned into an 
“imperial faith” (even if at the time the 
empire is still persecuting it). In the private 
sphere of the action, the presence of two 
women (a noble Roman lady and an illit­
erate Jewish teenager) further modulates 
the concepts of loyalty and treason. In 
this play, written in the mid-1970s, Eörsi 
expresses with rare intensity ideas which 
are now more valid than ever.
Abuse of the Christian faith and love (the history of which started with the 
death of Christ) has been a frequent dra­
matic subject, Tartuffe being perhaps the 
best known. The hypocrite, who worms 
himself into the confidence of his bene­
factor only to denounce and betray him, 
is portrayed as a modem sycophant in the 
Budapest Repertory Theatre production. 
The director, Dezső Kapás, has boldly 
transferred the plot into the recent past, 
turning it into a Hungarian play. The set­
ting is Budapest and the date May 29 
1938. That fateful day saw two notable 
events: the procession on the last day of 
the Eucharistic Congress, the great inter­
national Roman Catholic event held that 
year in Budapest, and the day when Act 
15, the first anti-Jewish law, setting a 
numerus clausus for Jews in the press, in 
offices, in the medical, legal, and acting 
professions, came into force in Hungary. 
In Orgon’s comfortable middle-class flat, 
the radio reports on both events. The situ­
ation is fairly delicate. Tartuffe, in the 
mask of a devoted, self-effacing Chris­
tian, has wriggled himself into the favour 
of a pious Catholic family (who in the 
final act are just returning home from the 
Congress’s closing procession). Orgon 
himself has Jewish blood. Up to this mo­
ment all this seemed of no significance, 
but now, listening to the news, Dorine, 
the maid promoted to housekeeper, thinks 
it better to conceal the menorah she hap­
pened to observe while packing. Who 
knows what lies in store? The audience 
knows the answer, but the characters are
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still unaware of it. Tartuffe carries out his 
petty tricks in the name of the religion of 
love, but on being thrown out by Orgon, 
he starts howling and gesticulating like a 
mini Hitler. On the day of “the world­
wide feast of love” (as the radio announcer 
puts it) the exclusion of certain citizens 
also begins. Orgon cannot yet know where 
all this is to lead, but it is not impossible 
that he is instinctively seeking the favour 
of the man who may offer him protection. 
His devotion to Tartuffe might imply some 
unconscious striving for security. It may 
be becaue of this that he wants his 
daughter to marry Tartuffe. Historical 
experience combines with historical 
blindness. “Many things could happen 
earlier, but times have changed.” How 
often in the past have people, their very 
existence threatened, reassured them­
selves with this self-deceptive hope? And 
how often have they fallen victim to 
hypocritical lies and their own good faith? 
The production tells us that in the name 
of sacred faiths something which citizens 
ought to fear is being elevated to the rank 
of raison d’état. Before asking whether it 
is permissible to up-date Moliére, it should 
also be asked whether this is not pre­
cisely the subject of Tartuffe, and 
whether it is not superfluous today to 
reiterate this idea.
A certain 20th century trend, pro­
foundly discredited over the past seventy 
years, has tried to promote the religion of 
love to an ideology. One noted examplar 
of this trend is Bertolt Brecht, whose im­
portance as a playwright has not been 
diminished by the failure of that ideology, 
nor by those who are trying to extend the 
bankruptcy proceedings to some of the 
best intellects and artists of our century. 
In The Caucasian Chalk Circle, Brecht 
examines the possibilities of affection 
under given social conditions. “It is 
dreadful to be tempted by Goodness,” the 
Singer comments on the meditation of 
the servant maid, Grusha Vashnadze, over 
the fate of an abandoned infant of a prince.
In the Csiky Gergely Theatre of 
Kaposvár’s production, the director, 
László Babarczy, makes it clear that al­
though Grusha’s heart tells her to adopt 
the foundling, the decision she makes is 
irrational, against her own interests, one 
which will bring her trouble. Brecht’s 
favourite idea (expanded in The Good 
Woman of Setzuan) is that under adverse 
conditions, it is hazardous to be good. In 
the “ancient China” of the Chalk Circle 
parable, conditions are bad because they 
are confused. The old regime has been 
overthrown and the new one is still trying 
its muscles. It is not yet strong enough to 
deal out the blows it would like to, it is 
forced to give way here and there and to 
set store by appearances; accordingly, 
amid the overall uncertainty of morality 
and law, justice might accidentally pre­
vail. In Grusha’s trial, arbitrary justice is 
manifest in the person of Azdak, an im­
postor sitting on the judge’s bench. Azdak 
is outside the law, a typical product of 
conditions of anomie. He is a reversed 
Tartuffe in that he shows himself worse 
than he really is. He is foul-mouthed, a 
drunkard who expects to be corrupted. 
He has no desire to ingratiate himself 
with anybody, in fact he enjoys the pose 
of being as repugnant as possible. Yet he 
manages, somehow or other, to see that 
the honest, the poor and the good come 
out victorious. Zoltán Bezerédi’s per­
formance makes the character even more 
lovable than usual. This may be because 
in times when there is full awareness that 
some people, posing as heroes, are im­
postors, we accept that real impostors can 
easily turn into heroes. Impudent confi­
dence-tricksters, holding out their hands, 
but surreptitiously dispensing justice, are 
appreciated in contrast to pretentious be­
lievers in utopias, who only fear for their 
power. Azdak reminds one of the simple 
truth that at a time when ideas and faith 
are devalued, one should trust “unprinci­
pled” acts rather than passionate ha­
rangues and professions of loyalty.
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F riedrich Dürrenmatt followed in the wake of Brecht when he took the 
judge, who twists the law out of moral 
considerations, as the model for his em­
peror who parodies power out of similar 
motives. Romulus the Great portrays the 
disillusionment of the moral philosopher. 
Romulus, the last Western Emperor, 
thinks that if the empire is collapsing 
anyway, burying morals, learning and the 
arts under it, one should precipitate rather 
than block the process, and save one’s 
subjects from one’s own degraded power. 
Since Dürrenmatt is a follower of not 
only Brecht but G.B. Shaw as well, he 
treats dogmatism with the chatty irony 
typical of sceptics. A strange paradox of 
this absolutely non-historical play is that 
history confirmed the playwright after his 
death, even if not in the way originally 
envisaged. The Great Powers of the 1950s, 
which Dürrenmatt imagined in the place 
of the Roman Empire and the Germans, 
are no longer what they were at the time; 
indeed, the one which has ceased to exist 
is not the one whose decline his play 
diagnoses. In the successor states to the 
former communist superpower, it is im­
possible to read Dürrenmatt’s play in any 
other way than as a pamphlet on the final 
dissolution of the system based on the 
“scientific ideology”. Romulus the Great 
reminds one of the Great System- 
Disintegrator, who hastened the process, 
to the amazement of the stupefied world— 
though perhaps not with the same delib­
eration as his predecessor in the play had 
done.
Géza Tordy’s staging in the Pesti 
Színház, emphasizes scenes other than 
those highlighted in the revival a year 
and a half ago at Kaposvár. There is 
nothing unusual now in the exchequer 
being empty and in the burning of docu­
ments that would compromise the sys­
tem. Today the sober, disillusioned 
voice—that of Romulus—”Do learn to 
live without fear”—sounds the stronger. 
The stress is now shifted from the “sav­
iours of the country”, who urge Romulus 
to take a patriotic stance, to Romulus’ 
everyday morals. The poultry-breeding 
emperor, renouncing both empire and 
power, is morally superior to the 
speechifiers responsible for the debacle. 
The question is only what will happen 
after the downfall. Odoacer, the enemy 
thought to be a murderous barbarian, turns 
out to be a stoical sage, similar to 
Romulus, who for the time being still 
keeps the real barbarians well in hand, 
though they stand threateningly behind 
him. The change of regime can take place 
peacefully, the closing scene suggests. 
But what happens if barbarism breaks 
loose? The production offers no answer 
to this.
W ay back in 1986, Milan Uhde, cur­rently the President of the Czech 
Republic, but then an opposition writer, 
wrote a play on Marx and Engels, the pair 
who share responsibility for the 20th 
century ideology of “welfare for the peo­
ple.” That strange couple feature incognito 
in the comedy, with distorted Christian 
names. The play expands Shaw’s malice 
towards the grotesque. In the intention of 
the playwright. Glad Tidings is not a po­
litical treatise: “It is about a whooping 
lie, a father who has proved a failure, a 
husband who has proved a failure, a lover 
who has proved a failure. I would like it 
to be viewed like this instead of seeking 
all kinds of complicated symbols and al­
legories in it... If I had wanted to argue 
with the philosophy of Marx, I would 
have written an essay, not a play.”
The plot concerns a comedy of adultery, 
in the course of which both the loving 
wife and the maid serving as the mistress 
die, and then rise as ghosts to render un­
necessary the dispensing of justice, which, 
after the utopian victory of the revolution, 
is nationalized anyway. All this, of course, 
would be of little interest if one were not 
to know who the characters were. Never­
theless, they are not given an over cruel
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treatment by the playwright or by János 
Dömölky, the director. Rather they laugh 
at them, as at the characters in a Feydeau 
farce who fail to find their own identity. 
The stage of the Chamber (the studio of 
the noted Katona József Theatre) is visited 
by ghosts—both living and dead—levi­
tating in the same white wrappers or suits, 
a couple of centimetres above ground.
Four days before the first Flungarian per­
formance of the play, the statues of Marx 
and Engels were removed from in front 
of the former Communist Party head­
quarters and carried to a sculpture park 
established for the statuary of the old re­
gime. That is one way of dealing with the 
ghosts of the ideology. Theatre has to do 
it, and has done so, in a different way.
170 The New Hungarian Quarterly
Gergely Bikácsy
Video Eye and Video Weapon
Róbert Pajer: D e v i l  T a k e  I t ; Árpád Sopsits: V id e o  B lues', Ferenc 
Grunwalsky: G o ld b e r g  V a r ia tio n s
The Hungarian cinema is on the threshold of a new era. This is now 
more than a conclusion drawn from eco­
nomic and political developments; the 
proof is in the new films and the young 
debutant directors and is borne out by the 
Budapest Film Festival of this spring. All 
the same, apart from Ildikó Enyedi’s 
charming My 20th Century, which at­
tracted wide attention three years ago, 
first or second films still excel only in 
their intentions.
Although the big achievements are still 
to come, these hesitant but gifted works 
do mark the change that has taken place, 
with certain paths now permanently 
abandoned and new paths being opened 
up. This is borne out by Zoltán Kamondi’s 
Paths of Death and Angels, which had a 
favourable response despite all its faults 
and mannerisms, and Tibor Klöpfler’s The 
Man Without Abode, an interesting piece 
that examines the film form and is obvi­
ously meant for a minority audience. What 
is common in these films is an admixture 
(sometimes in an uncertain and hesitant 
way) of “photographic reality” and the 
play of fancy, one that pushes off from 
reality. The two are not incompatible: new 
Hungarian films inspired by the post­
modern, combine a strong desire to cre­
ate reality with the fancy of taking off 
from it.
Gergely Bikácsy, a film critic and writer 
of fiction, is NHQ’s regular film re­
viewer.
A ticket to Róbert Pajer’s first film. Devil Take It, involves the cinema 
goer in an entertaining nonsense. The zany 
film is now generally accepted. In the 
best of them, a realistic opening leads 
into a topsy-turvy, surrealistic world, all 
logic left behind, in which anything can 
happen, and the apparent (or real) jumble 
of somersaulting nightmares is held to­
gether by the quality of the comedy. It 
must be said that Devil Take It is some­
what uneven in its humour.
We need not bother to waste time with 
the story-line, nor did its makers do so. 
Here, as opposed to the usual zany films, 
it is the starting point itself that is fantastic: 
the Devil arrives in Budapest in the shape 
of a hyper-rich elderly lady. Her driver is 
her no less diabolic familiar. Their inten­
tion is to steal the elixir of life, which 
does away with death, and to kill its in­
ventor. For reasons beyond my ken this 
involves a great deal of trouble. First the 
Devil pitifully bargains with the inven­
tor, who simply sends her packing. Later 
they entrust a slow-witted, though not 
feeble-minded, plumber with the job. He 
plays hard to get right up to the very end 
of the film. He has two completely insane 
criminal friends, who after many a comic 
turn, finally succeed. But since they are 
working on their own account, the Devil 
comes to grief—by the end of the film 
she is waiting for better days in a dog- 
pound, in the shape of a cat.
The arrival of the Devil into our dull 
life is an ancient device, used alike in 
master-pieces and broadsheets sold at the
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fair. With an acceptable enough inten­
tion, Pajer appears to be trying to conjure 
up the atmosphere of broadsheets. He does 
so ironically, cocking a snook in many 
directions, sometimes even portraying our 
real daily life as a contrast between our 
lives, whether crime-free or replete with 
petty crime, and the supreme Evil. He, 
just like any well-read member of his 
audience, must have had Bulgakov’s The 
Master and Margarita in mind. Whether 
or not this was intentional, I felt that this 
parallel continued in my mind. This film, 
with its generally witty, though carelessly 
patched up buffooneries, illuminates fairly 
ingeniously the great nothingness of our 
life. The real, the eternal arch Fiend 
(Bulgakov’s for instance) would arrive 
here, in the Budapest of 1992, all in vain. 
Satan needs an adversary, he desires a 
successful struggle, people worthy of be­
ing vanquished, he desires a world which 
may have already been abandoned by, 
but still remembers, God. He would be 
utterly bored in nothingness; a worthless, 
drained environment is more wretched 
than mediocrity. He would leave in a hurry 
for places languishing under dreadful 
dictatorships, to conquer the great talents 
suffering under the yoke, to wrestle with 
souls ravaged by tremendous passions.
That is what the real devil would do, 
but the devil in this film is so clumsy, so 
uncertain, so flighty, that she is probably 
only a sub-devil, a junior member, a sub­
imp. Accordingly the region of nothing­
ness suits her, the uncertain drabness of 
Hungary today. She is a worthy compan­
ion for the two clumsy burglars, the police 
officer, even more imbecilic than the 
burglars but more high-handed, and the 
mock hero, the half petty bourgeois, half 
criminal, dominated by his commonplace 
wife. In order to make the reluctant 
plumber get down to work, the visitor 
from Hell occasionally tempts him in the 
form of a beautiful young woman. It seems 
only natural that even this should prove a 
failure: the man does not dare to whip the
she-beast who yearns for this. The stasis 
of the static everyday in Hungary is 
stronger than Satan.
If the makers of the film will once 
overcome their inferiority complex, 
which they still conceal behind a power­
ful self-confidence (“where are we still 
from Satan!”), and will believe that with 
more demanding humour, a stronger 
story-line and more daring fancy, Lucifer 
and Beelzebub can in fact be conjured up, 
then they, these monsters with their hor­
rible humour, will surface on the Hun­
garian screen, ennobling our drab worka­
day world.
Two years ago, Árpád Sopsits came up with a real maiden film, traditional 
in the usual sense of the term; based on 
the documentative view of the 1960s and 
‘70s, it blended crude reality with gentle 
lyricism, the interest of news items with 
an exquisite depiction of the environment. 
Shooting Gallery was a film by a young 
man; it treated the form cautiously, al­
most traditionally, without too much ex­
periment. It was a realistic film and 
steeped in the exacting traditions of minor 
realism, with amateur actors and authen­
tic background, a story scarcely deviating 
from a daily news item and a lyrical ten­
sion.
Although Sopsits scored considerable 
success with his first film at various in­
ternational festivals, he later said that he 
did not intend to continue with “image 
preservation”, but intended iconoclasti- 
cally to break the image and discard the 
schemata of traditional feature films.
His second film is indeed a surprise, 
all the more to be appreciated for his 
courage to change styles, even though the 
outcome is only partially successful. The 
storyline of Video Blues could be called 
post-modem, and not just because the 
script is by László Garaczi, an interesting 
figure in post-modern Hungarian writing. 
The story is both pretentiously trashy (a 
story of murderous jealousy and revenge
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involving two brothers) and the chronicle 
of Nothingness—an anti-story, the tragedy 
of unimportant people, suggesting a 
parody—all in one.
Two brothers are in love with the same 
girl. One marries her and the other, dis­
appointed, escapes to Paris. The brother 
vegetating in Paris is filled with a thirst 
for revenge. This he wreaks in a contrived, 
tortuous manner by provoking his brother 
to commit murder by luring him to Paris 
and having himself be murdered by him. 
This bizarre story—despite all its post­
modern features and its refusal to draw 
on the narrative conventions of the cin­
ema—still has the effect of traditional 
kitsch: it is strident and mediocre all at 
once, no more than trash dressed up in 
modernism.
More important, and also more valu­
able, is the formal idiom of the film. 
Sopsits has not added novelty to the nar­
ration of the story through the unfolding 
of the plot. Despite self-ironical turns, he 
could not, or did not want to, boldly 
shoulder the bloody frivolity and trashi­
ness of the story. Rather than rely on the 
written script, he entrusts the formal idiom 
with all the burdens. However astounding 
the story, the value of Video Blues lies 
solely in its cinematographic solutions.
Virtually from its first to last shots, the 
film is the recollection of a correspond­
ence that has taken place via video tapes. 
Sopsits uses the novelistic, sometimes 
outright sensational story simply as a 
pretext for experimenting with image. 
(But meanwhile, let me repeat, he tries— 
erroneously—to keep the story as some­
thing that should be taken seriously.) His 
film suggests, with a far from negligible 
inventiveness and pictorial power, that 
reality, truth and the past cannot be re­
constructed, not even by the seeming ob­
jectivity of video recordings. The brother 
in Paris doctors old recordings, cutting 
and changing them, in order to prove that 
his brother’s wife, who considers her 
marriage a happy one, has always loved
him and indeed, has even deceived her 
husband with him. The brother in Hungary 
tries to deny the images of his brother 
with images. It is a duel between motion 
pictures in the jungle of video tapes (a 
post-modern metaphor in itself). The pli­
ant past, false or falsified, and restored to 
life, becomes more and more uncertain 
and confused: the duelists are swallowed 
up by a past turned into imagery.
The film culminates in a final grand 
scene, which is the climax both to the 
stridently melodramatic revenge story and 
to the experiments carried out with the 
video tape as a formal idiom. The brother 
in Paris dies; even after his death he has 
the last word, and the last picture as well. 
He delivers an epilogue to the video duel 
beside his bullet-pierced corpse. He has 
become immortal.
I have discussed the high standard of 
the formal idiom, but it is also the question 
of something more, as it becomes clear 
from the last sequence of the film. Before 
the strange “self-reckoning”, the brother 
from Hungary goes to buy a weapon—a 
fine one. He keeps on making his choice 
for a long time in the Paris gunsmiths, 
even though he has no chance whatever 
confronting an adversary armed with a 
video camera.
I do not know how well Sopsits is 
acquainted with Paul Virilio’s War and the 
Cinema, or his theories on the image. 
“The origin of cinematography is the rifle, 
and that of the film the repeating rifle... 
In the war of the images all kinds of 
perception are more important than any 
kind of ammunition. If I see what the 
enemy is about and he does not know that 
I can see him, I am the stronger. So im­
ages turn into a weapon”, the French 
theoretician of image and light writes. He 
would certainly welcome Sopsits’s film, 
whose consistency of formal idiom proves 
his theory right. The last sequences are 
particularly striking.
It is therefore the camera that is victo­
rious: the video eye, seeing everything
Theatre & Film 173
and transforming even the past, is mightier 
than a firearm. A pity, then, that the bra­
zen yet slight story, with its platitudes 
taken seriously, does not prove a worthy 
combatant.
Goldberg Variations is the title of the sixth 
feature film by Ferenc Grunwalsky. It 
refers to the music by Bach which ac­
companies a film of gloomy mood and 
tragic tension.
Goldberg Variations appears to be the 
closing piece of a trilogy. The director’s 
two previous films (A Full Day and Little 
But Very Tough) received critics’ prizes 
in Hungary, and despite controversy, were 
generally succés d’estime. They are little 
known abroad, and their true significance 
even seems to have escaped full recogni­
tion in Hungary as well. Grunwalsky is 
both held in high regard, and forgotten by 
his peers, understanding audiences and 
critics alike.
All three fdms end with one or more 
murders. In none of them is it the crime 
itself which is important; it is, rather, the 
person forced to commit it or trying to 
make his escape through it. The director’s 
experiments with film idiom would de­
serve a separate discussion. (Incidentally, 
Grunwalsky shot his recent films himself, 
something that now rarely occurs any­
where.)
The first shots of Goldberg Variations, 
before the main title appears, show a huge 
eye that begins to fill the screen. His two 
earlier films opened with similar shots. 
The eye opening on the viewer in an em­
barrassing close-up becomes the principal 
motif in films that are based on close- 
ups. (Or one should rather say “super 
close-ups”, to be precise.)
In all three films the eyes begin to live 
a life of their own, appearing as singular 
living creatures. Long silences, great 
stillnesses, and faces, which can perhaps 
be seen in such close-ups only in night­
mares all hallmark Grunwalsky’s three 
films.
All three films end with a murder. The 
young taxi driver protagonist of A Full 
Day owes a fairly large sum to a colleague 
who is engaged in dubious financial af­
fairs. Since he is unable to pay by the 
given deadline, the creditor, as an under­
world warning, “borrows” and “uses” the 
wife of the protagonist. The driver kills 
his wife in jealousy. Little but Very Tough 
is the story of a man turning from a thief 
into a brutal, wanton murderer; at the end 
of the film, after evening the score with 
his accomplices, he falls into a river while 
escaping. His death resembles suicide.
Grunwalsky’s new film, Goldberg 
Variations, is obviously the inner por­
trayal of a kind of penance. The principal 
characters are an average married couple, 
whose teenage son unaccountably com­
mits suicide. The film tells the story of a 
single day after the funeral. At its end, 
the man asks his wife to kill him. It is 
certainly not the horror of this conclusion 
that gives the film its value; rather it is 
the minute portrayal of the parents’ help­
less contortion and agony. Some of the 
critics rightly recalled the atmosphere and 
style of Bresson’s “atonement films”.
Grunwalsky, who is sometimes criti­
cized for his extreme, bizarre solutions, 
is a maniac if not of crime, then of socio­
authenticity, with a devotion to reality. 
All three of these films start out with real 
events and offer extremely precise de­
scriptions of their settings. They offer 
sociology, and also something more: a 
blend of psychiatric interview in depth 
and socio-photography. The director has 
long been inspired by both of these. He 
leaves descriptive and documentary film 
sociology far behind, and at the same 
time feeds on it.
Grunwalsky shot the first film of his 
trilogy in video, and the other two in 16 
mm; they were copied and blown up later. 
His reasons were only partly financial 
and economic; he also wanted to work 
faster, with a low budget and a small 
crew. Grunwalsky deliberately uses video
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for his experiments with formal idiom, 
and 16 mm film is also more easy to 
handle. Once he used the metaphor of 
“advanced light-guard” at the opening of 
an exhibition of his colleague, the pho­
tographer Lenke Szilágyi. He, too, delves 
to the centre of light with the desperate 
and sacrilegious audacity of a “light 
guard”, or rather a light scout, as nuclear 
scientists delve again and again into the 
latest smallest particle of the atom.
Some of the critics have spoken of the 
mannerisms of this director-cum-cam- 
eraman. Certain formal solutions, em­
ployed perhaps much too often and dan­
gerously close to being obtrusive, are 
disturbing in these films. Not only the 
play with light and illumination—but it is 
also disturbing that he sometimes uses a 
needlessly slanted angle. Yet these real 
or supposed mannerisms do not decrease 
the value of these films. To my interpre­
tation, Grunwalsky’s wrestling with form 
is a sign of the battle faught by every real 
creator: he wants to discover film anew. 
His point of departure once the camera 
rolls must be that no film has existed 
before him, that every device is being 
used for the first time.
As mentioned, the films of the trilogy 
are dominated by human faces in close- 
up. Sometimes, and often unexpectedly, 
the protagonists, and with them the cam­
era, look, in jolting rhythm, into the infi­
nite. The protagonist in Goldberg Varia­
tions, about to bury his son, gazes at the 
passing clouds through a rain-swept 
windscreen for some time. The sun cuts 
in from behind the sharp edge of the 
clouds. No words, no human speech is 
needed: we are given everything by the 
silence and the music. In Grunwalsky, 
only the sky, the trees and the clouds can 
cope with the force of the human face in 
close-up. As in Bresson, one feels the 
ultimate absence of god in Grunwalsky 
too. It envelops one mutely under the 
overcast sky.
At the end of Goldberg Variations,
after the cremation, the father goes back 
into the crematorium. Fires glow in the 
incinerators. “Are you strong enough to 
watch?” he is asked. He wipes away his 
tears and sweat. He stands with strangely 
sloping shoulders, turning his back on the 
glowing incinerator. “Feed-in”, goes the 
ugly jargon of the trade. A sort of dread­
ful humour is here, too. The situation is 
anomalous and awkward: the father asks 
whether it is possible to place by mistake 
someone still alive in the incinerator. Then 
there comes a point when even the 
blackest humour must subside into si­
lence: the father turns to the incinerator 
and watches the “feed-in”. This is one of 
the purest moments in this and in all 
Grunwalsky’s films.
His formal idiom and his whole outlook 
make Grunwalsky appear to be a director 
who would have been in his true element 
at the time of the classic silent film, be­
tween 1915 and 1925. He is thus a late­
comer. Or, he might be before his time, 
making his greatest films in some 30 years 
time, sometime around 2025, in the age 
of new and still unsuspected techniques 
and possibilities of seizing light.
This of course is only a suggestion. 
Grunwalsky lives in the naively perfect 
and irretrievable past and the still 
unseeable future of the film; so, he can 
certainly not forget about the present, with 
its muddy, mediocre reality. “There is no 
such thing as an unobserved camera,” he 
sums up in an aphorism which would not 
be unworthy of Godard. Godard’s name 
and example cannot be omitted when 
speaking of Grunwalsky. In the course of 
his career he has slowly started to deny 
the primacy of the sociological approach, 
without becoming unfaithful to the al­
most naturalistic depiction of reality 
(which, however, he now only uses as a 
background).
This suggests a link to Bunuel. While 
respecting it, Bunuel rejected Italian neo­
realism. He felt the manner of portrayal 
offered by this school to be insufficient.
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Naturalistic reality must be presented as 
a determining background, but he held 
that the duty of the cinema is to penetrate 
behind the surface, to reveal human inte­
rior.
“Let us live in our own Time” is the 
title of a book by Lajos Kassák (1887- 
1967), the noteworthy Hungarian avant- 
garde poet, writer and painter. Kassák, 
who in the first half of the century exer­
cised an extraordinary influence on Hun­
garian literature was, paradoxically, the
most realistic of artists, yet at the same 
time the most single-minded form­
breaking of artists. Without wanting to 
compare their weight and significance 
(nor was this my intention when men­
tioning Bunuel and Godard either), the 
same can be said of Grunwalsky too. “Let 
us live in our own time”: Few directors in 
today’s Hungarian cinema proclaim this 
so consistently, and few of them place an 
extraordinary technical and formal at­
tainment in the service of this imperative.
“M i, a  M A G Y A R  S Z E M L E  s z e r k e s z tő b iz o t t s á g a  é s  s z e r k e s z tő i ,  a  
te l je s  m a g y a r  s z e l le m i  é l e t e t  h ív ju k  m e g  a  f o l y ó i r a t  la p ja ir a .  
S ze re tn é n k , h a  ta lá lk o z n a  n á lu n k  m in d e n k i, a k i  é r té k e t  ő r iz  é s  
a lk o t, é l je n  it th o n , v a g y  h a tá r a in k o n  tú l, lé g y e n  v o l t  is m e r t ,  v a g y  
is m e r e tle n  a z  e lm ú lt é v t iz e d e k b e n .  K ö v e te lm é n y ü n k  c s a k  e n n y i:  a  
j ö v ő  f e l ő l  s z ó ln i ,  a  te l je s  é l e t  é s  a  te l je s  s z e l le m  f e l ő l  p i l la n ta n i  
je le n b e ,  m ú l tb a .”
(K o d o lá n yi G y u l a : A Z  Ú J  M A G Y A R  S Z E M L E )
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The Swiss Army knife is not a set of tools but 
an object for meditation, testifying that one 
must be ever-prepared, for this unravelling, 
un-predictable and absurd world may collapse 
on his head at any moment. For the time being 
l still have a job and a roof over my head, 
there is peace and I am suffering nothing, not 
even a toothache, but one tiny jolt and the 
whole thing will collapse: my place of work 
could go bust, a missile fired from who knows 
where could wipe my house away, leaving me 
under the open sky, and it may be that I myself 
will extract my upper left third incisor with the 
pliers in the Swiss Army knife, and put its 
chisel to use if I need to whittle myself a hut 
somewhere, since you have to go on living—-/ 
can't just fall on my sword because 1 don’t 
have a sword, just a Swiss Army knife, which is 
a little too short for the job.
From: The Swiss Army Knife, 
by István Váncsa, p. 128
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